WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XVI, Number 2 January 1964

Price $6.00 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

MORROE BERGER
CYRIL E. BLACK
ROBERT A. DAHL
HARRY ECKSTEIN
RICHARD A. FALK
WILLIAM T. R. FOX
MORTON A. KAPLAN
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
ARNO J. MAYER
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
EDWARD SHILS
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
HAROLD SPROUT

Editors: CYRIL E. BLACK, RICHARD A. FALK
Assistant Editor: JEAN MACLACHLAN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J. Rates: $6.00 per year; $10.00 for two years; foreign postage, 25 cents additional per year.

Back volumes: I-VII are available from the Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, N.Y., $20.00 per volume. VIII, Nos. 3 and 4, and IX continuing are available from WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J., at $6.00 per volume; single copies, $2.00.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *International Index to Periodicals*, and abstracts of its articles appear in *Historical Abstracts* and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone, and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers.

Copyright, 1964, by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. January 1964. Vol. XVI, No. 2. Second-Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XVI • JANUARY 1964 • No. 2

CONTENTS

Conventional Disarmament — *Evan Luard* — 189

The Functions of Political Orientations: A Typology — *Young C. Kim* — 205

Problems of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia — *Bernard K. Gordon* — 222

The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War — *Lynn H. Miller* — 254

Peking's Military Calculus — *Davis B. Bobrow* — 287

REVIEW ARTICLES

A New Study of Fascism — *Klaus Epstein* — 302

Disarmament as a Special Case in Military Strategy — *Arthur I. Waskow* — 322

Deterrence, Disarmament, and the Rocky Road Between — *Michael Brower* — 328

Rationalism and Liberalism — *Felix E. Oppenheim* — 341

The Contributors — ii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Evan Luard, formerly a member of the British Foreign Service, is now a Research Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford, where he works in the field of international relations. He is the author of *Peace and Opinion* (1962) and *Nationality and Wealth* (in press), both of which are studies of means of strengthening the existing procedures and structure of the United Nations.

Young C. Kim, Associate Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, is engaged in an empirical investigation of the correlates of political orientations in New York as part of a cross-national study encompassing the United States and Japan.

Bernard K. Gordon is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. On leave with the Institute for Defense Analyses during the past academic year, he made two trips to Southeast Asia and plans to return to the field late in 1964 under a Rockefeller Foundation grant. His publications include *New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power* (1960).

Lynn H. Miller is a graduate student in the Department of Politics at Princeton University.

Davis B. Bobrow, Assistant Professor of Politics and Research Associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, is working on an analysis of the Chinese Communist military in nation-building.

Klaus Epstein, Professor of History at Brown University, is the author of *Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy* (1959). His history of German conservatism from Möser to Metternich is nearing completion.

Arthur I. Waskow is Peace Research Institute Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. He has written *The Limits of Defense* (1962) and *The Worried Man's Guide to World Peace* (1963).

Michael Brower teaches American political economy as an Instructor in the School of Industrial Management at M.I.T. He is preparing a study of American atomic-military policy from 1939 to 1949 for a Ph.D. degree from Harvard University.

Felix E. Oppenheim, Professor of Government at the University of Massachusetts, is also serving during the current academic year as Visiting Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. The author of *Dimensions of Freedom* (1961), shortly to be published in Italian translation, he is now working on a book tentatively entitled *Theories of Politics: A Systematic Approach.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT

By EVAN LUARD

THE purpose of this article is, first, to analyze certain of the obstacles that have principally impeded progress on the subject of disarmament over the past fifteen years and more; secondly, to suggest that these difficulties may be less likely to frustrate the conclusion of limited agreements in the field of conventional weapons alone than of the more comprehensive type of agreement that has been chiefly discussed; thirdly, to try to demonstrate that, so long as comprehensive disarmament remains unattainable, progress in regard to conventional weapons is not only more easily to be achieved but more valuable than progress in other spheres; and, finally, to discuss some of the particular fields in which it might be possible to reach useful agreements within this sphere.

I

It is not practicable within the compass of this article to analyze in any detail the causes of the failure of the ceaseless efforts to reach agreement on disarmament that have taken place in the past. The first tentative efforts can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Rather more resolute attempts were made at the end of that century. Between the wars the subject was discussed at great length from 1921 to the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference in 1933. Since 1945, discussions have proceeded almost continuously. Yet during this time only two agreements of any consequence were reached: those on the limitation of naval armaments, arrived at by a few of the major powers between the wars; and the agreement on the demilitarization of the Antarctic of 1959.[1] Both these agreements were reached not in consequence of, but quite independently of, the regular attempts at negotiation on disarmament being carried on at the same time. The more general discussions on disarmament measures remained, on the contrary, completely barren.

But it is possible, without attempting a close examination, to suggest three principal reasons for the unfruitful results of all these attempts:

[1] Since this article was written, the agreement on a nuclear test-ban has been concluded and signed. This represents a similar type of agreement to those mentioned, and to those proposed later in this article, in that it is a measure of limited scope, in which the risks involved, and the advantages to be won, may be readily assessed and compared, and are not therefore too remote and problematic to be psychologically acceptable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1) the difficulty of finding any agreed concept of equilibrium; (2) the problem of instituting any instrument of control that is at once politically acceptable and adequately secure; (3) perhaps most important, the steadfast insistence of all parties, at least during recent years, that the entire procedure must be predetermined from start to finish, and that, therefore, the principal object of their endeavors must be the conclusion, at a single step, of "general and complete" disarmament, with a consequent refusal to consider any more gradual approach towards the object in view.

The first of these difficulties could be clearly discerned in the interwar disarmament negotiations. Each party then appeared convinced that disarmament was most essential for those weapons to which it was itself most vulnerable, and least necessary for those which it most needed. Thus Britain wanted the prohibition of submarines and bombers, which threatened her island defenses; but the retention of large numbers of cruisers and destroyers, which preserved them. France was willing to have a restriction on total armed forces, which might limit large regular armies; but was determined that this should not include conscript reserves, which represented an essential part of her own system. There were differences over national ratios. Italy was insistent that she should be accorded naval equality with France; France was adamant that she should not. France was determined to prevent large-scale rearmament by Germany; Germany resolved that she should not. National security was assessed subjectively. And thus the demands of each were mutually conflicting.

The incompatibility of subjective assessments of national security was demonstrated again after the Second World War. This has been reflected, for example, in the perpetually shifting emphasis in the plans of both sides on the relative importance of nuclear and conventional weapons, according to the advantage each possessed in either field at any particular moment. Thus, while at the end of the war the Soviet Union wished for the banning of the bomb and the destruction of all nuclear stocks, the United States favored a plan which, however sincerely intended, would have left it with an effective monopoly of advanced nuclear technology. It has been shown in the differences over the phasing of the different measures of disarmament. Thus, though for long the Soviet Union wished for nuclear disarmament to precede conventional, once she had obtained nuclear weapons she was ready to postpone the banning of such weapons to a later stage; while at this point the United States began to attach priority to the "cut-off" of production that might have prevented the Soviet Union from obtaining a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stock of nuclear weapons comparable to that which she possessed herself. It has been seen in the recent preoccupation of the United States with the control of outer space, where she fears Soviet capacities; and of the Soviet Union with foreign bases, where the United States is better equipped. Or in the American anxiety, through "open skies," U2's, or thoroughgoing inspection, to obtain security against the Russian intelligence advantages. And in the determination of the Soviet Union to prevent any comprehensive verification system that might threaten her present immunity in this field.

In almost every case the side, or the power, that is temporarily lagging in any particular field of technology will demand the right to catch up here, while it may be happy to accept controls (and hence stabilization) in the field where it is ahead. Every party concerned may have been sincere in their wish to achieve a satisfactory disarmament agreement; but they have been ready to do this only on condition that it presented no threat to their own security, judged according to their own assessment. But it is rare that subjective assessments of the conditions regarded as essential to security will appear to present no threat to the security of others. They will not therefore add up to a grand total, which all powers will accept as representing "international security." One of the greatest difficulties lies in the fact that any agreement will bring about the permanent establishment of a certain balance of armaments; so that each party is forthwith deprived of the opportunity of redressing the balance in any way that may seem desirable. It is for this reason that the most fundamental of all the difficulties occurs when the attempt is made to decide what relative level of each particular arm—tanks, bombers, aircraft carriers, and so on—each power will be allowed to retain at every stage of the agreement. It was this difficulty which proved most troublesome to overcome in the interwar disarmament negotiations. In the postwar discussions the question has scarcely even begun to be faced: and, until it is, the most important and intractable of the difficulties will not have been approached. There is thus no need to attribute failure in the talks to aggressive intentions on either side. The subjective assessment of security needs may alone be sufficient to achieve this.

The second problem that has prevented progress in these discussions has been that of achieving a secure but acceptable instrument of control for whatever agreement is arrived at. This difficulty has had two aspects. The first concerns the *degree* of control to be attained. Certain countries have at all times tended to resist the imposition of controls which other parties regarded as essential to provide adequate security. They have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opposed this on the grounds of infringement of sovereignty, or of alleged "spying" by the control organization. In the interwar discussions the French were insistent on the need for a strong control organization to provide security against the rearmament of Germany; the Germans, on the other hand, whose level of forces was still limited, opposed it, claiming that there was no assurance that "controls" would be followed by "disarmament." Since the war the Soviet Union has used similar arguments in raising similar objections.

But the other difficulty surrounding the question of control is more fundamental. This concerns the means of exercising authority over whatever control machinery is finally established. Each side has recognized that, with the conclusion of an effective disarmament agreement, the control organization will assume a position of crucial power. In the long run, if it is to be able to deal effectively with breaches of the agreement, it must possess physical force superior to that available to individual nations. Even in the short run, it may be possessed of vitally important authority and facilities. Thus the composition, nationality, installations, and competence of such a body are of supreme importance. The difficulties on these points encountered during the 1960-1961 negotiations on the suspension of tests (which were never finally overcome) give some indication of the seriousness of the problem.

It is not certain, however, that either of these difficulties need alone have proved an insuperable barrier to reaching some worthwhile disarmament agreement. But the third of the obstacles that has frustrated success in reaching agreement has been even more inhibiting. This has been the steadfast determination of all parties during recent years that the principal object of their activities must be the attainment, within the compass of a single treaty, of "general and complete disarmament," an agreement that would provide, within a few years, for the total disarmament of all the principal powers; an agreement that would lay down in advance a precise series of stages, each providing for an exact equilibrium, not only between nuclear and conventional weapons, but between each individual type of weapon and force; that would achieve equilibrium at each stage, not only between the major military blocs but between lesser powers and groups as well; above all, that would provide not merely a balance, but a balance that all would accept as a just one. The aim has been to achieve all this within the ambit of a single document, every one of whose terms must be agreed, down to the last details of the final stage, before the process could even be begun.

To hope that this could be attained is to expect governments to step

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out into the unknown, virtually blindfolded, not one pace at a time, which conceivably they might risk, but at a headlong run; and towards a final goal which it is impossible to visualize with certainty. It is almost inconceivable that any government today could ever, in the present state of international relations, undertake at a single stroke of the pen a commitment so complex, so delicately balanced, and so hazardous. Once again, the failure to reach agreement at Geneva on even the basic principles governing the mechanics of a comprehensive agreement is symptomatic of the difficulties to be faced.

Thus while governments may be obliged to declare their determination to achieve "comprehensive" disarmament, many will remain doubtful whether any such agreement can be achieved in the near future. The course of disarmament negotiations over the last fifteen years is hardly an encouraging portent. The parties find it difficult enough to agree who is to take part and what the agenda shall be, let alone to get down to serious discussion of the immensely complex concrete details of an agreement. Any number of elaborate, but imaginary, timetables have been exchanged back and forth; but it has remained impossible so far to achieve agreement even on general principles, such as the verification of retained armaments—still less on the essential concrete details. The fact, already noted, that in the whole of the fifteen years of discussions since the war, the parties have not even begun to approach the central problem of any agreement, and the one that is the most difficult to solve—namely, the relative level of effectives at each stage of the agreement—is sufficient to show how remote the prospect of a treaty which attempts to achieve "general and comprehensive disarmament" at a step must remain. And even were the main antagonists to agree on the balances between each other, they may be increasingly reluctant to carry out reductions so long as similar balances have not been negotiated and accepted by other nations and blocs. Reciprocation from China will be required. China will then demand balance with India. India with Pakistan. And so on, *ad infinitum*. The total number of combinations and permutations, of individual antagonists and of the alliances to which they belong, is almost infinite.

But meanwhile the years slip by. And the hope of progress on more limited agreements, where there may be more prospects of success, continues to be frustrated. For here the sacrifices of sovereignty and the trials of confidence that must be made may be more easily assessed and accepted. So long as no attempt is made to negotiate agreements in such fields in isolation, the chances of success cannot even be tested.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

None of the three difficulties impeding progress towards a comprehensive agreement need necessarily prove insuperable in negotiations directed at more limited objectives. In particular, none need fatally prejudice the chances of reaching some agreement within the field of conventional disarmament alone.

Apprehensions concerning national security, inevitably aroused in their extreme form by negotiations aiming at the attainment of total disarmament, are unlikely to prove so formidable in the case of negotiations concentrated on conventional weapons alone. For the very reason that no concession in this sphere could deprive either side of the ultimate deterrent, or represent a final sacrifice of sovereignty or security, there may be a greater willingness to arrive at limited agreements which could nonetheless mark an important step forward. There are urgent and understandable fears surrounding any agreement concerning nuclear weapons. The difficulties of control, and especially the supreme difficulty of achieving security against the retention of stocks, are eliminated in any attempt to reach agreement on conventional arms alone. While the undetected retention of a score of hydrogen bombs could be crucial to the success of a nuclear disarmament agreement, the possible retention of even a hundred tanks could scarcely be vital in a conventional agreement. The problem of achieving a balance at every stage between disarmament in nuclear and in conventional weapons is automatically eliminated if efforts are concentrated on conventional arms alone. Equally important, the difficulties of inducing potential nuclear powers such as France and China to accept any more comprehensive treaty would be bypassed. In this sphere the differences between subjective and external assessments of security are far more marginal.

Similarly, when conventional disarmament is considered in isolation, the problem of control does not pose such formidable problems. The establishment of some type of inspection system in this field need not demand total surrender of sovereignty or security. The setting-up of control posts, the institution of air inspection and similar measures sufficient to retain some check on conventional capacity, need not, at least in the early stages, entail the type of close inspection of industrial and other installations, the questioning of citizens, or those other detailed measures of verification about which the Soviet Union appears to retain the most acute apprehensions, and which she is accustomed to denounce as "spying." Indeed, on some of the forms of control that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would be necessary in this field—aerial inspections, the establishment of control posts and maximum arms and manpower levels—a considerable measure of agreement existed at the 1958 Conference on Measures Against Surprise Attack, and even earlier. What is mainly required now is detailed negotiation on individual measures.

Finally, all the immense complications that arise when the institution of limited measures of this sort has to be negotiated in conjunction with the establishment of a vast system of comprehensive disarmament, covering all nations and all arms, including all the delicate problems of balance involved, are automatically done away with if, for the moment, some of the problems of conventional disarmament are dealt with in isolation. There is indeed a great deal to be said not only for dealing with conventional disarmament in isolation from nuclear, but for dealing, one at a time, with each of the particular measures of conventional disarmament which might be usefully introduced. So far the only significant measures of disarmament to be achieved have been reached by this method. The agreements on naval limitation arrived at between the wars were confined to one field and certain types of ship only. The agreement on the demilitarization of the Antarctic since the war was similarly restricted. The only other negotiations which have ever looked near success, those on the suspension of tests, were, equally, rigidly confined to a fairly limited objective. Discussions in these cases were begun with a strictly defined aim, where the self-interest of all was readily measurable. Further progress in disarmament negotiations, therefore, seems likely to be achieved only if these are entered into with limited and specific objectives in view.

It has been objected that an attempt to reach agreement on conventional limitations, while leaving nuclear forces untouched, would represent a reversion from current trends favoring a strengthening of conventional forces and encourage a reversal towards dependence on nuclear weapons. This is based on a misapprehension. The desire to strengthen Western conventional strength arises because it is believed that the Soviet Union possesses such a superiority in readily available conventional forces that in certain situations the West might be left with a choice between resort to nuclear weapons or surrender. It is precisely the lack of balance which is thought to present dangers. What is here suggested is a balanced and mutual reduction of conventional forces, so as to achieve a position of equilibrium in which danger, and perhaps defense expenditure, might be reduced.

In practice, Western conventional rearmament has been accompanied by similar moves on the part of the Soviet Union. There is no attempt to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formulate appropriate balances and controls. In an age when the arms race has once more reverted to the conventional sphere, there is something to be said for transferring disarmament endeavors also to this area. This is particularly desirable when, as has been seen, many of the difficulties which frustrate progress in nuclear, or comprehensive, disarmament are less likely to prove troublesome in the case of conventional arms alone.

III

Not only, however, does agreement on a measure of conventional disarmament appear more capable of attainment than any agreement involving nuclear weapons as well. In existing conditions—that is, so long as total disarmament cannot be achieved—agreement in this field would also appear to be more valuable. For it is in fact more relevant to the real dangers of the world in which we live.

It is perhaps inevitable that over the past fifteen years mankind has been mainly preoccupied with the perils of nuclear weapons. Because these represented the most powerful weapons yet known, it has naturally been concluded that they were also the most dangerous. For long none dared to hope that they might perhaps be too powerful to represent serviceable armaments.

In all ages men have been mainly apprehensive about the most terrible weapons of the last generation. Yet in practice the most terrible weapons of the previous generation have rarely been those most dangerous to the present. Even in the Middle Ages attempts to limit the use of the crossbow were soon frustrated by the invention of firearms. Between the wars, attempts to restrict the size of naval forces, even if permanently successful, could have been of little value in an age when seapower was being nullified by airpower. Sometimes, however, the most terrible weapons cannot be dangerous *because* they are terrible. Chemical and bacteriological warfare were prohibited in the interwar period because the experience of the First World War made them appear the most ominous. But in the case of the weapons that were to prove most dangerous in the war to follow—the jet bomber, the flame-throwing tank, the magnetic mine, the torpedo, the rocket, and the nuclear warhead—controls or abolition were not even considered.

At the end of World War II there was no doubt which weapon was the most terrible. Thus since 1945 disarmament negotiations have been concentrated above all else on nuclear weapons. In 1946, by its first resolution, the General Assembly unanimously determined to set up an Atomic Energy Commission to bring about the abolition of the use of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear energy for warlike purposes. The United States made a number of proposals for the international control of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union made its call to "ban the bomb." And the attempt to secure the abolition or control of nuclear weapons has occupied a large part of the energies of the negotiators of disarmament agreements for the last fifteen years.

Yet in fact the search for security in this field has always been a vain one. For it has for long been generally admitted that, while it might eventually be possible to devise some kind of foolproof system of control over the *production* of nuclear weapons, and perhaps over certain (though not all) of the means of delivery, there is no system conceivable that could give security against the *retention* of nuclear stocks if enough care was devoted to achieving this. Yet once it is admitted that there can be no effective means of controlling stocks, there is little to be gained by securing the prohibition or control of manufacture—which itself would be formidably difficult to bring about beyond possibility of evasion. Further additions to existing piles of nuclear weapons can only marginally affect the destructive capabilities of either side—no more than can marginal additions of poison gas or bacteriological weapons, the control of which is rarely discussed. And the aspirations of other powers to nuclear capability are more easily inhibited by control of tests than through control of production.

But even if such control were possible, it is open to question how far, so long as total disarmament cannot be achieved, it would then be desirable. It can scarcely be denied that, in the existing situation, nuclear weapons represent the most important deterrent force that exists. It is likely that their total and unmistakable elimination, by removing the factor which more than all else has prevented major wars during the past fifteen years, would make the outbreak of war of some sort very much more probable. For nuclear weapons, so long as they remain credible, have a uniquely deterrent effect not only against nuclear war but against full-scale conventional war as well. The fact that, despite the constant tensions and never-ending succession of crises that have occurred ever since the last war, there has been no outbreak of major war between East and West, even with conventional weapons alone, has no doubt been at least partly due to this fear. In the post-atomic era, both sides have settled for more limited efforts to secure their aims—in Korea, Indochina, and South Vietnam on one side, in Guatemala, Laos, and Cuba on the other.

Thus, even if a cast-iron control over nuclear weapons could be devised, this might well aggravate rather than decrease the effective perils

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the world faces today. By making full-scale war less suicidal, it would become once more, in certain situations, a conceivable act of policy. The first instinct at a time of crisis might become once more to reach for the guns, instead of, as now, to reach for an accommodation. And so long as control could never be complete, the dangers would be far worse: the deterrent is certainly more effective when mutual and acknowledged as at present, than if it were possible, or thought possible, for one power to claim a monopoly by evasion.

The dangers of such a war, though it might be designated "conventional," are not much less frightening than those of nuclear war. There is no more alarming misconception than the widespread belief that, while the terrors of nuclear war are such as to threaten the future of mankind, the dangers of conventional war could fairly easily be tolerated. "Conventional" war is habitually identified with war that is not too horrific: its associations are with the type of conflict that the world endured, and survived, twenty years ago, or with the limited conflicts of recent years. This assumption is a highly dangerous one. Even the Second World War, with the relatively primitive military technology then available, caused something like twenty million deaths and destruction on a scale never before imagined. Even then it was said that the continued use of V-2's against London for another six months would have made that city uninhabitable. Today, the types of missile, guidance mechanism, and explosive power readily available to both sides mean that, even in a war restricted to conventional weapons, the horrors of the last conflagration would appear trifling in comparison. Modern guided missiles, saturation bombing, rocket artillery, submarine rockets, napalm bombs—these and others could wreak damage, both on troops and on civilian populations, infinitely more devastating than in any previous conflicts. Finally, if some forms of chemical warfare were used, including nerve gases, as some today seriously recommend, a new form of escalation, little less alarming than that more widely feared, might be set in motion. It is impossible to know what further refinements contemporary technology may be devising. Still less what it may soon provide. The very word "conventional," in the accepted sense of non-nuclear, is thus a totally misleading one. Many non-nuclear weapons today are very far from conventional, and the removal of the factor which probably more than any other prevents the outbreak of "conventional" conflict might therefore open the way for a regression rather than an advance.

It is indeed partly for such reasons that many disarmament proposals today make provision for a so-called "residual deterrent." Considerable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discussion at Geneva recently has centered on the means of verifying such a force. But once the nature of such a deterrent is accepted, it makes very little difference how many missiles and warheads it incorporates. The destructive capacity of modern invulnerable missiles may itself set a limit to the numbers either side chooses to invest in, especially as the common advantage of *mutual* deterrent power, as opposed to counter-deterrent power, is more generally accepted. Certainly the difficulties of control make any other form of limitation unlikely. In such circumstances it may be better to accept existing nuclear capacities as forming already a "residual deterrent," rather than devote untold energies to the unrewarding task of devising means of verification of a force that, to perform its function, must remain unverifiable.

But the last, and most important, reason why conventional disarmament has become today of overriding importance is simply because conventional weapons are those which in fact are employed within the contemporary world. During the fifteen years since the Second World War there have been few moments when conventional war, of larger or smaller proportions, has not been in progress in one part of the world or another. The proxy wars favored in this generation are normally of this form. One of these, the Korean War, was a bitter and protracted struggle between the two world ideological blocs. Recent measures to strengthen the conventional forces of both East and West are a clear recognition of the renewed possibility of conventional conflict. Thus, even if conventional war on an all-out scale between the Communist and non-Communist worlds is at present not to be expected because of the effect of nuclear deterrence, there can be no safe assurance that, as the nuclear stalemate appears more secure, such a war will not become more probable. There is an increasing danger that any power which calculated itself to possess an overall superiority in conventional weapons (or even an immediate superiority in those readily available) might at a time of tension be tempted to make use of these to secure its aims, in the confident expectation that its adversaries would not dare to indulge in nuclear retaliation; an expectation that might in time of crisis prove misfounded. It is perhaps time these implications of nuclear stalemate, although for long widely recognized in private, began to be publicly acknowledged and allowed for at the disarmament table.

Conventional disarmament has therefore become of triple importance. By securing some kind of balance in conventional forces it could lessen the risk of that type of conflict now most likely to occur; and one which might yet, even against all intentions, nevertheless trigger off a nuclear

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cataclysm. By nullifying the existing Soviet preponderance in conventional forces, it could save the Western powers from being compelled to engage in a level of conventional disarmament that might prove economically highly burdensome. And by presenting a field in which a limited measure of international inspection, within a specified field, might perhaps prove acceptable, it could represent an important step forward on the path towards some more comprehensive disarmament system.

IV

Thus an agreement in the field of conventional disarmament may not only be more easily attainable than one that seeks to cover nuclear weapons as well; it may also be more relevant to modern needs.

It is not the purpose of this article to seek to describe in detail the type of agreement that it might be possible to arrive at. All that is attempted here is to indicate briefly the type of field in which there seems most hope of making progress. In particular, the proposals described here all represent measures on which some area of agreement between East and West has already been identified.

AIR INSPECTION

Most of the early Western disengagement proposals provided for some type of inspection from the air in the later stages. At the first Summit Conference at Geneva, President Eisenhower put forward his Open Skies plan for mutual air inspection of the whole of the United States and the USSR (though not apparently of their allies). On November 17, 1956, the Soviet Union put forward a plan providing for air photography over a distance of 800 km. on each side of the demarcation line dividing East and West. There were later a number of proposals on both sides for the opening of large areas, covering parts of the Arctic Circle, North America, Russia, and most of Europe, to inspection both on the ground and from the air. Later, and rather more realistic, plans were discussed at the Conference on Measures Against Surprise Attack in 1958.

This is therefore a measure to which both sides have given some support in the past. But because it has never been considered in isolation, no progress has so far been made. On the face of it, it would not appear too difficult to reach agreement on a measure of fairly limited compass such as this. If necessary the flights could be carried out by neutrals, or U.N. inspectors. Air reconnaissance within a limited area could

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not materially affect the security of either side: indeed, reconnaissance satellites are probably already providing some of the information that would be acquired. It could not impair ultimate military strength in a period of acute tension. But it could give useful reassurance about the disposition of conventional forces within the zone covered. It could give advance warning of the movement or concentration of troops, tanks, guns, or other arms in any area. Even if it merely induced a withdrawal of some armaments and establishments behind the inspected zone, this itself would provide a useful measure of limited disengagement. By reducing the element of secrecy, and so of uncertainty, it could promote some growth in mutual confidence. Above all, it could provide reassurance, communication, additional information to supplement that from intelligence agencies, in order to allay the kind of fears that arise in times of tension and so reduce the danger of pre-emptive attack.

CONTROL POSTS

The Soviet disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955, included provision for internationally manned control posts at key communication centers, such as ports, airfields, and rail and road junctions, to provide warning of concentrations of troops. The general concept of control posts was accepted in subsequent Western plans. The Soviet Union specifically reaffirmed her support of the establishment of control posts at railway junctions, big ports, and highways, irrespective of progress on other measures of disarmament, in her memorandum submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 1961.

This again would seem a fruitful field for progress. It is again one that has never been discussed except in the context of more comprehensive schemes, but it could be of considerable importance in reducing suspicion and paving the way for more substantial measures. The posts could in the initial stages be established in limited areas near to the dividing line between East and West. They could subsequently be extended farther back into the interior on either side. This is a form of control, involving little probing or interference, that would probably be more acceptable to the Soviet Union, even in comparatively backward areas, than some more comprehensive inspection system. The teams would have to be assured of all necessary facilities—for example, at airfields—to make supervision effective. And they should be partly composed of neutrals if possible, as was agreed for the teams to control bomb tests.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS

This is another field in which there is already some agreement between East and West, though it is not here suggested that it is one in which much progress is likely to be made immediately. Both sides have in the past accepted that ceilings for the armed forces to be retained by the major powers during the earlier stages of a disarmament agreement should be 2.5 million for the Soviet Union, United States, and China, and 750,000 for Britain and France as a first step; and that at a later stage the figures should be somewhere between 1.5 and 1.7 million, and 650,000, respectively. In recent discussions at Geneva, the United States proposed reductions to 2.1 million at the end of the first stage (at the end of three years) and 1.05 million at the end of the second stage (after six years), excluding civilians. The Soviet Union wants reductions to 1.7 million at the end of its first stage (21 months) and 1 million after three years. It has subsequently raised the first figure to 1.9 million. The most important differences here therefore relate to the phasing, which is bound up with all the complexities of a comprehensive agreement, rather than to the exact figures themselves, where the differences are relatively marginal. Over conventional weapons there has been more agreement. Here the Soviet Union has now accepted the American proposal of a 30 per cent reduction in three years and another 35 per cent in the next three years (though the crucial question of balances *between* arms has scarcely been touched).

The form of inspection which would be needed to ensure that manpower levels were being observed would have to be comprehensive and complex, of such a sort indeed as the Soviet Union is least inclined to accept. But limitation of major conventional weapons—for example, tanks, guns, and aircraft—in specified zones at least, should be less difficult.

The best way to make progress would probably be, once some experience had been gained in the control of conventional forces in a limited zone—for example, along frontiers or other sensitive areas—gradually to extend the regions in which levels were limited. Thus the Soviet Union's proposal in October 1961 to consider, in advance of comprehensive disarmament, mutual reductions of forces in East and West Europe might well be worth following up. If this were done, the zones would need to be defined in such a way as to avoid penalizing particular countries, great or small. Gradually, as a sufficient level of confidence was attained and satisfactory inspection methods

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

developed, the system might be extended to large parts of the territory of major powers. The important object is not, of course, to secure any particular level of armed forces, but to give some assurance that there exists a reasonable balance between those of either side.

DEMILITARIZED ZONE

This, once again, is a proposal that has received some measure of support on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The communiqué issued after the talks between Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Khrushchev early in 1959 declared that "further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection." It is true that other Western powers have been less enthusiastic; but recent events in Central Europe might make them more willing to consider some such plan today, if, for example, it could incidentally ensure the future of Berlin.

A scheme of this sort need not at first provide for any reduction of forces or armaments. An important step forward would be achieved by the fact of inspection alone. But in time it should be possible to introduce maximum force levels within the area. The areas covered should be of equal extent. But for obvious political reasons there should, and could, be no attempt to cover entire countries, such as West Germany. Experience could be gained of the techniques that would be necessary to control the level of manpower, tanks, guns, and other essential arms. There could be control of missiles and other large-scale means of delivery, even if a cast-iron assurance concerning nuclear warheads remained impossible.

Finally, the area covered in the agreement could be extended. Such a scheme could in fact become the pilot project for a very far-reaching measure of disarmament. Indeed, the whole approach to the problem of disarmament could be made by a progressive geographical extension, rather than a progressive reduction of overall totals. For the latter, however limited in scope, is impossible to introduce without a comprehensive system of control covering the entire territory of all the powers concerned. And the extension of zones by this method would seem likely to arouse less acute apprehensions—for example, from the Soviet Union—than if the zones were selected by a sampling procedure that was partly random in its effect, as has sometimes been suggested. A geographical approach not only would reduce the technical problems involved, but might serve, by leaving certain areas uncontrolled for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a period, to allay those fears and anxieties relating to national security which present the most stubborn obstacles to the achievement of a worthwhile disarmament agreement. A series of subjective assessments of national security need no longer inhibit every opportunity for progress.

V

There are thus a number of fields in which there would seem to be some room for progress. In some, important advances might be made by unilateral measures, accompanied, if possible, by self-imposed, neutral-administered inspections. There is, after all, room for unilateral action in instituting controls as well as in disarmament itself.

But progress seems likely to be achieved only if there is a realistic recognition of the very difficult problems of mutual confidence to be overcome; and in particular if the parties can be content, however frustrating to their natural impatience, to move by a single step at a time rather than by attempting to achieve everything at a single leap. For fifteen years delegations have been arguing about the complexities of elaborate schemes for comprehensive disarmament. Unless they are ready to revise their methods, they may well still be arguing fifteen years from now. By more modest efforts more progress may finally be possible. We may, by such means, develop experience in the use of inspection systems. Confidence that such measures need not represent an unacceptable sacrifice of national security and sovereignty may be built up. The important thing is surely to make a start.

Such a view may appear unambitious, even pusillanimous, to some. But the difference concerns effective means, not desirable ends. All experience in this field suggests that it is precisely such modest efforts that, taken together, begin to add up to something worth while. Eventually, by a gradual accumulation of just such limited schemes, it may be possible to attain something like the goal that all aim at. By grasping too greedily for the stars, we may finally find we have nothing in our hands at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

A Typology*

By YOUNG C. KIM

THIS article introduces a functional typology of political orientations. The term "political orientations" is used here to refer to politically relevant symbols, whether cognitive, evaluative, or affective. It is equivalent to any one or any combination of the value, belief, and expressive symbol components of Parsons' cultural system that have political relevance.[1] The typology is not concerned with the specification of the substance or components of political orientations. Rather, it represents an effort to identify their functional significance.

The actor is viewed as responding to or intending to enact roles that are derived from and mediated through the activated segment of his political orientations. Objects of orientations—or stimulus situations, to borrow a phrase from social psychology—are not regarded as exerting their influence directly on the dependent variable of a political act. The process of interpretation or definition provides a link between the object of orientation and the act. The enactment of roles on the part of the ego supplies cues or meanings to the alter, whose perception of the meanings is conditioned by its own political orientations. An act to fulfill a role expected of the activated political orientation constitutes a political act. In the cases where the meanings are stabilized between the ego and alter, the objects of orientation may be regarded as automatically and independently exerting their influence on the dependent variable.[2]

* I wish to thank Professors John C. Wahlke and Benjamin Walter for their helpful comments on the first draft of this article.

[1] Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 7-8, 21-22, 55, 66-67. For recent reformulations in Parsons' concept of a cultural system, see A. L. Kroeber and T. Parsons, "The Concepts of Culture and of Social System," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (October 1958), 582-83: T. Parsons, "A Rejoinder to Ogles and Levy," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (April 1959), 246-50: T. Parsons, "The Point of View of the Author," in Max Black, ed., *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons* (Englewood Cliffs 1961), 342-56; T. Parsons and others, eds., *Theories of Society* (New York 1961), II, 979-80.

The term "political orientations" corresponds roughly to the technical meaning given the term "political culture" by Almond and Beer. In this connection, see Young C. Kim, "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics," to appear in the May 1964 issue of *Journal of Politics*.

[2] Herbert Blumer, "Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable,'" *American Sociological Review*, XXI (December 1956), 683-90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An observed political act cannot be explained in terms of activated political orientations alone. The objective consequences of an act are nevertheless real, and the incongruity between the intended and the observed result must be explained in terms of non-orientation variables. A fundamental assumption is that orientations are not merely epiphenomena, but are functionally related to overt behavior. When orientations are classified in terms of functions, no suggestion is made that the orientations are sufficient explanations of observed political behavior.

No attempt will be made here to specify the nature of and the interrelationships among value, belief, and expressive components of political orientations. The components are inexorably intertwined, exerting cumulative and simultaneous impacts on a political act. Each component may be predominant at a certain period or point of, say, a decision-making process and the identification of various phases may indeed be possible.[3] The result of such an effort, however, might not be very illuminating, for a product (decision) cannot be adequately accounted for unless all three of the components are taken into account. For the purpose of this article, it is assumed that the enactment of a political act or role is accompanied by *all* three components.

This is not to deny a need for the specification of the substance of political orientations and particularly a need for the allocation of weight to the three components. In so doing, we should eventually be able to ascertain the difference in impact on a political act of political orientations with different combinations of weight. If the weight is understood to mean the intensity assigned to a given component by the actor, and if we let subscripts $_{1,\ 2,}$ and $_3$ represent an increasing degree of intensity, a set of political orientations with, say, the combination of value$_3$ + belief$_3$ + expressive symbol$_2$ can be expected to differ in its impact on a political act from another set with value$_1$ + belief$_1$ + expressive symbol$_1$. The proposed typology, however, is meant merely to identify the various ways in which political orientations may conceivably affect political behavior, without regard to the particular pattern of components with different combinations of weight that may have been involved in the performance of that act.

Three dimensions are considered: (1) the object of orientations; (2) deliberateness, i.e., the subjective intentions of the symbol users; and (3) direction, i.e., the positive or negative nature of the function that the orientations serve. The threefold division of orientations formu-

[3] Robert F. Bales and Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Phases in Group Problem Solving," in Darwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics* (Evanston 1953), 386-400.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lated by Easton and Hess—government, regime, and community—is adopted to indicate objects of orientations or levels of relevance. As they use the terms, government orientations are concerned with "day-to-day authorities," "policy conflicts," or "struggles over control of public policy"; regime orientations with "basic form and norms of the system" or "fundamental arrangements"; and community orientations with "unity of a given political community."[4] Their specific terms of "government" and "regime" are retained, but "community" is replaced by "state" to avoid confusion with the well-established usage in sociology and anthropology.

An exposition of the typology will be followed by a discussion of its utility. The terms supplied in the course of the presentation represent merely a working vocabulary designed to facilitate the discourse, not an attempt at standardization. The property space-chart gives an overview of the typology. (See Table 1.)

A Typology

I. State Orientations: orientations of which the object is the state.[5]

A. MOBILIZATION[6]

When orientations are viewed as contributing toward the sense of common membership in a society or the cohesiveness of a political community, we speak of mobilization function and mobilization orientations. The positive nature of the direction dimension is indicated, but the dimension of deliberateness is not included in the concept. When the dimension of deliberateness is introduced, we have the following dichotomy of A_1 and A_2.

A_1—*Identification.*[7] When orientations are employed deliberately by the actor for a mobilization effect, we speak of identification orientations or orientations performing an identification function. Illustrations: (1) the idea of "Soviet patriotism" defined as devotion to the Soviet fatherland; (2) "Cuba si, Yanqui no!"

[4] David Easton and Robert Hess, "Youth and the Political System," in S. M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds., *Culture and Social Character* (New York 1961), 229-51.

[5] A collectivity as well as an individual may become the object of orientation.

[6] This is an adaptation of Deutsch's usage; cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

[7] The term is used in a narrower sense than Erickson's concept of identity, in that the dimension of deliberateness is injected here. See Lucian W. Pye, "Personal Identity and Political Ideology," in Dwaine Marvick, ed., *Political Decision-Makers* (New York 1961), 290-311. For the distinct usage of the term "identification" in psychoanalytical literature, see U. Bronfenbrenner, "Parsons' Theory of Identification," in Black, ed., 191-213. The usage is not unrelated to identification as used here, in that a state becomes a model or object of generalized cathectic attachment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Object of Orientations	Deliberateness	
	Non-Deliberate	Deliberate
	Direction	Direction
	Positive / Negative	Positive / Negative
I. State	Attachment A_2 / Alienation B_2 → (Mobilization) A	Identification A_1 / Desertion B_1 → (Demobilization) B
II. Regime	Ideology C_2 / Utopia D_2 → (Legitimation) C	Doctrine C_1 / Contra-Doctrine D_1 → (Illegitimation) D
	Deliberateness	
	Non-Deliberate	Deliberate
III. Government		
a. Scope	Directive E_1	Prescription F_1
	Permission E_2	Prohibition F_2
	Support E_3	Preservation F_3
	Resistance E_4	
b. Process	Perception-conditioning G_1	Perception-set H_1
	Goal-conditioning G_2	Goal-set H_2
	Means-conditioning G_3	Means-set H_3
c. Acceptance	Rationalization I_1	Manipulation J_1
	Ritualization I_2	Justification J_2

TABLE I

A_2—*Attachment.*[8] In the absence of subjective intention on the part of the symbol users, when orientations are serving a mobilization function we use the term "attachment orientations," or we speak of orientations performing an attachment function. Illustrations: (1) affective sentiment arising from "The Star-Spangled Banner" and the Lincoln Memorial; (2) the Queen of England as a political symbol.[9]

B. DEMOBILIZATION

When orientations are viewed as contributing to the disintegration of the sense of common membership in a society or the cohesiveness of

[8] Identification orientations become attachment orientations through the passage of time. At a particular time when an observer is considering the dimension of deliberateness, the distinction is useful.

[9] Edward Shils and Michael Young, "The Meaning of the Coronation," in S. M.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a political community, we speak of demobilization orientations or orientations performing a demobilization function. The negative direction is indicated, but the dimension of deliberateness is absent. Addition of the deliberateness dimension provides B_1 and B_2.

B_1—*Desertion.*[10] When they are used deliberately to give a demobilization effect, we speak of desertion orientations or orientations performing a desertion function. Illustrations: (1) orientations employed in the advocacy of Communist internationalism in non-Soviet countries; (2) Hitler's use of the "self-determination principle" with respect to the Sudetenland.

B_2—*Alienation.* In the absence of subjective intention on the part of the symbol users, when orientations are judged to perform a demobilization function we speak of alienation orientations. Illustration: affirmative acceptance of and belief in the desirability of international organization without any awareness of its ultimate implications for the entity of the state.

II. Regime Orientations: orientations that are relevant to the regime. The object of orientation is the regime. The focus is on the basic arrangements of power.

C. LEGITIMATION

Orientations contributing toward the legitimacy of the regime—the acceptance of the appropriateness of the basic arrangements of power—may be referred to as legitimation orientations or orientations functioning as legitimation. The positive direction is indicated. The inclusion of the dimension of deliberateness leads to C_1 and C_2.

C_1—*Doctrine.*[11] When orientations are employed deliberately with a view to legitimizing the basic arrangements of power, we speak of doctrine orientations or orientations functioning as doctrine. Illustration: the neo-Confucian system of thought as adopted by the Tokugawa regime.[12]

C_2—*Ideology.* In the absence of subjective intention on the part of the

---

Lipset and N. J. Smelser, eds., *Sociology: The Progress of a Decade* (New York 1961), 220-23.

[10] Brinton's reference is primarily to regime orientations rather than to state orientations. Moreover, the dimension of deliberateness is not entertained by Brinton; cf. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York 1952), 42-53.

[11] This is broader than Lasswell's "political doctrine," which is equated with Merriam's "credenda." "Doctrine" as used here embraces "miranda." It is transformed into ideology as the stability of a political system increases.

[12] Young C. Kim, "On Political Thought in Tokugawa Japan," *Journal of Politics*, XXIII (February 1961), 127-45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actors, if orientations are viewed as performing a legitimation function we speak of ideology orientations. Illustration: democracy in the United States.

D. ILLEGITIMATION[13]

In the case of orientations that are viewed as contributing to the overthrow of or as supplanting the existing basic arrangements of power, we speak of illegitimation orientations or orientations functioning as illegitimation. The negative direction is indicated. Addition of the deliberateness dimension leads to D_1 and D_2.

D_1—*Contra-doctrine.* When orientations are employed deliberately in order to give an illegitimation effect, we speak of contra-doctrine. Illustrations: (1) orientations used in the advocacy of the restoration of monarchy in a republic; (2) the notion of *Sonno-Joi* as utilized by anti-Shogunate forces.

D_2—*Utopia.* In the absence of subjective intention by the actors, when an observer ascribes to orientations the function of illegitimation we speak of Utopia orientations. Illustration: the formal subscription to "constitutionalism" in the Soviet Union can be said to have a Utopia function.[14]

III. GOVERNMENT ORIENTATIONS: Government orientations may be divided into three categories—scope, process, and acceptance orientations. The functions to be identified below are relevant and applicable to both classes of actors, the decision-makers and the publics[15] in their various combinations of relationships; (1) the publics vis-à-vis the decision-makers (pd); (2) one public vis-à-vis another public (pp); (3) one decisional unit vis-à-vis another decisional unit (dd); and (4) a decisional unit vis-à-vis a public (dp). The functions are considered operative in each of these four relationships with varying degrees of impact. For the sake of brevity, only one relationship will be specified with respect to each of the three categories of government orientations. The dimension of direction will be omitted.

[13] Franz Neumann's "alienation" and Robert Lane's "disidentification" are similar to "illegitimation," particularly "Utopia." Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology* (New York 1962), 161-64.

[14] Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government* (New York 1958), 510-18.

[15] In adopting the concept of multiple publics, Almond, Snyder, and Rosenau have been followed. A public refers to a particular aggregate of people relevant to a particular issue. Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York 1960), 136-57; James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961), 27-73; Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, *American Foreign Policy* (New York 1954), 525-40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III a. SCOPE ORIENTATIONS: orientations reflecting as well as affecting the scope of governmental or non-governmental activities of various role occupants.

E. NON-DELIBERATE SCOPE ORIENTATIONS

E_1—*Directive* (pd). Orientations indicative of the publics' conceptions of the proper domain of governmental activities; e.g., prevention of crime.

E_2—*Permission* (pd). Orientations indicative of the zone of indifference, i.e., the area in which the decision-makers can safely operate. Cohen's example of the climate of American opinion on the Japanese Peace Treaty and V. O. Key's example of the publics' attitude toward Hawaiian statehood can be cited here.[16]

E_3—*Support* (pd). Orientations that tend to support a continuation of the existing policies. Key's example of the attitude of the publics toward social security provides an illustration.

E_4—*Resistance* (pd). Orientations inhibiting decision-makers from enacting policies that would adversely affect such orientations; e.g., (1) orientations upholding the sanctity of private property in the United States and (2) orientations of the publics about the alleged desirability of free enterprise may both be said to inhibit any attempt at nationalization of industries.

F. DELIBERATE SCOPE ORIENTATIONS[17]

F_1—*Prescription* (pd). Orientations utilized in urging specific courses of action; e.g., (1) orientations invoked in the NAACP's fight for desegregation, and (2) orientations used in or reinforced by the clamor for action against Cuba.

F_2—*Prohibition* (pd). Orientations involved in articulated opposition to a specific policy; e.g., orientations utilized deliberately by the AMA

[16] V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York 1961), 27-40; Bernard C. Cohen, *Foreign Policy and Political Process* (Princeton 1957), 29-62.

[17] Orientations in this category represent articulated interests, expectations, and demands that are brought to bear by a public on its relations vis-à-vis the decision-makers. E and F together constitute the substance of Easton's "inputs." It will be noted that G and H are particularly relevant to Almond's analysis of institutional interest articulation, while F corresponds roughly to the substance of orientations characteristic of Almond's associational interest groups. "Non-associational" and "anomic" interest articulation are largely covered by E.

A sharp distinction between E and F is not always feasible. F_1, for example, may represent E_1 in an intense form. However, it is useful to distinguish between the two according to the dimension of deliberateness, for decision-makers will find it more difficult to formulate and execute policies that are incompatible with deeply internalized or articulated orientations. It does not appear to be useful to set up a counterpart to E_2 with a deliberate dimension.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in its fight against President Kennedy's medical care program for the aged.

F_3—*Preservation* (pd). Orientations deliberately utilized in arguing for the preservation of existing policies; e.g., orientations involved in the argument for the continuation of the present policy of non-recognition of the Communist Chinese government.[18]

The letters in parentheses (pd) used in the subcategories E and F indicate that the relationship concerned is that between the *p*ublic and the *d*ecision-makers. Likewise, one can speak of scope orientations with regard to other sets of relations: directive (pp), (dd), or (dp); permission (pp), (dd), or (dp); and so on. Prescription (pp), for example, refers to prescription orientations relevant to the relations between one *public* and another *public*; e.g., orientations used in the struggle between a business group and a labor group regarding a government tax policy. Prescription (dd) refers to orientations involved in the relations between one *d*ecisional unit vis-à-vis another *d*ecisional unit; e.g., orientations involved in a policy debate—say, over Cuba—between the President and certain Congressional leaders.

III b. Process Orientations: orientations affecting the process of decision-making, whether governmental or non-governmental. The following are the functions that might be operative in the process of decision-making that will affect the publics (dp).

G. NON-DELIBERATE PROCESS ORIENTATIONS

G_1—*Perception-conditioning* (dp). When the focus is on the subconscious effect of orientations on the perception of reality or the definition of a situation by the decision-makers. Illustrations: Lippmann's "pseudo-environment," Aspaturian's "prisms," and Boulding's "image."[19]

G_2—*Goal-conditioning* (dp). When orientations are viewed as subconsciously contributing to the decision-makers' preference for certain goals over others. Illustration: Dulles's image of the Soviet Union and his attitudes toward communism are said to have subconsciously affected his formulation of American foreign policy.[20]

G_3—*Means-conditioning* (dp). When orientations subconsciously contribute to the preference for certain means over others. Illustration:

[18] This is not to deny the existence of E_3 with regard to this issue.

[19] Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs 1962), 141-42: Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International System," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961), 391-98.

[20] O. R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (September 1962), 244-52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

orientations that tend to inhibit American decision-makers from intensive adoption of psychological warfare as a means of foreign policy.

H. DELIBERATE PROCESS ORIENTATIONS

H_1—*Perception-set* (dp).[21] Orientations serving as a conscious tool for object appraisal. Illustration: a determination by the United States that a certain act of the Soviet Union is a manifestation of the "Soviet design for world conquest" may result from a conscious application of American orientations regarding the Soviet Union. Unlike G_1, the actors consciously apply their orientations to the definition of the situation.[22]

H_2—*Goal-set* (dp). When orientations supply or constitute specific goals to be consciously striven for. Illustration: world communism is alleged to constitute such a goal for the Soviet decision-makers.[23] What distinguishes H_2 from G_2 is that the actors are aware of the orientations in question and consciously accept their impelling or constraining nature.

H_3—*Means-set* (dp). When orientations serve as conscious criteria in the selection of means. Illustration: belief in and fidelity to international law and morality on the part of American decision-makers are said to inhibit them from resorting to violence in the settlement of international disputes. Unlike G_3, the actors are aware of the orientations involved and consciously take them into account.

The functions specified under G and H are applicable also to other sets of relations. Thus one can speak of perception-conditioning (pp), (pd), or (dd); goal-conditioning (pp), (pd), or (dd); and so on.

III c. ACCEPTANCE ORIENTATIONS: orientations affecting the acceptability of decisions, governmental or non-governmental. The following are the functions applicable in the relations between the decision-makers and the publics (dp).

I. NON-DELIBERATE ACCEPTANCE ORIENTATIONS

I_1—*Rationalization* (dp). When orientations are subconsciously entertained and verbalized by a decision-maker, assuring himself of the

[21] This is somewhat equivalent to Katz's "knowledge function" and what Smith, Bruner, and White call "object-appraisal," though the deliberate dimension is emphasized here. Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV (Summer 1960), 163-204: M. Brewster Smith and others, *Opinions and Personality* (New York 1956), 41.

[22] Janis's comment on modes of resolving postdecisional conflicts is pertinent here. I. L. Janis, "Motivational Factors in the Resolution of Decisional Conflicts," in Marshall R. Jones, ed., *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (Lincoln 1959), 198-231.

[23] In this connection, see Raymond L. Gordon, "The Effect of Attitude Toward Russia on Logical Reasoning," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XXXVII (February 1953), 103-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

propriety of an act or decision that has been made. His own approval is obtained by his non-deliberate reception of consciously acceptable "explanations," thereby suppressing consciously unacceptable motives that really influenced the decision.[24] When verbalized in the presence of other persons, the orientations in question are capable of affecting the acceptability of the decision by those other persons even though the decision-maker had no intention of winning their approval. Illustration: a decision-maker who allowed an electoral strategy to influence his decision to undertake a military intervention abroad subconsciously verbalizes the importance of national security as an explanation for his action, thus facilitating approval by himself, and possibly by others as well.

I_2—*Ritualization* (dp). When verbalization of orientations is gratifying in itself to the symbol users.[25] Illustration: references to freedom, equality, and justice in connection with political festivities.[26] Such an act constitutes expressive, consummatory behavior, and the actor is not aware of its effect on the acceptability to others of any decisions or acts with which he himself is associated.

J. DELIBERATE ACCEPTANCE ORIENTATIONS

J_1—*Manipulation* (dp). When used deliberately to influence future actions of the publics or to prepare them for anticipated acts of the government. Whether the anticipated acts are eventually carried out is immaterial. Illustrations: those orientations that Eisenhower and Dulles used in emphasizing the importance of Indochina to the security of the free world in the months preceding the fall of Dienbienphu.

J_2—*Justification* (dp). When orientations are deliberately used to facilitate the approval by significant persons of acts already committed. Illustration: the official explanation given by decision-makers following the dispatch of U.S. Marines to Lebanon.

The functions of I and J categories are applicable to other sets of relations as well: pd, pp, and dd.[27]

[24] The psychoanalytic concept of rationalization emphasizes a reduction of the actor's consciously unacceptable motives by invoking consciously acceptable motives. J. Sarnoff, "Psychoanalytic Theory and Social Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV (Summer 1960), 251-79.

[25] Verbal behavior of high-L subject—in the terminology of Himmelstrand—belongs to this category. Ulf Himmelstrand, *Social Pressures, Attitudes and Democratic Processes* (Stockholm 1960), 49-70, 76-89, 263-302.

[26] This is consistent with the view of Malinowski and Homans that magic and religion function to reduce anxiety.

[27] A concept that links the three categories of government orientations relevant to four different sets of relations is that of role. A role is constituted of norms of behavior

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One may construct a matrix to identify each of the terms presented above. (See Table 2.) This will make us sensitive to the possibilities for further refinement.

The Utility of the Typology

(1) The typology provides a convenient check list for those who are concerned with the functions that values, beliefs, and expressive symbols may be expected to perform. By its use, such familiar and conventionally phrased problems as "the role of public opinion in American foreign policy-making" and "the role of Soviet ideology in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy" can be more systematically handled. Conventional answers to the latter problem reflect an overwhelming emphasis on the categories of deliberate process and acceptance orientations at the expense of non-deliberate ones. With regard to the first problem, the traditional answer ranges from an uncritical faith in the importance of non-deliberate scope orientations (pd) to a cynical belief in the predominance of deliberate process orientations (pd). More sophisticated views of recent years do not systematically consider the deliberateness dimension and its relevance. An awareness of the manipulation function and of the possibility of coincidence between F and H orientations still leaves open the nature of the relationship between F and G and its impact on the successful invocation of H orientations.

(2) The typology will serve as a classificatory device by which individual political systems or classes of political systems may usefully be compared. Any category or subcategory of political orientations may be considered as a continuum and a particular political system or class of political systems can be assigned a position on it. Moreover, political systems may be compared in terms of their positions in a series of continua (categories of political orientations). The French political system may be placed in a relatively higher position on the continuum of doctrine than that of Great Britain and the United States. One might say that democracy, if plotted on the continuum of G_1 (perception-conditioning), is closer to the low end of the continuum, whereas a

---

associated with a given position. The subcategories of government orientations specified above subsume the components of Professor Wahlke's role concept. His core-role sector would be equivalent to the normative aspect of scope orientations (dd), and his clientele-role sector to the normative aspect of scope orientations (dp), and so forth. John C. Wahlke and others, *The Legislative System* (New York 1962), 3-28.

The self-conception of a role entertained by the occupants—say, the decision-makers—may or may not be congruent with the norms and expectations that a public has of a position. A challenging question for political scientists is to identify the factors associated with the different modes of resolving such an incongruity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

X indicates the presence or incorporation of that dimension (column) in the conceptualization of each term (row). Other dimensions, such as intensity and stability, can be added as needed.

OBJECT OF ORIENTATION					DIRECTION		DELIBERATENESS		TERMS (Functions)
		Government							
State	*Regime*	Scope	Process	Acceptance	*Positive*	*Negative*	*Non-deliberate*	*Deliberate*	
x					x				Mobilization
x						x			Demobilization
	x				x				Legitimation
	x					x			Illegitimation
x					x		x		Attachment
x						x	x		Alienation
x					x			x	Identification
x						x		x	Desertion
	x				x		x		Ideology
	x					x	x		Utopia
	x				x			x	Doctrine
	x					x		x	Contra-doctrine
		x					x		Directive
		x					x		Permission
		x					x		Support
		x					x		Resistance
		x						x	Prescription
		x						x	Prohibition
		x						x	Preservation
			x				x		Perception-conditioning
			x				x		Goal-conditioning
			x				x		Means-conditioning
			x					x	Perception-set
			x					x	Goal-set
			x					x	Means-set
				x			x		Rationalization
				x			x		Ritualization
				x				x	Manipulation
				x				x	Justification

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

totalitarian regime stands closer to the high end. Similarly, on a J_1 (manipulation) continuum, a totalitarian system stands closer to the high end, while a democratic political system is presumably near the low end.

By determining the relative position of, say, totalitarian, Anglo-American, Continental European, and "developing" political systems in each of the subcategories, we will get a composite picture of the orientational characteristics of each class of political systems. Again to illustrate, what is known as the Anglo-American political system would be characterized by a high degree of C_2 in C category, while the totalitarian political system, particularly in its initial period, would contain a high degree of C_1. The Anglo-American political system in peacetime probably enjoys a lesser degree of A than the totalitarian political system. All political systems show a high degree of A_1 during a period of crisis. By assigning a relative position to each political system in regard to all the subcategories specified, we will obtain an "orientation profile." If we abandon for the moment all the traditional classification systems, each political system can be characterized by a configuration or cluster of orientation indices. A classification of political systems based on such orientation profiles will cut across the conventional ways of classifying political systems.

(3) The typology will enable us to identify more systematically the interrelationships between the various categories of orientations and the relationships between orientation and non-orientation categories. For the purpose of illustration, a number of hypotheses will be presented below. Orientation data will be considered either as dependent variables or as independent and intervening ones.

A. ORIENTATION DATA AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES

(a) *Hypothesis linking orientations and psychoanalytic categories.* A host of psychoanalytic concepts such as projection, displacement, repression, reaction, denial, identification, and rationalization (the last two terms used in a technical psychoanalytic sense) are relevant to a consideration of the motivational basis of orientations at various levels (state, regime, and government). It should be possible to specify the linkage between these psychoanalytic concepts and each of the orientation functions presented in the preceding pages.[28]

[28] Political scientists have long been aware of the relationships between attitudes and inner motivational dynamics; e.g., Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago 1930).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hypothesis 1. Perception-conditioning (dp) is related to denial. Denial refers to an ego-defensive function which "facilitates the perceptual obliteration of threatening external stimuli."[29]

(b) *Hypotheses linking orientations of different levels, and those linking orientation and non-orientation categories.*

Hypothesis 2. The frequency with which identification orientations are invoked varies directly with the extent of illegitimation (D), particularly contra-doctrine (D_1) that the decision-makers perceive to be a threat to their position in the existing power structure.

Hypothesis 3. The frequency with which identification orientations (A_1) are invoked varies directly with the degree of perceived adverse consequences on the national (public) interest as defined by the decision-makers.

3a. The ability to define "national interest" rationally is conditioned by: (1) the decision-makers' sense of security in the present position; (2) the absence of conflicting prohibitions (F_2); (3) the presence of complementary prescriptions (F_1); (4) the favorable nature of non-deliberate scope orientations, particularly the absence of resistance (E_4); and (5) the intensity of belief in the appropriateness of the proposed course of action.

Hypothesis 4. The diffusion of alienation orientations (B_1) varies inversely with the successful functioning of legitimation orientations (C).

4a. Alienation varies inversely with doctrine (C_1).

4b. Alienation varies inversely with ideology (C_2).

Hypothesis 5. Adherence to legitimation orientations (C), particularly to ideology, varies directly with increased social status as perceived by oneself.[30]

Hypothesis 6. The extent of Utopia (D_2) varies directly with the incongruity between desired and achieved aspirations in life.

Hypothesis 7. Adherence to legitimation orientations (C) varies directly with the degree of national satisfaction, as measured by the extent to which the public believes that scope orientations (pd) are being fulfilled.

[29] Sarnoff, 267-69. For example, orientations of certain Indian leaders regarding Communist China—namely, their refusal to perceive a stimulus that had threatening implications—may have been a function of denial. Festinger's theory of dissonance reduction is relevant here. Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Dissonance* (New York 1957); and Janis, 204-10.

[30] See Hadley Cantril's study of protest voters, *The Politics of Despair* (New York 1958), 28-76. The hypothesis seems consistent with findings of the studies of prejudice by Campbell, Bettelheim, Janowitz, and Shils.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hypothesis 8. The degree to which non-deliberate process functions (G) are operative depends on the nature of communication facilities, situational exigencies, articulated input, and the decision-maker's position on the L-scale.

8a. The degree to which the decision-makers are susceptible to the operations of perception-conditioning (G_1), goal-conditioning (G_2), and means-conditioning (G_3) varies inversely with the multiplicity of channels of communication open to the decision-makers, provided that the channels are not monopolized by a homogeneous group.

8b. The degree to which the decision-makers are susceptible to G_1, G_2, and G_3 varies directly with the degree of lack of structure of the situational properties occasioning the decision.

8c. The extent to which G_1, G_2, and G_3 functions are operative varies inversely with the clarity of the patterns of priority among the perceived deliberate scope orientations on a given issue.

8d. The degree to which G_1, G_2, and G_3 functions are operative varies directly with the degree of conflict believed to be present between prescription (F_1) and prohibition (F_2).

8e. The degree to which the decision-makers are susceptible to G_1, G_2, and G_3 varies directly with the urgency (pressure of time) with which a decision has to be made.

8f. The degree to which the decision-makers are susceptible to the operations of G_1, G_2, and G_3 varies inversely with the degree of the ritualization function (I_2) that the orientations in question are performing for the decision-makers.

B. ORIENTATION DATA AS INDEPENDENT OR INTERVENING VARIABLES

Hypothesis 9. Political participation varies directly with the sense of efficacy,[31] the latter in turn varying directly with the degree of national satisfaction.[32]

Hypothesis 10. The immunity of a political system to the application of extra-constitutional means of change in the basic arrangements of power varies directly with the degree to which legitimation orientations are effectively diffused among politically relevant actors.

[31] In addition to the voting studies of the Survey Research Center, see Milbrath's sociality-dominance-esteem syndrome and its correlation with political participation. L. Milbrath and W. Klein, "Personality Correlates of Political Participation," *Acta Sociologica*, VI (1962), 53-66. See also a preliminary report of a study by Almond and Verba for the relationship between political participation and what they call "subjective competence." Sidney Verba, "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study," *ibid.*, 22-42.

[32] See Hypothesis 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is not suggested that the kinds of relationships mentioned above—either between orientation subcategories or between orientation and non-orientation variables—are so novel that political scientists have not been aware of them. What is emphasized here is that, in addition to systematizing our knowledge, a typology even of this simple nature directs our attention to a number of hypotheses that we might otherwise neglect. The proposed typology constitutes a step toward refining existing concepts and sharpening our knowledge. For instance, the familiar consensus-stability proposition can be more fruitfully studied by determining what levels of orientations we are talking about.

From an operational point of view, use of the typology in obtaining and classifying data will meet no formidable problems. The application of two dimensions—i.e., the criteria of levels of relevance and of direction—is relatively simple, though the determination of the presence or absence of subjective intentions on the part of symbol users appears to be an elusive undertaking. However, the paucity of and difficulty of access to data regarding the deliberateness dimension do not preclude the construction of valid inferences. Increasing sophistication in empirical research dealing with the realm of values, beliefs, and expressive symbols is indeed reassuring.

In addition to providing a comprehensive and systematic check list of the functions of political orientations, the typology will serve as a useful device in guiding our inquiries and ordering the data collected. For the purposes of comparative politics, it can help us to construct an orientation profile of political systems. This would be an undertaking that is empirically oriented and amenable to statistical analysis. It will sensitize us in a systematic way to a number of possible relationships between the data subsumed under the concept of political orientations, and to the correlative relationships between political orientations and the other categories. A breakthrough in the conceptualization of other categories will necessitate some modification and further refinement of the typology of political orientations, but such a development itself will be aided by the proposed typology. Further specification of non-orientation categories that would go beyond such broad categories as economy, social structure, situational factors, environment, etc., remains a crucial task for systematic students of politics.

Postscript

Another approach to the problem of political orientations would be to specify a particular configuration of orientations that are considered to be "functional" for the maintenance of a political system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For this purpose, we can make use of the pattern variables, determining functionally requisite orientations at the levels of the state, regime, and government. One might argue that orientations that are functional at the state and regime levels would be particularistic, diffuse, and affective. At the level of government, scope orientations (dp) necessary for maximum efficiency would be universalistic, specific, and neutral as to affectivity. Any deviation from the above would probably be dysfunctional. In actuality, orientations of a mixed nature prevail in all political systems. Thus, with regard to the scope orientations (dp), we are likely to think of a tendency toward dysfunctional behavior in a developed country, while in a developing one we note a tendency toward functional behavior.[33]

A less ambitious undertaking would be to ascertain the characteristic patterns of role orientations as actually held by the actors (individuals and collectivities) without attempting to specify functionally requisite orientations.

Still another approach would be to classify orientations in terms of the Parsonian notion of the four functional problems that each social system must be concerned with: goal attainment, adaptation, integration, and pattern maintenance and tension management.[34] If it were employed along with his notion of a cycle of phase movement in which each of the four functional problems enjoys its moment of specific attention, we could examine the overall pattern and quantitative distribution of political orientations connected with each problem which indicate the nature of the political system at any given time. For instance, one might say that in peacetime a liberal democratic state can be expected to exhibit a high incidence of orientations concerned with the problems of goal attainment and adaptation. Similarly, a garrison state should exhibit a high incidence of political orientations regarding the problems of integration and pattern maintenance and tension-management.[35]

[33] At the sublevels of E (pd) and F (pd), the decision-makers would prefer some affective, diffuse, and particularistic elements, though the democratic theory and rationality of bureaucracy presuppose universalistic, specific, and affectivity-neutral orientations.

[34] T. Parsons, "A General Theory in Sociology," in R. K. Merton and others, eds., *Sociology Today* (New York 1959), 4-16; Parsons, "The Point of View of the Author," in Black, ed., 311-63; Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System," in Parsons and others, *Theories of Society*, I, 30-79.

[35] Spiro's four phases of flow of policy are identical with Parsons' four functional problems. When considered in terms of Parsonian terminology, Spiro's categories (flexibility, efficiency, effectiveness, and stability) become more readily comprehensible. Herbert Spiro, "Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (September 1962), 577-95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By BERNARD K. GORDON*

IS regional cooperation feasible within Southeast Asia? The idea continues to have vitality, although most of the attempts to make use of the concept in this area have so far met with little apparent success. The Colombo Plan, SEATO, and the Bandung Conference are reminders only of the most prominent efforts to apply "regionalism" to the area. As early as 1947, the Burmese nationalist, Aung San, urged greater cooperation among Southeast Asian states, but his ideas had no lasting effect. And despite the many more formal proposals made since 1947, the area continues to be Balkanized. Yet today regional proposals seem to be proliferating and, for this reason, it is important that the obstacles to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia should be well understood. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established, and the Malaysia plan, incorporating Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories, was put into effect in September 1963. In addition, and largely as a result of problems connected with the Malaysia proposals, "Maphilindo" was formed during June and July 1963. This is a loose consultative grouping of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. On a wider scale, there have been some proposals to organize an Asian Common Market; and the United Nations, through its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), seems to be urging certain forms of regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.[1]

Every one of these proposals deserves a separate examination into its anticipated benefits and its chances for success. But each proposal faces a common obstacle in the general assumption that politics in Southeast Asia is too burdened with tension and suspicion to allow any hope for regional collaboration. It is that assumption with which this article intends to deal.

Undeniably, international relations in Southeast Asia are not smooth, and illustrations of apparent tension come quickly to mind: Cambodia

* The author would like to express his thanks to the Institute for Defense Analyses, in which he served as Research Associate during 1962-1963, for the intellectual and material encouragement indispensable to the preparation of this article. All opinions and conclusions are the author's alone.

[1] See "The Scope for Regional Economic Co-operation," in United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, XII (December 1961); and United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, "Report of the Consultative Group of Experts on Regional Economic Co-operation in Asia," December 1961, mimeo.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Thailand have still not resumed diplomatic relations, and in the wake of the alleged oppression of Buddhists in South Vietnam, Cambodia severed political relations on August 27, 1963, with that neighbor, too. Similarly, President Sukarno of Indonesia and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia indulged in thinly veiled deprecations of one another long before Malaysia was established. Its emergence made their mutual dislike more public and helped to lead to a diplomatic break as well. The list could be expanded without difficulty, but the major sources and manifestations of tension in Southeast Asia seem to fall roughly into six categories. Four are mentioned most often by qualified observers and deserve major attention here: (1) territorial conflicts; (2) irredentist and minority problems; (3) personal disputes among leaders; and (4) conflicts that can be traced to Cold War alignments.[2]

I. Territorial Conflicts

No doubt the most prominent aspect of contemporary conflict in Southeast Asia is that of territorial and related disputes. The very notion of Southeast Asia as an historical and geographical construct evokes an image of loosely extended empires superimposed on the same map. The history of the area has meant that there are today numerous pockets of populations surrounded by ethnically different peoples. Boundaries are generally indefinite and, even where definite, often of little significance, and there are some instances of openly competing claims to the same tract of territory. During 1962, two prominent illustrations of this form of conflict were provided by the Cambodian-Thai dispute over the site of Preah Vihear temple and the recently lodged Philippines claim to North Borneo.[3] Less well-known are a number of claims and counterclaims by Cambodia and Vietnam in

[2] At least two additional categories could be constructed: (1) "traditional and historic enmities," which implies the existence of national memories; and (2) tensions resulting from economic factors. On the latter, much study is needed in order to sharpen our knowledge of economic and trade patterns in the region, but it does seem clear that despite parallel production of many commodities there is at present little real "competition" for the same markets. Indeed, those who would favor working towards economic cooperation and integration in Southeast Asia, like Philippines Vice-President (and formerly Foreign Secretary) Pelaez, stress that Asian nations must cooperate soon. Otherwise, he feels, their economies will have begun to compete directly, as in Europe and perhaps Latin America. For some of the more basic aspects of this problem, see my "Economic Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, III (May 1963), 235-44.

[3] A very useful presentation of the Borneo issue is Martin Meadows, "The Philippine Claim to North Borneo," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVII (September 1962), 321-35. References to some excellent sources on the temple dispute can be found in L. P. Singh, "The Thai-Cambodian Temple Dispute," *Asian Survey*, II (October 1962), 23-26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regard to certain islands in the Gulf of Siam (northwest of Dao Phu Quoc). Moreover, the possibility of a variety of other conflicting claims, perhaps best called "latent" claims, can be seen in Thai interests in Battambang and Siam Reap provinces (Khet) in Cambodia; Malayan concern for the three southern provinces of Thailand; and possible Indonesian aspirations regarding a wealth of territory, including the eastern sections of Timor and New Guinea, Singapore, the Malay Peninsula, and the formerly British-held regions of Kalimantan (Borneo) which have now become part of Malaysia.

Setting aside the "latent" issues, there is a lesson to be learned from confining our attention to those disputes which have become matters of practical significance: i.e., the Preah Vihear case, the North Borneo claim, and West Irian (West New Guinea). Even the following brief examination of both the temple case and the Philippines claim emphasizes an element common to both of them: the issue seems to have been of real concern and cognizance only to each national elite.

THE CAMBODIAN-THAI TEMPLE DISPUTE

The International Court of Justice ruled on June 15, 1962, that Cambodia holds sovereignty over Preah Vihear temple. For several months prior to the ICJ opinion, and immediately afterwards, there were many public reports that the temple case had aroused widespread emotion among the peoples of both Cambodia and Thailand. Press coverage from Bangkok indicated extreme displeasure over the court's ruling; there were "public demonstrations," and when the Thai government did announce that it would reluctantly comply, some Ministers were said to have wept at the Cabinet meeting at which this decision was reached.[4]

It is questionable, however, whether there was much factual basis to the report of widespread Thai emotional involvement in the issue. Certainly the demonstrations protesting the Court's ruling were, to say the least, not spontaneous. Bangkok schoolteachers, for example, were instructed to dismiss Thai students early enough in the day to participate in the marches and demonstrations.[5] Before the decision itself, the government, both through its official spokesmen and through a press that is not altogether free, had encouraged the belief that the Thai case was invulnerable. As a result there probably was widespread expectation, especially among the Bangkok public, that the Court would

[4] Singh, *op.cit.*, relying on articles in the *Bangkok Post* and the *Bangkok World* during late June 1962, cites several of these public manifestations.

[5] A so-called "ban" on public demonstrations went noticeably unenforced.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

find against the Cambodian claim. According to a number of experienced observers in Bangkok, including some Thai and foreign officials whose work regularly takes them to outlying areas, there was probably a fairly wide awareness of the issue. But as an anthropologist with several years of experience in northeast Thailand pointed out, far more concern during those months was devoted to an international sporting event in which Thai athletes were involved. The general consensus was expressed by an American official in Thailand: "Most people knew about the temple case, but if the government had not energized their emotions, little reaction would have resulted."[6]

THE NORTH BORNEO CLAIM

Late in June 1962, President Macapagal of the Philippines announced his government's intention to claim British North Borneo. This announcement was the culmination of an intensive six-month Manila press campaign favoring Philippines ownership. However, unlike the role of the Bangkok press in the Cambodian-Thai temple dispute, this was not an instance of a government-inspired newspaper barrage. In the Philippines, because of the peculiarly free nature of newspapers there,[7] it is hardly likely that the government used the press to enflame Filipino nationalism. Instead what does appear to have happened is that the press helped galvanize the government to challenge formally British sovereignty in North Borneo.

For reasons still undetermined with certainty, Manila newspapers had begun in late 1961 to give increasing attention to some old doubts on the validity of British sovereignty in North Borneo. Yet throughout 1962 the press campaign did not seem able to develop any noticeable mass enthusiasm for the issue, and the dispute was not marked by public demonstrations, student marches, or any of the other common manifestations of modern nationalism. Indeed, for a period of several months early in 1962, it was common to regard the North Borneo issue largely as the product of a Manila newspaper circulation war.[8] Certainly the British government did not appear to give much weight to the claim, and perhaps mistakenly did not bother, for a period of months, even to respond to the diplomatic note.[9] But if this was a

[6] Interview, Bangkok, August 17, 1962.

[7] They have been called the "freest press in the world." See David Wurfel, in George McT. Kahin, ed., *Government and Politics of Southeast Asia* (Ithaca 1959), 459.

[8] Interview, Department of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, June 1962.

[9] Britain's failure to react with gravity to the claim may have offended the Philippines leadership, and was perhaps one more factor impelling President Macapagal to press the claim with vigor.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tactical error on Britain's part, it cannot be denied that an aura of unreality does cling to the entire dispute. Even in the weeks immediately after Macapagal's public announcement that the claim would be lodged, there still was no evidence of mass enthusiasm or concern. The editors of the Manila newspapers themselves, for example, quickly decided that there was better circulation material in the case of Harry Stonehill, an extremely wealthy American whose activities in the Philippines since 1946 had led to much evidence of official corruption. The dramatic proceedings which led up to his eventual deportation from Manila in August 1962 easily shunted aside the newspapers' coverage of the North Borneo claim.

Consideration of these factors leads to the tentative conclusion that the Philippines government is unlikely to press its claim very far. For one thing, no essential interests seem to be at stake. Moreover, several factors give the impression that President Macapagal's claim was at least partly motivated by exasperation. The press campaign had, after all, been under way for six months before he made the announcement, which then followed rather directly in the wake of a very bad moment in Philippine relations with the United States. It is hazardous to attempt to plumb motives, but it seems that in addition to a probable desire to do something to quell the newspaper clamor, the claim was undertaken to satisfy two major requirements. First, the Philippines government evidently wanted to demonstrate the extent of its aggravation with the United States after the U.S. Congress initially failed to pass the War Claims appropriations bill. It was possible to demonstrate displeasure by raising problems with Britain over North Borneo, since by implication the Borneo claim involved Malaya's plans for the Malaysia Federation. To this extent, the Philippines government struck at a proposal on which Washington was smiling. Second, the Macapagal government in all likelihood wished to convey to other Asian leaders the image of the Philippines as an Asian state at least as "nationalist" and anti-colonialist as any of them. Accordingly, official statements from Manila have explained and defended the North Borneo claim in anti-colonial terms.[10]

To a considerable extent, it must be conceded, President Macapagal has succeeded in attaining both these objectives, for his dispute with Britain has caused considerable hand-wringing in Washington. As President Kennedy himself said, Malaysia is "the best hope of security

[10] As one of many examples, see Jovito R. Salonga, "PI Should Define Its Stand," *Philippines Free Press*, May 5, 1962; quoted in *Larawan*, Series VIII, No. 3, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C., November 19, 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for that very vital part of the world."[11] Moreover, the statements of Indonesian officials, which often abound in references to "neo-colonialist" conspiracies aimed at encircling Indonesia, noticeably avoided including the Philippines months before the formation of "Maphilindo."

It is still too early to say with any certainty what the outcome of the Philippines North Borneo claim will be. Before Malaysia was established, it was possible that some form of conciliatory response from Britain—if it had come early enough—would have helped to satisfy President Macapagal's requirement. Indeed, even the possibility of a cash settlement, as a final compensation to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu, was not to be excluded.[12] Certainly there is much evidence that neither President Macapagal nor Vice-President Pelaez, while he was Foreign Secretary, wanted this relatively minor issue to imperil Philippines hopes for warmer collaboration with their Malayan partner in ASA. Pelaez especially has been very optimistic about ASA and its chances for success and permanence. In an interview in 1962 he referred only once, almost flippantly, to the need to "settle the North Borneo thing."[13] More recently, it became clear that the Philippines was willing to mute its claim to North Borneo, though not to suppress it altogether.[14] Finally, in the months that followed the rupture in diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, Manila experienced considerable criticism at home. Apparently many Filipinos believe the claim is being carried too far, and that the Philippines government is following slavishly a line set down by President Sukarno.

THE CAMBODIAN-SOUTH VIETNAMESE ISLANDS DISPUTE

Only brief attention will be paid here to a third territorial dispute. While there have been formal complaints, deriving from the claims and counterclaims of Cambodia and Vietnam, there is little doubt

[11] See transcript of press conference, *Washington Post*, February 15, 1963.

[12] This notion received much currency. See, e.g., *New York Times*, October 1, 1962, 5. However, with the death in mid-1963 of N. Osmeña, who had represented the Sultan's heirs with great vigor and who reportedly was pressing for a settlement running into tens of millions of dollars, this aspect of the claim is likely to become less significant.

[13] Interview, Manila, July 31, 1962.

[14] The tri-partite Foreign Ministers' meeting which paved the way for "Maphilindo," and which convened in Manila from June 7 to June 11, 1963, dealt in part with the North Borneo dispute. The "Report" stated that the Philippines retained its right to pursue the claim "in accordance with international law and the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes." But it was also made clear that the Philippines was preparing to accept the inclusion of North Borneo in Malaysia: "The Ministers agreed that in the event of North Borneo joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia the Government of the latter and . . . the Philippines should maintain and promote the harmony and the friendly relations. . ." ("Report and Recommendations of the Conference of Foreign Ministers," Manila, June 11, 1963, 4, mimeo.).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that this "dispute" is almost entirely artificial. Clearly the sovereignty of these two tiny islands to the northwest of Phu Quoc is not essential to the major foreign policy concerns of either of the governments involved. Although, as Homer Bigart pointed out, South Vietnam claims sovereignty to these two islands,[15] it is clear that the Vietnamese claim is not a serious matter. It has even been conceded by a member of the Vietnamese Cabinet that the whole purpose of that claim was simply to forestall any dealings with the government of Cambodia on almost any issue. This Vietnamese Minister, who is generally regarded as among the most extreme of anti-Cambodian spokesmen, explained that President Diem's claim to the two tiny islands was "totally artificial . . . and contrived."[16]

There are a number of other conceivable "territorial disputes"; in fact, there are no two adjoining nations in the area which do not have at least a potential claim outstanding between them. But an examination of even those claims that have been formally made leads to the conclusion that they are of minor significance. It must be recognized that in dealing, for example, with the Battambang and Siam Reap areas of Cambodia we have something very different from Alsace-Lorraine. All evidence points to the loose articulation between peoples and governments in Southeast Asia—indeed, the problem of building "identification" is one that AID programs are supposed to tackle. As we continually keep telling ourselves, Southeast Asian states, as underdeveloped nations, face the problems of rudimentary education, extremely weak communications nets outside the capital city, and a little-developed national consciousness. In such societies the mental horizons of the overwhelming bulk of the population extend barely beyond their immediate personal experience.

To these factors, all of which retard development of modern "nationalism," three more factors must be added: In every state of Southeast Asia except the Philippines, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, the press is subject to heavy government controls or acts as an outright official mouthpiece. This exclusive control over the information available to the public is reinforced, moreover, by the highly personal nature of state leadership in Southeast Asia, for in every case but the

[15] *New York Times*, April 13, 1962. The Vietnamese names for these two islands are Phudu and Tianmoi. In Cambodian terminology, they are Koh Ses Ream and Koh Thmey.

[16] Interview, Saigon, August 8, 1962. The Vietnamese government decided to dispute ownership of these islands, because—in the Minister's exact words—"To make such an extreme claim we would not be bothered by having to negotiate with Sihanouk for a long time." See also Michael Leifer, *Cambodia and Neutrality* (Canberra 1962), 25-26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Philippines the ruling elite is small. In some cases, as in Cambodia and Burma, all significant decision-making and policy-making seem concentrated in the hands of less than five men. Finally, of course, there is no effective opposition to most of these leadership groups.

With these characteristics of Southeast Asian governments in mind, it is important to recognize a basic ambivalence and paradox. If we accept the thesis that the politics of the area is oligarchic rather than mass or popular,[17] we cannot at the same time accept the notion that the Burmese "people," let us say, have a clearly expressed desire to recapture former territory—and that the Burmese government will act on this desire. Instead, all the evidence supports the oligarchic thesis and reveals the wide policy latitude possessed by Southeast Asian leaders. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that we are not concerned in this article with the simple *potential* for conflict or tension deriving from territorial disputes, but with problems that are likely to impede collaborative efforts that might otherwise be regarded as beneficial. On that basis we conclude that there is not one operationally significant issue of an essentially territorial nature dividing the states of Southeast Asia.[18]

II. Irredentist and Minority Problems

The problems raised by irredentism are roughly equivalent to the irritations caused by competing territorial claims. That is, ethnic and cultural minorities, with differing degrees of potential and actual attachment to another state, abound in Southeast Asia. Significant political problems do not arise from the existence *per se* of these people, but only when their presence aggravates relations among neighboring states in the area. Attention, therefore, generally concentrates on Shans in Burma, Vietnamese in Cambodia, and Cambodians (Khmer Krom) in Vietnam. A problem is generated only when one government extends the umbrella of its interest (or is under pressure to do so) over its ethnic or cultural brethren across a border.

Thus the Moros on Mindanao and elsewhere in the southern Philippines are not a focal point for Indonesian "protection,"[19] nor are the

[17] Again, excepting the Philippines.

[18] Indonesia's dispute with Malaysia, focusing on the Borneo territories, is not a conflict over boundaries. It is much more complex, as we point out below.

[19] An extremely well-informed Filipino Catholic priest, trained in the United States and with extensive experience in the Moslem areas, indicated that while the Church was getting nowhere among these peoples, there was also no detectable interest in ties with Indonesia. Yet, as the former Chief of Philippines Military Intelligence (Capt. Carlos J. Albert) pointed out, the Moslem peoples of the Philippines have been ignored

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Islamic and Malay elements in southern Thailand a source of difficulty between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. The existence of these minorities is an historic and ethnographic fact, but it appears an exaggeration to describe that fact as of serious political significance.

CAMBODIAN-VIETNAMESE MINORITIES

When we turn to those minority group problems on which it is important to concentrate, a basic information gap immediately becomes apparent. For example, one of the most frequently cited cases of the irredentist problem ostensibly revolves around the Cambodian minority in Vietnam and the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Aside from much other ignorance on this issue, the very size of these groups is unclear. Some sources state that there are 396,000 Khmer Krom (Cambodians in Vietnam). Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia has referred to 600,000.[20] Professor Bernard Fall in a recent article says that there are "over 500,000," and regards them as "one of the sources of insecurity in some areas of Vietnam today."[21] For reasons largely unexplained, the Vietnamese in Cambodia are far less often referred to as a source of tension between the two states. Here too, however, the same uncertainty of figures is apparent: Steinberg's HRAF study on Cambodia gave the number as 292,000 in 1950;[22] another recent source cites it as 237,000; and the U.S. Department of Commerce report on Cambodia (1961), which in other sections is based partly on State Department sources, gives 400,000.[23] It seems inadmissible to regard these differing estimates as unimportant details.

The diversity of these estimated population figures illustrates the problem of having to make difficult political decisions against the background of too little and conflicting information. The United States, for example, has an interest in reducing the mistrust between Cambodia and her two American-aligned neighbors. If one of the factors contributing to this mistrust does in fact derive from irredentism and the

---

by the government, and "an unfortunate chasm" exists between Christian and Islamic peoples in the Philippines South. As a result, "a well-organized propaganda campaign, emphasizing Indonesian affinities, magnifying differences and justified grievances of our Moslem Filipinos, stage-managed incidents, coupled with submarine-supplied arms and munitions, could create a most serious national security situation for the Philippines" (*Manila Times*, January 20, 1963).

[20] Prince Sihanouk in a conversation with Jerrold Schecter of *Time-Life*, August 8, 1961 (from Schecter's notes). See also Leifer, 24.

[21] Bernard Fall, "Southeast Asia: The West at Bay," *Current History*, XLIII (November 1962), 297n.

[22] David J. Steinberg, *et al.*, *Cambodia* (New Haven 1957), 34.

[23] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Basic Data on the Economy of Cambodia* (World Trade Information Service, Part 1, No. 61-65), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mistreatment of minorities, it is difficult to see how policies designed to help alleviate this sore can be framed without accurate knowledge of even the most basic facts. And it must be conceded that between Vietnam and Cambodia the minority problem is exploited as a source of tension. As we have indicated, Prince Sihanouk has referred to "600,000 [people] of Cambodian origin and of Cambodian language and customs" resident in Vietnam. In the same conversation Sihanouk said: "The Government of South Vietnam persists to consider them as Vietnamese and refuses to discuss their future with us. But at the same time they mistrust their attachment to their motherland and too often apply to them a discriminatory treatment—taking away their properties, arrests, even tortures and in certain cases executions. Thus caught between two fires, the Cambodians of Cochinchina are leading a miserable life. We have done everything possible to approach the Saigon authorities and international institutions, but all without result."[24]

Within recent months and, it is accurate to say, regularly, Sihanouk has repeated these charges, and the Cambodian Ambassador to the United Nations is reported to have charged Vietnam with actions "amounting to genocide."[25] It is generally assumed that this exchange of bitter complaints is not just a reflection of tension, but one of the causes of tension in the area. It is then reasoned that these complaints are among the important impediments to bilateral or regional collaboration, but one of the major difficulties in attempting to assess these obstacles is our ignorance regarding the factual basis for the complaints.

The Vietnamese, of course, deny the Cambodian indictment. Saigon authorities maintain that while there are necessarily some Khmer Krom among the Vietnamese who support the Viet Cong, the Khmers have not been singled out as rebels. The Vietnam government has not taken the position that the ethnic Cambodians within its territory are particularly susceptible to communism, nor does Saigon maintain that the Khmer Krom are especially important in the rebellion. Vietnam's government insists that in its attempts to crush the insurgency there has been no particular discrimination against ethnic Cambodians, and adds that in those areas where ethnic Cambodians are an important minority, insurgency is no greater than elsewhere.

In support of their position the Vietnamese point to their police and guard deployments. They maintain, that is, that no greater numbers of

[24] Prince Sihanouk, in conversation with Jerrold Schecter, August 8, 1961.

[25] U.N. General Assembly, Special Political Committee (A/SPC/S.R. 332), October 22, 1962, 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

police are required in the Khmer Krom areas than in other regions of insurgency, thus attempting to prove that Sihanouk's charges of unusually harsh or discriminatory treatment of Cambodians are unfounded. And it is difficult to believe that if Sihanouk were convinced of discriminatory treatment of the Khmer Krom, he would not retaliate more effectively against the Vietnamese resident in his own country. Sihanouk is an adroit leader of exceptional cleverness, with an apparently well-developed sense of what is appropriate. He has means for retaliation against the Vietnamese, yet there is no indication that he has followed such a course. Certainly, Vietnam has not complained of any new reprisals against Vietnamese who live in Cambodia. Instead, throughout 1962 and much of 1963, Sihanouk simply repeated his threat of "breaking off relations with the Vietnamese after one or two more provocative actions."[26] Finally, at the end of August 1963, when the international prestige of the South Vietnamese government was at its lowest, and when it appeared that the United States might be ready to withdraw support from President Diem, Prince Sihanouk did in fact sever "political relations." He was, however, careful to exclude economic ties from the break.[27]

The dispute, therefore, seems very one-sided, and it is probable that Prince Sihanouk makes use of the allegations of Vietnamese mistreatment of the Khmer Krom chiefly for purposes of internal support. The problem does exacerbate relations, however, and is likely to continue to do so, especially in the absence of any firm knowledge of the facts pertaining to the numbers of minority peoples, the formal and informal restrictions which affect their existence, and so on. In this respect, there is a parallel situation on the other side of Cambodia's border.

THAIS IN CAMBODIA

In Thai-Cambodian affairs it is the Thais who complain of genocide, claiming atrocities in those instances when Cambodians find Thais on the wrong side of the border. The Bangkok press often handles these incidents in a most inflammatory way, and these events, but more

[26] An example is provided in Prince Sihanouk's speech at Samathy Ram Pagoda, November 3, 1962, broadcast by the Cambodian radio service. The vagueness of the threat itself ("one or two" actions, etc.), plus Sihanouk's anticipation of his opponent's next thrust, including references to Vietnam's control over the Mekong and the Port of Saigon and its consequent control over the Cambodian economy—all these indicate that Sihanouk has not wanted the affair to go too far or to get out of hand. Leifer, however, reports that in 1961 the Cambodian press carried "veiled threats" of retaliation against Vietnamese in Cambodia (p. 25).

[27] *New York Times*, August 28, 1963. Cambodia explained the break in terms of both the alleged repression of Buddhists and additional border incursions from Vietnam.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially the manner in which they are publicly treated, help further to deteriorate already difficult Thai-Cambodian relations. In Bangkok many "neutral" observers concede that extreme charges frequently are made against the Cambodians on the basis of very little information, and that the Thai government could do much to help resolve the problem.

At least three elements in the situation are under Thai control. It seems within the capacity of Thai officials to help to reduce these clashes, since generally speaking it is Thais who are found in Cambodian territory and not vice versa. Moreover, it is clearly feasible for the Thai government to restrict the publicity the border guards give to their activities. But, in the third place, there is some suspicion that the border police make use of these incidents to maintain and raise their own prestige, recognition, and budgets.[28]

The argument that it is within the capacity of the Thai government to reduce this source of tension with Cambodia is supported by a comparable situation in regard to Burma. On the Thai-Burma border there have been roughly as many incidents as with Cambodia, but the official and public reactions are very different. The relations between Thailand and Burma are considerably more friendly and, as a result, border violations and incidents are not regarded so seriously. Accordingly, press treatment is much milder, and it is probably also true that fewer incidents are reported.

This is not to say that Thai-Burmese relations, which have been heavily colored by irredentist problems, no longer contain potential sources of conflict. But it is clear that Bangkok's border problems with Burma must be seen in a different light from its relations with Cambodia. One of the major reasons for this difference appears to be the changed attitude of the Thai government regarding support for the Shans. Considerable sympathy does exist among Thais in the Chiang Mai area for the Shan independence movement.[29] This sympathy apparently continues to be reflected in supplies of funds and arms, and a handling of the opium traffic in a manner which allows the Shans

[28] The situation is perhaps not very different from the rumored tendency of the U.S. armed services to "find" greater Soviet military activity and build-up during March and April in some years—when the appropriations committees are considering the defense budget submissions.

[29] The extent of Thai "identification" with the Shans and their movement can perhaps be exaggerated. For one thing, only half the population of the Shan states are Shans, and only they and one other group are Buddhists. The rest are largely Christians or some variety of animists. For another, it is not certain that Bangkok would wish to incorporate—all other things being equal—the Shan areas as part of Thailand. It might be an invitation to the same sort of dissension that Burma must now undergo.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to purchase supplies. But the extent of support in Bangkok now appears to be questionable. For example, a leading Thai Foreign Ministry official pointed with pride to one recent arrest of Burmese insurgents.[30] About twenty armed Shans, he said, were found on the Thai side of the border and their apprehension by Thai authorities greatly pleased the Burmese. In Rangoon the government broadcast its appreciation to Thailand and the Thai Ambassador was called in to receive Burmese thanks personally. This took place during August 1962 and gave support to Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat's earlier disclaimers of interest in the Shan movement.[31] Other observers also saw this incident as reflecting deliberate Thai interest in improving somewhat her relations with Burma. Some of the reasons behind this interest seem to be personal: the friendly relationship between General Aung Gyi (who until February 1963 occupied the second most important position in Burma) and Thai Air Marshal Dawee Chulasapya (Chief, Joint Staff, Department of Defense) is an illustration. Also, the visit of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Rangoon was probably intended to improve personal relationships. Whatever the reasons, and considering the unfortunate and fertile potential for tensions between Thailand and Burma growing out of ethnic, bloc alignment, and other factors, present Thai-Burmese relationships seem not as unpromising as might be expected.

Indeed, it is not altogether unlikely that if an attempt were made to widen the membership of ASA by including Burma, Thailand would support the move. According to several Thai officials, Burma is regarded as the second most likely new candidate for ASA membership.[32] Her disinclination to become involved in the organization up to this time is sometimes seen as largely the result of internal Burmese problems and instability rather than simple "isolationism."

As a general conclusion, it appears that irredentism is not likely to be a major source of Thai-Burmese tension in the near future. This view is supported by the fact that those complaints which have been raised have emanated from the Burmese side. That is, there is no special pattern of public and official Thai complaints that Burma mis-

[30] Interview with the Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, August 15, 1962.

[31] The *Bangkok World*, e.g., on March 9, 1962, reported that Sarit had pledged his intent to maintain excellent relations between Burma and Thailand. Denying any intention to become involved "on the question of the Shan states," he repeated his view that the problem was "a strictly internal affair of Burma."

[32] One official expressed the understandable opinion that if South Vietnam were to apply for ASA membership, it would be difficult to refuse the request.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treats her Shans. Considering the past history of the energetic Thai people, and the fact that they share ethnic bonds with minority populations not only in Burma, but in Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, and even China, it is sometimes surprising that operationally important problems of Thai and other irredentism have not arisen.

Consider, for example, the Islamic peoples in Southern Thailand. The potential for a Moslem secessionist movement clearly exists, but Thai officials regard this as distinctly less of a problem than a Lao secessionist movement in the northeast. The point of importance, however, is that the Thai government has no reason to believe that the government of Malaysia (with whose people Thai Moslems have characteristics in common) gives any support to separatist elements in southern Thailand. Thus Bangkok officials discount the significance of an Islamic irredentist problem, and many other long-time residents of Thailand concur in this judgment.

It should not be forgotten, moreover, that in many other nations even this low-level potential for an irredentist problem might have been utilized to aggravate relations between neighboring states. Neither Thailand nor Malaya has exploited this potential, though there have been instances when the two countries have disagreed on sensitive problems. Some Federation officials during past years, for example, believed that Thai border patrols were not sufficiently energetic in suppressing the predominantly Chinese guerrillas. Apparently these Malayan fears have been allayed, and it is clear that the Thai government took steps to remove Malaya's grounds for complaint. Thus despite their areas of difference, and the clear potential for irredentist tensions, relations between Thailand and Malaysia are quite good. A senior official in Bangkok, for example, when asked to rank Thailand's neighbors in terms of their good and bad relations with his country, unreservedly named Malaya as the Southeast Asian state with which his government is on best terms.

It is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is an important and researchable question to ask: what factors have led to the establishment of reasonably smooth relations between Thailand and Malaya? Certainly almost all of the traditional sources of tension exist: they face each other on a difficult-to-patrol border; the bulk of their peoples, as the ethnographic map shows, represent separate and distinct racial groups; one nation is Buddhist and the other Islamic; important portions of their foreign earnings are drawn from export of the same products, and in that sense they are economically "competitive." In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sum, Thai-Malaysian relations should perhaps be explosive. Why are they not?

The quickest and easiest answer would be that the international bloc alignment of the two countries overshadows all other differences. That broad a conclusion requires more evidence than is available, and tends to overlook other contributing factors. For example, their membership in ASA suggests that Thai and Malayan leaders believe that a mutually beneficial economic payoff might be had by maintaining reasonable political relations.[33]

Perhaps another explanation for their relatively smooth relations, on the Thai side, concerns the press. As has been suggested, Bangkok press treatments of Burma-Thai and Malaya-Thai affairs are quite different from the usually inflammatory discussion of Thai-Cambodian matters. This must contribute to a smothering of potential tensions. At the same time, it should be recognized that Thai newspapers are not completely free agents, and whatever credit is parceled out in this connection must be shared with the Thai regime.

This evidence, even including the two countries' anti-communism, seems an inadequate explanation of the friendly relations between Thailand and Malaysia. Indeed, for those interested in Asian tensions generally, Thai-Malay affairs might be the most worthwhile in the region to explore in considerable detail, since it could be enormously useful to extrapolate from this relationship to other bilateral and multilateral contacts in Southeast Asia. A dissection of all the factors which have led to favorable Thai-Malay relations might open up similar areas of susceptibility among other states that have no more apparent reason for being on friendly terms than do Thailand and Malaysia.

INDONESIA

A balanced analysis of territorial and irredentist sources of conflict in Southeast Asia requires separate treatment of the special problem of Indonesia. Here is the only instance in which irredentism in the usual sense of the term—the desire to recover lands and peoples "lost"

[33] It is known that Thailand had been the "foot-dragging" member of the ASA group. She balked when it became clear that no more than three countries would comprise the new association, and even suggested holding off until at least a fourth could be found. In addition, the Thais were cool initially to the ASA capital-fund and permanent headquarters suggestions of the Tungku and Pelaez. Despite these differences, Thailand continues to support ASA and is beginning to believe that the organization is "here to stay." Indeed, by early 1963, when relations were strained between the Philippines and Malaya, it was Thanat Khoman's task, as Thai Foreign Minister, to act almost as an intermediary between the two other members of ASA. In appreciation of his efforts, President Macapagal said jokingly that in the future he would think of Thanat as "the ASA Ambassador."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the past—is openly referred to by local officials as a possible impetus for governmental actions. Yet observers concerned with the assessment of Indonesian policies appear divided on the significance of this factor.

One of the puzzles has been Muhammad Yamin, who was Minister of Information when he died late in October 1962. He may have served as a focal point for politically significant irredentist motives. Although this author had the opportunity to speak at length with Yamin and with numerous others who have followed his career, it is still unclear whether Yamin's views contributed directly and significantly to the thinking of Indonesia's leadership.

What is clear is that Yamin's attitudes, and the policies which could flow from them, might pose very serious problems for several nations in Southeast Asia, and even for the United States. Yamin was identified with the "Greater Indonesia" thesis. As Guy Pauker has written: "... as early as 1945 some ultranationalists, such as Professor M. Yamin, Deputy First Minister in charge of information and chairman of the National Planning Council, had formulated visions of a Greater Indonesia which would eventually include Malaysia and perhaps more."[34] In a booklet published in 1958 Yamin argued that the "homeland Nusantara was already a world amongst thousands of islands," implying that present-day Indonesia is the successor to all of the former Nusantara territories: "These can be divided into eight groups of islands . . . the *Malay peninsular*, the islands of Sumatra, of *Kalimantan*, of Java, and the group now known as . . . the South-eastern Islands, the islands of Sulawesi, the group of the Moluccas and the territory of West Irian" (italics added).[35] It is clear from this statement that Yamin's map of rightful Indonesia would incorporate all of Malaysia, including Borneo and Singapore, and parts of Thailand. For, as Yamin concluded, "Thanks to the workings of the forces of nationalist independence in Southeast Asia . . . it is certain that one day it will develop again to become the sovereignty of Nusantara, covering the Austronesian people. . . ."

In his conversations with me, Yamin made perfectly clear his belief that "Greater Indonesia" was a concept which the Indonesian people accepted and on the basis of which they would act. "Recovery" of Portuguese Timor, for example, was so widely assumed to be the next goal by the Indonesian leadership, Yamin indicated, that discussion of the subject was hardly necessary. But there was more: "We must

[34] Guy J. Pauker, "The Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (July 1962), 625.

[35] Muhammad Yamin, "A Legal and Historical Review of Indonesia's Sovereignty over the Ages," *Dewan Nasional* (Djakarta), September 24, 1958, 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all say nothing now. Not until May 1963. Then we move." With those words he prefaced his point that not until *Irian Barat* was finally settled in May 1963, and Indonesian sovereignty no longer questionable, would he and other nationalists press for "recovery" of lost territory. During our conversation, he indicated his view that the most prominent of these lost territories, at least for the short run, was Singapore.

Are these wild notions? Guy Pauker expressed the opinion that most Indonesians probably do not share these "grandiose visions."[36] He offered no evidence to support this conclusion, but it is true that President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio have sometimes stated that they have no further territorial aims. Yamin, on the other hand, was severely critical of Subandrio's early statements that plans for the proposed Malaysia Federation were no particular concern of Indonesia's. Yamin felt that these remarks were a "stupid mistake." So apparently did Ali Sastroamidjojo. Months before the Djakarta government formally announced its policy of "confrontation" of Malaya and its support of the Brunei rebels, the former Indonesian Premier declared that Indonesia does in fact have reason to lay claim to all of the Borneo territories. This statement prompted a violent reaction from Malaya's Abdul Rahman.

The point of importance, however, is that Foreign Minister Subandrio soon recast his initial public statements of non-interest in Malaysia. On September 27, 1962, Dr. Subandrio said that Indonesia was watching the Borneo territories closely, and that his country would take "countermeasures to any hostile Malayan moves" if these seemed needed. Later he denied that he meant literally to invite the Russians into Indonesian Borneo in answer to Malaysia plans, but he did repeat that Indonesia has "a great interest in events occurring in territories on its borders." Indonesia, he added, could not stand by while the "rights of the inhabitants of Borneo are disregarded." If this was an early and official indication that Indonesian policy would develop into more open hostility to Malaysia, there were also signs that among the wider public Professor Yamin was probably not alone in many of his beliefs. The fact that he sometimes made some foolishly extreme claims for "Greater Indonesia" should not lead us to conclude that Yamin's general concepts, and especially his less extreme notions, have found no support in Djakarta.

In October 1962, for example, while Indonesia's leadership was still maintaining in public that the proposed Malaysia Federation posed no

[36] Pauker, 625.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threat to Indonesia, the newspaper *Warta Berita* expressed a different position: Malaysia, it said, was simply another Western attempt to carry out SEATO goals. The "pan-Malaya Doctrine is not realistic" was its comment.[37] Muhammad Yamin would have agreed, since it was precisely his point that "realism" demanded Indonesian leadership of any pan-Malay movement.[38] And in the year which has followed the first intimations that Indonesia would take a positive interest in Malaysia, there have been a number of developments which seem to give new life to Yamin's urgings. In the Brunei revolt of December 1962, Sheikh Azahari had the public support of Indonesia's leaders, and by early 1963 Djakarta's military spokesmen announced that they would train "independence fighters" in the British Borneo territories (months later General Nasution acknowledged that the Indonesian army had indeed trained 6,000 anti-British rebels).[39] Simultaneously, the initial policy of "confrontation" of Malaya and opposition to Malaysia was announced, although this was called off for a short while after President Sukarno met Tunku Abdul Rahman in Tokyo during early June 1963. Finally, however, it has become clear that the "confrontation," which was formally reinstated two months later, is fundamental in Indonesian policy. Thus President Sukarno has refused to accept the findings of the United Nations survey, and when Malaysia was established on September 16, 1963, he refused to recognize the enlarged nation. This was followed by Indonesia's decision to sever all economic ties with Malaysia, accompanied by President Sukarno's repeated insistence that not only must Malaysia be opposed, but that it must be destroyed or "devoured."[40]

Foreign Minister Subandrio and President Sukarno have both denied, of course, that Indonesia has expansionist desires. Yet even during the initial confrontation Dr. Subandrio stated that "physical conflict" with Malaya might be unavoidable unless Malaya "changed its attitudes

[37] Reported on Radio Indonesia, October 27, 1962.

[38] This point is also made by Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation in Southeast Asia," *Orbis*, VII (Summer 1963), 342. Weatherbee's discussion appeared after the present article was essentially completed; our findings, however, are consistent.

[39] *New York Times*, September 3, 1963.

[40] In his speech of September 25, 1963, at an anti-Malaysia rally in Jogjakarta, President Sukarno explained at length why the U.N. mission to survey opinion in the Borneo territories had not convinced him that the residents there really favor Malaysia. He asked for a new survey: "Please reascertain the wishes of the Kalimantan Utara people. Do it over again. . . ." Sukarno promised that if a new survey, under the "procedures agreed upon in Manila," prove that opinion favors Malaysia, "we shall say O.K." But if those procedures are not followed, he warned, "the Indonesian people will devour any colonialist and imperialist [undertaking]."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

towards Indonesia."[41] Indonesia continues to justify its opposition to Malaysia by complaining that "the Malays represent themselves as accomplices of neocolonialist neoimperialists pursuing a policy hostile to Indonesia."[42]

Dr. Subandrio's phrasing suggests that irredentist sentiments alone are not the only factor shaping Indonesian elite attitudes towards Malaya and surrounding territories. Thus it is probably true that Yamin's special brand of pleading for aggrandizement—under the banner of "rightful return"—may not soon be picked up by others. But the extent to which his policy objectives may be supported by others now in authority, and for reasons which are merely variants of Yamin's, remains disturbing. For even the most reasonable of Indonesian leaders tend to view their own nation as the leader of the "emerging forces" in Asia and are most distrustful of other states which have arrived at independence without the benefit of a bloody revolution. It is for this reason, for example, that Indonesian leaders continue to regard the Malayans as "British puppets."

To the extent, therefore, that Indonesian leaders accept the implications of their revolutionary ideology and can make use of irredentism as well, Indonesia is likely to remain a potentially expansionist power.[43] The available evidence tends to indicate that her leaders will continue to give regionally cohesive goals a very low priority—unless, as in "Maphilindo," there is a likelihood that those goals support greater Indonesian hegemony. As Weatherbee also concludes, "Indonesia, under its present leadership, does not have an integrative function in world politics, does not contribute to regional stability [and] does not identify its interests with the regional interest."[44]

III. Personal Conflicts

Personality feuds and animosities among the leaders of Southeast Asia are fairly well-known. It is important to emphasize, however, that individual personality factors weigh heavier in the politics of developing areas generally than among the older nations, where role and position are more important. A recurrent feature of the relations between Cambodia and her two neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, for example, is the incidence of intensely personal criticisms on the part of the leaders

[41] *Washington Post*, February 12, 1963.
[42] Foreign Minister Subandrio, quoted in *Christian Science Monitor*, January 24, 1963.
[43] This possibility is examined in detail in B. K. Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism." *Pacific Affairs*, xxxvi (Winter 1963), forthcoming.
[44] Weatherbee, 348-49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of each nation. Often these personal attacks are reflected in bitter newspaper comment.

PRINCE SIHANOUK

In Bangkok, for example, a prominent Foreign Ministry official was asked to discuss the major outstanding difficulties between Thailand and Cambodia. It was expected that a harangue on the Preah Vihear temple dispute would follow. Instead the Thai official said that resumption of diplomatic relations and even certain forms of mutual cooperation were not blocked by any insuperable substantive issues. "The only obstacle so far as Thailand is concerned," he declared, "is the personality of a 'spoiled man.'" Prince Sihanouk, this official continued, is a man who is emotional, selfish, and vain. Given his personality, the government of Thailand has little hope of dealing with Cambodia on a satisfactory basis.

Vietnamese officials tend to express similar (perhaps even more bitter) attitudes towards Prince Sihanouk. One Cabinet Minister in Saigon stressed not Sihanouk's personality but his "defeatism"—his whole "political conception"—as a major source of Cambodian-Vietnamese tensions. President Diem's brother, Nhu, was also known to harbor very bitter feelings about neutral leaders generally, and Prince Sihanouk specifically. The Vietnamese believe that Sihanouk and the handful of men who help and advise him regard eventual Communist dominance in Southeast Asia as inevitable. It is largely for this reason that so many in Saigon believe that the Prince takes no effective action against Viet Cong activity and is helpful in other ways to the Communist cause.

Against this background of animosity, rumors of attempts on Sihanouk's life or his regime continue to circulate. There has in the past been at least one plot uncovered (known as the "Dap Chhuon affair"), and Sihanouk occasionally refers to that incident.[45] He probably is aware, however, that these days there is very little evidence of any Thai-Vietnamese design to overthrow him. Although the Vietnamese and Thai public attitude towards Sihanouk is hardly less hostile than before, there appears to be a recognition that removing Sihanouk would not solve many problems. As a high-ranking Vietnamese official expressed it, "Two or three years ago there might have been advan-

[45] A recent reference was made in the Cambodian weekly magazine, *Nationalist*. In the editorial of October 9, 1963, Prince Sihanouk reportedly claimed that Ngo Trong Hieu (formerly South Vietnamese Minister for Civic Action) and an American diplomat had helped a rebellion against the Cambodian government in 1959.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tages" if Sihanouk were replaced. Today, however, this official continued, assassination of Sihanouk or other extreme measures would have little utility, because the men who surround the Prince are no different than he. In the past, it appears, Vietnamese hopes might have centered around Prince Monireth and General Lon Nol. Today it is simply felt that while those two leaders might be more malleable than Prince Sihanouk, the game no longer appears to be worth the risk.[46]

If, as seems likely, there have recently been no conspiracies against the Prince, the thesis would be supported that Sihanouk makes effective domestic use of the supposed attacks against his own life and on the stability of his regime. The Prince's behavior is, to be sure, erratic, but, as frequently has been observed, "If he's crazy, he's crazy like a fox." Sihanouk has himself made public references to assurances from the American Ambassador of successful United States efforts to dissuade Vietnamese and Thai aggression against Cambodia.[47] If these efforts have in fact been made, then the United States is helping to lessen one element of instability in Southeast Asia.

Sihanouk's behavior, of course, does not facilitate efforts to help him. Malaysia's Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, probably has given little previous thought to either Cambodia or Prince Sihanouk. Yet, through his official party organ, Sihanouk recently launched an aggressive attack on both the Tunku and Malaysia, the Premier's priority project. Thus the Tunku was referred to as a man whose "megalomania leads him to take Cambodia as a target for his attacks."[48] The incident was probably not an indication of any continuing line in Cambodian propaganda and policy, for both countries exhibit massive ignorance of one another.[49] Certainly, there seems to be no firmly established personal antipathy between the Tunku and Prince Sihanouk.

Between Cambodia and her two immediate neighbors, on the other hand, there is a pattern of vitriolic personal characterizations that makes Sihanouk's remarks about the Tunku seem extremely mild. Readers familiar with the newspapers of these countries will recall the frequency with which such words as "pig," "dog," and "traitor" are used in public

[46] Interview, Saigon, August 9, 1962. Monireth is Sihanouk's uncle and President of the Crown Council; General Lon Nol is Cambodian Minister of Defense.

[47] In the speech at Samathy Ram Pagoda, November 3, 1962.

[48] *Neak Cheat Niyum*, December 24, 1961. (This is the official organ of Sihanouk's personal movement, the Sangkun Reaster Niyum.)

[49] For example, in two very long conversations with Charles Meyer in Phnom Penh I was unable to detect any particular interest whatever in Malaya. Meyer, a former sergeant of Alsatian origin, is sometimes referred to as one of the two *éminences grises* of the Cambodian regime. He is quite close to Sihanouk, prepares many of his public announcements, and apparently helps to run more than one government ministry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and press comment by Cambodia and her Thai and Vietnamese neighbors. However, Sihanouk must have concluded that there are limits even to this kind of vehement exchange and was reported to have denied that he had "prayed to the spirits of his ancestors to bring about Ngo Dinh Diem's destruction."[50]

Nevertheless, it is generally conceded that vicious official pronouncements, when seized upon and further amplified by newspapers, have helped to aggravate tensions among these states. As the earlier discussion of territorial disputes emphasized, the role of newspaper comment often appears to be critical; in this case, too, it seems clear that some of the personalized conflict would be reduced were it not for inflammatory press activity. There have in fact been some attempts at press *moratoria*, specifically on public statements attacking the leaders of adjoining states. In each case, however, some minor misstep seems to have killed the agreements very quickly. The simple fact that the solution of a press *moratorium* was tried should not be overlooked, however, since it reflects a local willingness to reduce the aspect of tension that is complicated by personality factors. These past efforts to cover over personality disputes give support to those who believe that this is not a deep-seated factor in the relations of these states.

Even between Cambodia and Thailand, where the personality conflict is ostensibly severe, there is continuing evidence that both parties may be willing to reach an accommodation. The agreement of both Sarit and Sihanouk to the informal UN investigation of Nils Gussing—and its recent extension through 1963—is significant. Also significant are Sihanouk's hints that a "normalization" of relations with Thailand may be expected. These have become especially noticeable since the rupture of political relations with South Vietnam.[51] After all, Sihanouk's liking for South Vietnam's leaders is no greater than his liking for Marshal Sarit, and the Prince continues to show that he wishes to avoid an economic break with Saigon.

There are, to be sure, points of tension between Cambodia and her neighbors. But it is a conclusion of this study that the personal element is not basic to these relationships. Moreover, it is improbable that per-

[50] Editorial in *La Dépêche du Cambodge*, October 24, 1962.

[51] An example is the Prince's speech of October 6, 1963, at Vat Dan Tong, discussed on the Cambodian radio service on October 8. Characteristically, however, it was reported that when Prince Sihanouk visited India early in 1963, he made remarks about Thailand which the Thais thought more abusive than their mutual "truce" allowed for. Asked about this, Sihanouk is reported to have replied that "as far as he was concerned the truce had gone overboard." (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 4, 1963, 9.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sonality factors alone will impede an improvement of relations along lines that seem satisfactory on other grounds.[52]

SUKARNO AND THE TUNKU

Between Indonesia's President Sukarno and other Asian leaders, personal bitterness has been until recently less openly expressed. It has nonetheless been evident and real. In Djakarta the leaders' pent-up jealousies of Malaysia, and the ideologically based criticisms to which the Federation is subjected, find reflection in nasty comments about the Tunku. It is apparently quite common for Indonesian leaders to speak of Abdul Rahman as a farcical spokesman for Malays. They argue that he is not a Malayan at all, but a Siamese. The Tunku is in fact of only half Thai extraction, but some Indonesians ask, "How can he pretend to speak for Malaysia or Malays? He is simply a façade."

The Federation leadership, of course, has privately and publicly returned the compliment: both the Tunku and Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak are quite bitter towards both Sukarno and Subandrio. Sukarno's well-known conviction that the Malaysian Prime Minister is a dupe of British imperialists has contributed to the aggravated relationship. What perhaps brought it to a head so far as the two Malayan leaders were concerned was the handling by the Indonesian President and Foreign Minister of Malayan proposals on West Irian. As it turned out, the Indonesians later accepted quite similar proposals from Ambassador Bunker[53] while in effect ignoring the Tunku's suggestion. A leading Australian official in Kuala Lumpur, one of the most experienced observers of Southeast Asian affairs, confirmed the general consensus that Subandrio's behavior infuriated the Malayan leaders and "left Rahman out on a limb." These developments have simply widened and reinforced the general derision with which the Indonesian leaders are regarded throughout Southeast Asia. The Tunku himself, in attempting to assess his more recent difficulties with Indonesia in the wake of Sukarno's opposition to Malaysia and his support for the Brunei rebellion, summed up the problem in this manner: "I still believe the whole trouble is a personality thing. He doesn't like me."[54] Yet the importance of particular personal antagonism can be exaggerated. That is, even if the Tunku thought that Sukarno was one of

[52] It should also not be forgotten that just before the diplomatic break, Sihanouk and Sarit reportedly met in Tokyo. This report, in the October 8, 1961, *Japan Times*, has never been denied.

[53] Ellsworth Bunker, former U.S. Ambassador to India, served as the United Nations mediator in the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West New Guinea.

[54] *Washington Post*, March 3, 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the most delightful men on earth (and some do feel this way), the gulf that separates the two elites is already so wide that it probably could not easily be bridged. The greatest portion of the negativism, as we have pointed out, emanates from the Indonesian side.

In attempting to assess the significance of this personality conflict, it is probably worthwhile to repeat that such factors appear to be of greater importance in Southeast Asia and other developing areas than in the traditional Western diplomatic context. Of the three factors inhibiting Southeast Asian cooperation so far discussed, this element is probably the most important. As a contrast, consider former Chancellor Adenauer's known bitterness towards Britain and British leaders. It has been a factor to be taken into account but generally not one on which expectations of German policy could be based. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, the potential for significant swings and shifts in policy is much greater. Because of the existence of non-mass politics and the narrowness of the elite, the latitude available to the few leaders is much wider. The government of Malaya, for example, for years resisted the approaches of Singapore leaders advocating the formation of some sort of integrated state. Up to 1961, as one observer put it, "Singapore and the federation were not only moving further apart, but seemed to be drifting into open economic conflict."[55] Suddenly, however, "the situation has changed," and the change is in great part due to the personal change of mind of Tunku Abdul Rahman and one or two of his closest advisers. This was a major foreign policy shift for Malaya, with enormous ramifications for the entire region, but it is fair to say that it was carried out almost without significant internal pressures or debate.

Thus, if personality clashes are regarded as a potential impediment to greater regional cooperation, it would also follow that the narrow pyramiding of the Southeast Asian governmental structure presents both vulnerabilities and opportunities. In this connection the visit to Burma of Thanat Khoman, Thailand's Foreign Minister, and Premier Ne Win's December 1962 talks in Bangkok can be seen as favorable developments. Similarly, General Aung Gyi's allegedly warm relationship with Thai Defense Chief Dawee may have provided a basis for improved Thai-Burmese contacts. But it seems indefensible to argue that personal factors can do much more than facilitate already tenable relations, or further embitter an existing unfavorable diplomatic situation. Thus, neither the existing Thai-Burmese friendships, nor the fact that the top leaders in both states count themselves "military men,"

[55] Emma Sadka, "Singapore and the Federation: Problems of Merger," *Asian Survey*, II (January 1962), 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has yet resulted in any shifts in their relationship. Indeed, there is a widely held view that Marshal Sarit's regime somehow expected the new Burmese leadership to adopt a more clearly non-Communist foreign policy. There is some evidence that when this did not happen, the Thai government became, if anything, less favorably inclined to the Ne Win regime than it was to U Nu's government. Incidents of this kind tend to bear out the thesis that, like territorial and irredentist disputes, personality factors as impediments to collaboration have probably been exaggerated.

At this point the reader familiar with Burma may object that nothing, and certainly not personal relationships, is likely to shake neutralist Burma out of her isolation. The Burmese example, that is, is often cited to illustrate the rigidifying effect of global tensions and the Chinese presence as a divisive force in Southeast Asia. It is logical, therefore, now to turn to the impact of bloc alignment generally. Many observers expect that it is this element that could most seriously inhibit greater regional collaboration.

IV. Cold War Alignment

Beginning at least with the establishment of SEATO, and probably earlier, the potential for regional association in Southeast Asia has been complicated by the new element of bloc alignment. While it always would have been difficult, for example, to persuade Cambodia to collaborate with Thailand, this initial disinclination is aggravated today by the fact of Cambodian neutrality. Cambodia, of course, is only the most obvious example of a point that can bear emphasis.

The earlier divisions and distinctions among Southeast Asian countries, which were quite sufficient to dampen any enthusiasm for "regionalism," derived largely from the absence of any common experience or tradition.[56] Today, and for a decade past, these divisions appear to have been intensified by the acceptance of either neutrality or bloc alignment as a basic principle of foreign policy. Thus the neutral countries like Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia can add a new perspective to old fears and suspicions. In the view of their leaders, the actions of Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines can now be seen not as separate and separable, but as part of a military alliance context in

[56] See, for example, Nathaniel Pfeffer's earlier comment that "there is not such a thing as Southeast Asia except for cartographic purposes. . . . it is a place on the globe where certain groups of people, holding little in common, live contiguous to one another." ("Regional Security in Southeast Asia," *International Organization*, August 1954, 311-15.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which the neutrals feel alien. Something of the reverse is also true, for Indonesian and Cambodian foreign policy is regarded with extreme distaste by Thailand and Vietnam. Their leaders would not enthusiastically support—if it were possible on other grounds—the entry of those neutralist nations into an alliance which included the Western-oriented states of Southeast Asia. There is no exact parallel to be sure, but it would be something akin to asking the government of West Germany happily to approve NATO membership for, let us say, Yugoslavia. As a result we find it almost impossible to envisage today anything approaching an effective political or military alliance which included such diverse states, in foreign policy terms, as Indonesia alongside Malaysia, or the Philippines and South Vietnam with Burma. For if in the past Southeast Asia was regarded as a prime example of "Balkanization," the description was never more apt than today.

It should be clear, however, that a new, tightly knit political or military regional body is nowhere being recommended at present. The unfortunate experience of SEATO has been sufficient. What is at issue is the continuing interest in Southeast Asia for lesser forms of cooperation, and the focus in this article is on the extent to which global alignment preferences might impinge upon such intraregional relationships. A generally held view is that collaboration between neutral and aligned states in the area cannot be expected even in the least sensitive fields.[57] It is in some of these non-official sectors especially that the evidence tends to dispute this thesis.

APO AND EROPA

Consider, for example, the organizations known as APO and EROPA, i.e., the Asian Productivity Organization and the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration. Neither Burma, Indonesia, nor Cambodia is a member of either of these two non-official bodies, both of which have as their goal the improvement of certain needed skills among Southeast Asian countries.

The emphasis of APO is on practical training designed to increase industrial productivity specifically, and it operates through national productivity groups. To this end it has brought technicians, managers, foremen, etc., to Japanese and other industrial facilities, including

[57] The area does not, of course, contain any Soviet satellites. There are nations that are clearly aligned with the U.S. (the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand); non-aligned "neutrals" (Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia), which often seem to lean toward the Communist bloc; and one nation (Malaysia) that is a member of the Commonwealth and is clearly Western-oriented and anti-Communist. Laos is the only state in the region whose neutrality has been affirmed by international agreement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indian and American factories and mills. The activities of EROPA are somewhat wider in scope. This organization, with centers in Delhi, Saigon, and Manila, publishes a journal on Asian administrative experiences and methods. It hopes to improve training in public administration, and expects in general to provide a means of cross-communication among groups and individuals involved in administration.

Both organizations are non-official, although in the case of APO the Japanese and American governments do make contributions,[58] and EROPA provides for national state membership. Moreover, with very active Indian membership in both organizations, it has been difficult to maintain that either is an American, SEATO, or other Western "front."[59] These organizations are mentioned here primarily for two reasons. First, these new agencies represent two of the barely discernible attempts of Asians to cooperate regionally in order to solve problems which are region-wide. To that extent the experiences of these organizations can probably be of use in the future. More to the point, the non-membership in APO and EROPA of the three Southeast Asian "neutrals" has everywhere raised questions of bloc impediments. There seems to be a general assumption that Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia are not members because "these countries don't want to affiliate with an international body which appears oriented toward the West." If this hypothesis is correct, it would cast doubt on the successful outcome of other, perhaps more far-reaching, attempts at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Yet even a quick analysis tends to undermine the easy "bloc" explanation. In Rangoon, for example, it was possible to question the Burmese official who was in Tokyo when APO was established and through whom Burma was initially approached regarding membership. He explained the problem quite differently. It had been a source of some embarrassment, he said, that as the months wore on after APO's query he was unable to make any reply. On several occasions he cabled Rangoon, asking for instructions, but received no answer.[60] For, as the APO staff itself had indicated to me, Burma never refused to join the

[58] The U.S. contribution is made through an AID agent.

[59] EROPA's "Training Center" is in Delhi, and the APO Secretariat in Tokyo has a heavy infusion of Indian nationals—who, by the way, seem to cooperate most effectively with Pakistani colleagues.

[60] Interview, Rangoon, September 1, 1962. This would certainly seem consistent with the findings of a U.N. study group on administration, which remarked on the inordinate delays involved in any communications with the government of Burma. They found that most letters had to proceed through several dozen steps before any reply was sent out. In this connection, one might think that Burma could benefit indeed from EROPA membership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organization—she simply did not respond. The inference, however, was that Burma was refusing politely.[61] The assumption elsewhere too, whenever the question was raised, was that Burma would not join such an organization because it included too many of the Western-oriented nations.

Burmese officials, on the other hand, while they are quick to mention some of the requirements of Burma's neutrality with reference to all sorts of other issues, never mentioned bloc reasons when APO or EROPA was discussed. Closer to the truthful explanation may be the obvious fact that during the past several years Burma has been in constant internal turmoil. She has been deeply troubled by severe economic and political instability, a never-ending armed rebellion, and recently, of course, a drastically altered composition of her top leadership. Combine all of these factors with an invitation to join an organization about which very little is known, even among the best-informed individuals in Southeast Asia, and it does not seem so surprising that Burma has not joined APO. In this case, the argument along bloc lines is extremely dubious.

Cambodia's non-membership in EROPA may also indicate that the thesis of bloc alignment as an impediment to cooperation is more a construct of detached Western minds than a factor in the foreign policy calculus of Southeast Asian leaders. Outside Cambodia, in response to questions, one answer was almost invariably received: it is probable that the Cambodians have not joined EROPA because they think it is another front for SEATO. In Phnom Penh itself, however, no one mentioned this as a factor when the question was put to Cambodian officials, foundation personnel, and others long familiar with the Cambodian scene.

It was learned, in fact, that several years ago the Royal Khmer government did send a group of observers to an early EROPA meeting.[62] Their eventual recommendation was against membership, but the decision seems to have had nothing to do with world politics. Among their reasons was the conviction that the overwhelmingly British and American administrative tradition of most of EROPA's members was simply not applicable to Cambodia's French-derived patterns of administration.[63] It was also realized that the few Cam-

[61] Interview, APO headquarters in Tokyo, July 22, 1962.

[62] Interview with Leonard Overton of the Asia Foundation in Phnom Penh. He of course follows closely developments relating to education and training.

[63] This might seem to ignore the fact that the Vietnamese, with at least as heavy a French tradition, have not been inhibited from becoming among the most enthusiastic of EROPA's members. On the other hand, there are many more English-speaking Viet-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bodians to whom EROPA is of interest are largely ignorant of English, and probably would not benefit sufficiently from EROPA participation. Finally, to employ an argument very similar to the case of the Burmese, the Cambodians may tend to feel that participation in a wide number of multilateral organizations is simply beyond their capacity. Trained and relevant individuals for whom such international participation could be of great value are generally in very short supply. In this case it may have been felt that they could not readily be spared from domestic tasks.

The important point, however, is that the most probable explanation for Cambodian and Burmese non-membership in these two regional organizations is peculiar to the country involved and not related to bloc alignments in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the fact that Cambodia and Burma are "non-joiners," for whatever reason, helps to perpetuate the massive mutual ignorance that is so characteristic of Southeast Asia. It is very likely that cross-national communications among elites—through functional groups of the APO and EROPA variety—could become an effective means for resolving the problem. To that extent it is surprising that there is not more awareness among diplomats regarding this kind of multilateral contact.[64]

Diplomats themselves, however, are seldom enabled or encouraged to perceive their Southeast Asian assignments in a regional context. While British and Australian officials may be organized to treat the area as an entity,[65] American officials often complete their assignments in one Southeast Asian country and then move on to another continent without ever having visited any other state in the area. A not uncommon example was a Political Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. While in 1962 he had been in his post for more than two years, he had not yet been given the opportunity to visit Phnom Penh, less than two hundred miles distant, and only a one-hour flight. This practice sometimes leads to the diplomatic disease known as "localitis." Indeed,

namese than Cambodians, and South Vietnam's administrative system has been considerably overhauled along American lines as a result of the Michigan State University contract.

[64] One case was extreme. In a conversation with a senior foreign official assigned to one Southeast Asian capital, it became clear that he had never heard of either APO or EROPA. Without any but the briefest explanation of what the two organizations expected to accomplish, he was quite certain that they had little relevance to "his country." This reaction was not, however, very typical. To many others both organizations seemed to be of considerable promise as a means of improving regional communication.

[65] The British have a regional intelligence organization at Phoenix Park in Singapore, and the Australian High Commissioner in Malaysia appears to have area-wide responsibilities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there does appear to be a tendency for American officials—let us say, in Bangkok and Saigon—to accept the local Thai and Vietnamese perception of Cambodian foreign policy. As a consequence, the significance of ideological and other divisions is exaggerated and the potential for regionally cohesive steps tends to be downgraded.

THE INDONESIAN EXCEPTION

It must be conceded, however, that in the case of Indonesia ideologically based notions as such are likely to block possibilities for wider regional communications. But the problem even here is less an Indonesian affinity for the Communist bloc than a result of Indonesia's own special brand of revolutionary ideology. In recent years, for example, Indonesia has been having enormous difficulty with her rubber production. As a number of reports and studies have pointed out, Indonesian trees have been allowed to grow to an age far beyond the normal times at which rubber is tapped. Yet when it has been suggested that help be sought from Malayan technicians, who have developed the industry to its highest level, the reaction has been one of extreme coolness, even insolence. The unspoken answer seems to be that whatever Indonesia's present failings, she has nothing to learn from the Malayans—nor, for that matter, from anyone else in Southeast Asia. As we pointed out earlier in this article, even informed and sophisticated Indonesians tend to view the rest of Southeast Asia principally from the vantage point of ideology. Their attitudes do not make one sanguine regarding significant Indonesian cooperation with the other important states in the region. At the same time it must be recognized that intensified Southeast Asian collaboration, without Indonesian participation, faces a bleak prospect. In terms of market size and mineral resources, Indonesia may be the weightiest of all factors. Moreover, it would not be pleasant to witness the rest of Southeast Asia finally coming to grips with common problems while a disgruntled Indonesia watched from the sidelines. For despite its sinister and exaggerated sound when Indonesians employ it (and they often do), there may be truth in their statement: "There is no Southeast Asia without Indonesia. Indonesia is Southeast Asia."

Indonesians' superiority-notions about their own role in Southeast Asia seem to have led to a certain regional aloofness rather than a policy of direct involvement. Thus, despite the ideological and other potential for Indonesian meddling in the affairs of several adjoining states, there was until 1963 little evidence of a pattern of subversive activities. The general consensus of informed observers in the area has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been that, until the Brunei rebellion, opposition groups in other states received little but vocal support from Indonesian sources. It is not yet possible to say whether recent illustrations of more active support, as in the training of rebels in Sarawak, signals a firm departure from that policy. It is true, however, that the policy of "confrontation" has been accompanied by some evidence of Indonesian matériel, propaganda, and indirect military assistance designed to subvert the government of Tunku Abdul Rahman.

The Indonesian Communists, of course, will continue to support President Sukarno's anti-Malaysia policies, and in this effort they will be doing the work of both Peking and Moscow. But it is important to stress that Indonesia's disinclination to improve regional cohesion in Southeast Asia need not be traced to Communist inspiration. Instead, Djakarta's attitudes towards "regionalism" are the product of a widely based distrust of the West, and a desire on the part of the leadership to assert constantly Indonesia's nationalism and independence and her global and regional importance. Indonesia's participation with the Philippines and Malaysia in "Maphilindo," for example, should be seen in this light. It is clear that her leaders are not yet ready to cooperate intimately in a group in which the other two members have domestic and foreign policies so different from their own.[66]

V. The Prospects for Cooperation

As factors that impede Indonesian participation in regional cooperation, some of these elements would be subject to partial erosion if such neutral states as Burma and Cambodia first became involved in regionally oriented programs. That development need not be regarded as altogether unlikely, especially if such non-aligned states as Burma and Cambodia became convinced that regional cooperation, particularly along economic lines, held out the prospect of benefits not otherwise attainable. In turn, that development should not be discounted, for it is a conclusion of the study on which this article is based that the eventual expansion of an organization like ASA (the Association of Southeast Asia) can be achieved. Clearly, the usually mentioned obstacles to regional cooperation do not loom so large when subjected to close analysis as when they are all lumped together. In particular, bloc factors, like personality disputes and territorial-irredentist conflicts, appear to have been exaggerated as sources of conflict in Southeast Asia.

[66] Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, July 1-5, 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perhaps the first starts in the direction of improved cooperation will be generated by two sources: by the United Nations, through ECAFE, in which case the prospects for neutralist participation will be improved, and by ASA. ASA is making quiet though effective progress on a variety of fronts related to technical cooperation and economic development, and most importantly, appears able to survive the disagreement between the Philippines and Malaysia.[67] If ASA does achieve its practical though limited goals, this too will provide an attraction for eventual neutralist participation. Indeed it does seem that ASA has the best chances for success of any of the efforts towards regional cooperation so far attempted in Southeast Asia. In this connection, two conclusions must be stressed. First, it appears that the most frequently cited divisive forces, with which this article has dealt, are not as significant as generally assumed. Second, there is among leaders in Southeast Asia a widespread attitude favorable to regional cooperation which will help overcome the apparent obstacles. Western thinking has tended to lag behind these developments, and for that reason policy-making may be ill-equipped to adapt to changes in Southeast Asia. As Roger Hilsman wrote several years ago: "Our true failures probably lie more often in failing to recognize emerging problems in time to evolve effective policies or in meeting big, bold, demanding problems with half-measures, timorous and cramped."[68]

[67] Reports that the Philippines was heading towards the recognition of Malaysia were corroborated by a statement of Foreign Secretary Lopez that he expected diplomatic relations to be restored "soon" (Voice of America broadcast, October 29, 1963).

[68] Quoted by Dean Acheson, "The President and the Secretary of State," in Don K. Price, ed., *The Secretary of State* (New York 1960), 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUST WAR

By LYNN H. MILLER

AFTER an eclipse of nearly two centuries, the ancient doctrine of just war has received renewed attention and interest in the twentieth century, primarily as the result of two conditions in the contemporary world. First, a new international system has come into being, replacing the European balance-of-power system of the recent past; and, secondly, modern technology has created military weapons without precedent in destructive capabilities, thereby radically altering the techniques and even the rationale of warfare. It will be the purpose of this article to examine the current status of the doctrine of just war to determine its viability for modern international politics and law. Specifically, the intent is to determine how relevant the doctrine may be to the two characteristic political conditions of our era just noted. A very brief historical review of the doctrine's development and demise will permit a fuller discussion of modern attitudes toward the subject.[1]

I. Historical Development

The *bellum justum* doctrine first took shape in Christian moral theology at a time when the church was attempting to become the universal religion of a universal political order. As such, it was forced to take a stand on war as an instrument of policy. Saint Augustine's basic distinction between the just and the unjust war provided a useful guide for the priest and Christian layman, and formed the basis for meeting an urgent political need of the time, i.e., defense against the invasion of the barbarians. He held that if a war results from a just cause, it may be waged in the knowledge that it is permitted by God,

[1] For a more complete account of the development of just war doctrine, see especially Joachim von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, XXXIII (October 1939), 665-88. Another valuable, although briefer, account is Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York 1961), 201-17. Lothar Kotzsch, *The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law* (Geneva 1956), ch. 1, discusses the origins of the doctrine in the pre-Augustinian period. The influence of both Luther and Calvin upon the doctrine's development is discussed by Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience* (Durham, N.C., 1961), 114-33; and a somewhat different emphasis is to be found in Arthur Nussbaum's article, "Just War—A Legal Concept?" *Michigan Law Review*, XLII (December 1943), 453-79. An interesting sociological interpretation is J. T. Delos, "The Sociology of Modern War and the Theory of Just War," *Cross Currents*, VIII (Summer 1958), 248-66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whereas, if such a condition is lacking, the war is the product of evil men who seek aggrandizement for themselves in defiance of God's will. The purpose of war is not victory, but the restoration of an ordered society.[2] If Augustine's distinction was an aid in formulating legal rules to regulate war, he had not sought to make such a formulation, nor did his doctrine pretend to lay down principles for the law of nations. It was, however, what it was intended to be—a workable ethical guide for the practicing Christian who also had to render unto Caesar his services as a soldier.

By Aquinas's day, the Roman Empire had disintegrated, but the unity of Christendom seemed firm. In such a context, and particularly with the concept of natural law now firmly implanted in Christian teaching, the Thomistic assurance was that objective justice could be done if the war were just. Aquinas laid down three conditions for a just war: (1) the declaration of war must be made by the legitimate authority—an important limitation in an age when privately waged vendettas were the rule rather than the exception; (2) there must be a just cause, which, as in Augustine's concept, could be found only in the fact that "those against whom war is being waged deserve this on account of some fault"; (3) the belligerent must possess a just intention—"to do the good and avoid the evil."[3] However powerful the voice of the church during this period, its judgments on political matters were never self-executing. Thus, even though the conviction may have been widespread that the church should be the final arbiter of questions determining the justice of war, secular princes were not thereby obliged to apply the church's criteria. Moreover, ambiguity was bound to arise in interpreting the Thomistic doctrine so long as the secular authority was in the position of having to judge his own case in the absence of effective positive law. In spite of these weaknesses, it is notable that one of the major political evolutions which followed Aquinas was the gradual reduction of the problem of private warfare to insignificance.

By the sixteenth century, the concept of state sovereignty clearly prevented the possibility that the justice-seeking, higher authority could, even in theory, rule upon the justice of particular wars. Vittoria recognized that fact but sought rather lamely to avoid its consequences by urging the sovereign to take wise counsel (presumably that of church authorities) before initiating war. The Thomistic requirement that the just war must be declared by the duly constituted authority did not take one nearly so far in Vittoria's age, when wars waged among a mul-

[2] Von Elbe, 668-69.
[3] Kotzsch, 32.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

titude of sovereign states might all meet that requirement. It became necessary to seek an answer to the important question of whether or not a war could be just on both sides. Vittoria's answer distinguished between the objective justice of the natural order and the subjective innocence of a party to the conflict. The case in which both parties would have an *objectively* just cause could not occur, "for if the right and justice of each side be certain, it is unlawful to fight against it, either in offense or in defense."[4] However, *subjective* innocence might be found in the "invincible ignorance" of those who waged objectively unjust wars in good faith.

A hundred years later, by the time Grotius sought to rescue the *bellum justum* doctrine from a then-outmoded theological framework which had little connection with the legal requirements, the attempt to incorporate the doctrine into the secularized positive law of emergent nation-states had only a fleeting triumph. With the break-up of the universal church and the growth of nation-states, there had arisen a corresponding need to determine whether or not the objective justice of a war could exist on both sides now that Christian sovereigns, both invoking the same doctrine and a just cause, fought each other. Generally speaking, Grotius regarded just war as a legal procedure for the assertion of positive rights. The question of whether both parties to a conflict may be just he answered in conformity with the scholastic doctrine. Objective justice could exist only on one side, yet both parties might argue their positions in good faith—that is, with subjective innocence. The unique aspect of the Grotian doctrine lies in the attempt to establish the necessity of sanctions by neutral states against one or the other of the parties at war. Grotius regarded the determination of a just cause as having specific legal effects upon the neutral states, which were thereby forbidden to lend assistance to the party supporting an unjust cause and to place obstacles in the path of the party waging a just war. Yet the determination of where justice lies in a given case was left to the neutrals themselves, and because that judgment is not one that is easily made, the practical value of the rule was virtually nullified. "The formula offered by Grotius tended to spread war to the states that took sides regarding the justice of the controversy rather than to deter violence."[5] The positive rights and obligations of the *jus ad bellum* which Grotius developed so explicitly thus were undermined as the result of their mischievous effects in practice.

[4] Von Elbe, 675.
[5] Kaplan and Katzenbach, 203.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was Grotius's follower, Christian Wolff, who stressed that the entire attempt to determine the justice of war lay outside the scope of positive law—an understandable position in view of the fact that the doctrine of just war had never been incorporated successfully into positive law. He held that it was natural law which obliged nations not to resort to war except for a just cause, even though voluntary law might allow states to follow their own opinion as to the justice of their cause in the absence of an authority superior to the state that was capable of making a ruling.[6] Thus Wolff made the doctrine both more realistic—by recognizing the limitations facing positive law in attempting to provide for the justice of war—and at the same time more unattainable—by almost denying its validity for positive law. Wolff's conclusions marked the temporary resting place for concern with a doctrine that had not been made to work. However important the doctrine may have remained as an ethical standard, the attempt to make it a legal norm controlling the resort to belligerency was virtually abandoned, and emphasis was shifted to the development of regulations for controlling hostilities once they had begun. The tendency thenceforth until the close of the nineteenth century was "to shift the emphasis from a delineation of the occasions when it was legitimate to wage war to a system of shifting alliances between the leading European states designed to make it impossible for a nation to mobilize superior force against its political rivals. Thus, stability was not a matter of enforcing rules restricting the use of force, but rather the control of force depended upon the existence of countervailing force. Political mechanisms of stability were more successful than the earlier attempts to establish stability by positing clear rules. Law thus became virtually irrelevant to the use of war to promote national interests. . . . The decision to use force, however, was not subject to third-party characterization, and a state was in a position to legitimate recourse to war by giving its own explanation."[7]

The fact that just war doctrine suffered this decline, however, should not obscure the great significance of that doctrine in the Christian tradition, particularly as expressed by Augustine and Aquinas. The belief was enunciated that war, which was to be avoided when it served as a vehicle for disorder and injustice, could *in certain circumstances* be made an instrument of justice and a means for the restoration of order.

[6] Von Elbe, 681-82.

[7] Richard A. Falk, "Revolutionary Nations and the Quality of International Legal Order," in *The Revolution in World Politics*, ed. by Morton A. Kaplan (New York 1962), 320.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, the issue in determining which role war may assume is inevitably a moral one, according to this tradition, since nothing more nor less than the moral standards of men can determine the character of war. As a French writer recently has pointed out, "It follows, on the one hand, that war, finally reduced to the scale of man, poses a moral problem, and on the other, it is stripped of the *sacred* character conferred on it by so many cultures."[8] Yet, as in other historical situations when moralists have attempted to provide a guide for political behavior, the mere presence of a formula often worked to inhibit considerations of morality in individual cases of warfare, and the garment of the just war was stretched to cover the naked unjustness of many medieval conflicts. It even has been asserted that "the importance attributed to the idea of the just war throughout the Middle Ages and well into the seventeenth century undoubtedly delayed the appearance of any body of rules restraining the more barbarous practices of warfare. . . ."[9] It is this negative side of the just war coin which, as we shall see, still plagues those who would reformulate a just war theory.

So far, our consideration of the development of just war theory has been concerned with the so-called *jus ad bellum* aspect, the conditions which theorists have considered as permitting a state justly to resort to war. Yet, when at last the attempt to specify occasions when war could be regarded as legitimate was abandoned, a body of rules for the regulation of war once it had been resorted to remained. The rules—the *jus in bello*, or the laws of war—had not been considered as independent of the principles of the *bellum justum* so long as that doctrine was regarded as potentially viable. Throughout the Middle Ages, "the *jus ad bellum* was . . . on the one hand, formed and developed by the doctrine of *bellum justum* which, on the other hand, gave rise to the application of the *jus in bello*."[10] The assumption throughout this period was that the war legitimately declared must be waged in accordance with legitimate means. Not only was it required that the amount of force used be proportional to the extent of the injury suffered—Augustine's chief stipulation for limiting war—but the *bellum justum* doctrine also carried with it requirements as to the rights of combatants and the proper treatment of prisoners. However, these last-named requirements never were incorporated into the existing positive law with sufficient success to permit the *bellum justum* doctrine to emerge from

[8] Delos, 250.

[9] Gerald Draper, "The Idea of the Just War," *The Listener*, LX (August 14, 1958), 222.

[10] Kotzsch, 86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Middle Ages as a recognized prescription for the *manner* in which war should be waged. It is probably futile to attempt to determine whether the doctrine fell into disrepute in the modern age because it failed to combine rules regarding the legitimate resort to war with those concerning its conduct, or whether its decline was the result of an overemphasis upon meeting the conditions of the *jus ad bellum* at the expense of restraint in the conduct of war.

Without attempting to examine the separate development of the *jus in bello* after the decline of the *jus ad bellum*, it need only be noted that the independent growth of the former was a concomitant of the disenchantment with the attempt to regulate the resort to war. As war came to be regarded as a natural catastrophe, like a flood whose occurrence was uncontrollable, emphasis shifted to the attempt to control its consequences. The nineteenth century thus saw the act of resorting to war as extra-legal and concerned itself instead with the legality of war techniques. In another time and international context, such a view of war might be even more fictitious than the earlier one which attempted, without success, to outlaw the unjust conflict—a possibility that twentieth-century social psychologists have noted. Yet in the international system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the view was plausible enough, for it "accurately reflected the dilemma of an order dependent for its effectiveness upon the maintenance of a balance of power, and consequently upon methods which remained impervious to effective legal control."[11]

II. Twentieth-Century Perspectives

The concern for limiting recourse to war within the legal order was never completely absent, however, even when an international system flourished which did not have room for such a theory. As Bluntschli noted wistfully, "There exists a great humanitarian interest to conceive of and to describe war as an instrument of justice in order to restrict thereby recourse to it."[12] The First World War created a final disillusionment with the balance-of-power system that had permitted an armed conflict to become a conflagration and furnished the necessity for reexamining the methods whereby recourse to war might be restricted. Wilson's insistence that the world needed "not a balance of power but a community of power" was an early expression of the twen-

[11] Robert W. Tucker, *The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine* (Baltimore 1960), 120.

[12] Johann C. Bluntschli, *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestelt* (Nördlingen 1878), 287.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tieth-century groping for an international consensus to outlaw at least some kinds of war. May we regard the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, as attempts to reembody the just war doctrine in legal framework?

Some writers, concerned only with the broad concept of the attempt to limit war, have placed the Covenant and Charter in the tradition of just war theory, whereas others have argued on a somewhat more specific basis that the content of the peace-keeping provisions of these twentieth-century organizations differs from that of the traditional just war doctrine. Thus, much of the apparent disagreement of writers on the subject simply stems from the fact that their discussions are not always on an identical level of meaning. For example, Kaplan and Katzenbach are concerned with the broad concept of the attempt to limit war when they state that ". . . the Versailles Treaty represents a return to the concept of war as an instrument for law enforcement . . . and thus represents a reversion to earlier concepts. . . . The League of Nations was envisioned prospectively as the instrumentality whereby force could be brought within a legal framework by collective sanctions to insure the punishment of violators."[13] On the other hand, Josef L. Kunz considered the much more specific content of the traditional *bellum justum* doctrine and of the League and U.N. provisions when he wrote: ". . . recent developments through the League of Nations, Kellogg Pact and United Nations . . . do not constitute a return to the classic *bellum justum* doctrine. . . . these treaties . . . understand by the term 'wrong' exclusively a violation of *positive* international law, whereas the classic doctrine means by 'wrong' a violation both of positive and of 'natural' law. A just war can be waged to enforce not only a positive, but also a *natural* right. . . ."[14]

There is probably too great a tendency for contemporary writers to see the relationship of the League and U.N. to the just war doctrine in terms of their own particular prejudices toward that doctrine or toward the international organizations themselves. Thus Nussbaum, writing in 1943, took a stand against the attempted legal resuscitation of the just war theory and refused to see any connection between that doctrine and the League attempt.[15] Lothar Kotzsch, in deriding the just war concept, asserted that it had been abolished finally by the U.N. Charter.[16] Both of these views may be correct if the writers mean to

[13] Kaplan and Katzenbach, 209-10.

[14] Josef L. Kunz, "Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale," *American Journal of International Law*, XLV (July 1951), 532.

[15] Nussbaum, 474. [16] Kotzsch, 101-2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

say that the Covenant and Charter depart significantly in content from the *bellum justum* doctrine, but they mislead us if they would have us believe that these twentieth-century international organizations have not arisen, at least in part, in response to the absence from the international scene of the traditional doctrine. With this parenthetical caveat in mind, then, we need to consider the ways in which the Covenant and the Charter differ specifically from the traditional *bellum justum* theory.

The League Covenant did not prohibit all war, but forbade the resort to war wherever substitutes were provided by the Covenant. However, as Kaplan and Katzenbach have asserted, "in the event of failure of these peaceful settlement methods, or on matters not covered by them (if any), a good argument for 'self-help' as lawful could be made—that is, argument in favor of the just war or lesser forms of sanction."[17] Moreover, the League concept of community sanctions against a violator of the peace can be seen as perfectly consistent, in theory, with the Augustinian conception of just war as a sanction to right a wrong received. In this view, the blueprint for such action by the League—i.e., the Covenant—acted to ensure that any war which might be fought under the League banner would be not only legal according to the League definition of a legal war, but also just—again in the Augustinian sense.[18] Yet the League Covenant transcended the traditional just war doctrine precisely inasmuch as it sought to bind the determination of the justice of an act of international violence to the community consensus of member nations. It attempted to provide, in other words, not only a blueprint but also a community for action on the basis that the formula alone was not self-executing. It was, of course, on just this point that the League failed, indicating to some that the step intended to modernize the just war doctrine in the attempt to make it workable had been taken in the wrong direction. But before the failure of the League, a more radical move to curtail recourse to war was incorporated into international law through the Kellogg-Briand treaty.

This instrument shifted the nature of the attempt from the formulation of a *jus ad bellum* to what has been called a *jus contra bellum*.[19] The shift was obviously one of emphasis, from the positive to the negative side of the question, but it marked the beginnings of the concern of twentieth-century theorists with the problem of outlawing all forms of armed violence, with the exception of those that might be encom-

[17] Kaplan and Katzenbach, 210.

[18] But note Kunz's disagreement with this interpretation (cited above, note 14). It seems to this writer that the idea of sanctions in the League Covenant is consistent with the traditional theory, even though the relationship of the two is not made specific.

[19] Kotzsch, 99-100.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passed within a strict right of self-defense. The Kellogg Pact lacked the sanctions which the League—theoretically possessing them—did not apply, and therefore its immediate impact upon international law was insignificant. In addition, the use of the undifferentiated term "war" in the Pact gave rise to legal ambiguities as to what was meant to be included by the concept. The League was to be plagued by the same problem; both the Covenant and the Pact of Paris could be frustrated simply by not making a declaration of war. The Kellogg Pact owes its importance, then, to the fact that ". . . it was the first multilateral convention which provided genuine positive rules for the outlawry of aggressive war. Its legal impact, however, has only been specified after the end of World War II when Allied military tribunals tried German war criminals. The Kellogg Pact was then interpreted in the sense of having made resort to aggressive war a 'war crime.' "[20] It is true that the Kellogg Pact was cited as a partial basis for the indictment at Nuremberg, although the significance of that fact probably should be interpreted mainly in terms of the general attempt to return, in the post-World War II period, to the task of outlawing some or most kinds of war. The Kellogg Pact, as probably the only remaining legal attempt in that direction, therefore assumed a new significance. Thus, it has been noted that the Nuremberg trials ". . . are comprehensible only if the reasons that led to the demise of the concept of the just war no longer operated. To make sense, these tribunals had to represent a development toward an ordered world community in which the use of force by national authorities without sanction from some international body was outlawed and in which effective tribunals for punishing transgressors were established. . . ."[21]

The United Nations Charter furthered the trend set by the Kellogg Pact toward making explicit a *jus contra bellum*, and it may be regarded as an attempt to codify in some measure the antiwar doctrine. "The outlawry of war is stipulated with regard to both formal and material wars. In order to achieve that goal, the Charter necessarily had to prohibit any unilateral act of force such as armed reprisals or intervention."[22] On this point the Charter is clear, yet the essential antiwar purpose of the organization—in spite of the fact that "war" is delineated somewhat more specifically than previously—may leave undefined or unregulated a large area of potential state policy somewhere between

[20] *Ibid.*, 100-1. Philip C. Jessup discusses the effect of specifically reserving the right of self-defense from being included in the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in his book, *A Modern Law of Nations* (New York 1948), 163.

[21] Kaplan and Katzenbach, 45.

[22] Kotzsch, 270.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the "arbitrary use of force" and "normal" peaceful relations among states. If the Charter is explicit in providing measures against the arbitrary use of force, it nonetheless ". . . seems to provide no system of sanctions to enforce community policies, no forcible military sanctions for any rule other than that which forbids the use of force."[23] This objection is a disturbing one, for it seems to suggest that insofar as the Charter was successful in defining those warlike acts from which military sanctions would result, it thereby served also to delimit that next-lower level of conflict against which legal sanctions were not provided. In other words, if the Charter says that the only legitimate war is the war of self-defense against overt aggression—and it is not at all clear that it does—it seems to provide no justification for sanctions taken against a state that has not yet engaged in overt aggression.

An excellent example of the kind of dilemma confronting states as the result of this problem is that of the British and French invasion of Suez. It has been argued that, in the absence of such action by the British, French, and Israelis, the violation of international law on the part of the Egyptians would have gone unanswered by the U.N.[24] To look at the issue from another angle, one might conclude that the Anglo-French action, which was condemned by the General Assembly, was just according to the traditional theory of just war. Julius Stone has urged that because an impasse of this type creates an intolerable situation, sanctions are required against a violation of international law and are necessarily not forbidden to states. Therefore, states may use force or the threat of force to ensure conformity to accepted principles of international law without doing violence to the Charter. "A just war is still a legal one, and forcible sanctions to guarantee rights are not aggression, clearly, and are not even, in most cases, threats to the peace—provided the force employed is moderate and limited to the vindication of legal rights."[25]

However tenable such an argument may be, it has been rejected by most scholars and statesmen; for example, note the treatment of the Anglo-French invasion of Suez by the General Assembly. Kaplan and

[23] Kaplan and Katzenbach, 213. Tucker notes as well that the Charter permits the use of preventive force without substantive restraint: "The one attempt in this century to realize a centralized system of international order . . . nevertheless sanctioned the preventive use of force subject to no substantive restraint other than that imposed by the necessity of obtaining the unanimity of the major powers. . . . The Council has only to decide upon the existence of a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' before taking the enforcement measures provided by the Charter . . ." (pp. 133-34).

[24] Most ably by Julius Stone in *Aggression and World Order* (Berkeley 1958).

[25] Kaplan and Katzenbach, 214.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Katzenbach argue that if the U.N. put the just war theory into practice, that organization probably could not control it. Therefore, they maintain, the refusal to accept the Stone interpretation of the provisions of the Charter—i.e., the just war interpretation—may be the course of greater discretion. They would recognize this refusal to widen the scope of sanctions as stemming from the lack of total legal organization of the international community: "Those who want the rule of law enforced on a world-wide basis (provided it is their rule of law which is in fact enforced) may deplore the difficulty under the Charter of collective or individual action to enforce generally accepted community norms. But conscious abstention from the just war approach has the same hard realism. . . . Although the risk of general war in some cases may be so slight that participants can risk forcible intervention to secure particular objectives, there is virtually no way to state those conditions in doctrinal terms so long as the community remains decentralized and only partly organized."[26]

The tendency not to broaden the scope of sanctions is the dominant one in the U.N. today. As such, it is in keeping with the Charter's *jus contra bellum* provisions, which have been said to transcend the old *bellum justum* doctrine by attempting to outlaw all war short of that of self-defense. Whether or not the new doctrine transcends the old one or falls somewhat short of it depends, it would seem, upon one's point of view. Certainly it encompasses a greater amount of warfare within the unjust category, but it may at the same time rob the just war division of many types of coercion that might be considered necessary for the development of a stable international legal order. We will again consider the relationship of the United Nations to the most important actors in the present world scene, but first we must turn to an examination of the status and kind of just war concepts that dominate the thinking of those actors.

III. The American Attitude

As presented by one writer on the subject, the twentieth-century American doctrine of just war is both simple and radical. It "is distinguished by the assumption that the use of force is clearly governed by universally valid moral and legal standards; it is distinguished further by the insistence with which these standards are interpreted as making the justice or injustice of war primarily dependent upon the

[26] *Ibid.*, 216-17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

circumstances immediately attending the initiation of force."[27] The just war, in this view, is one fought in self-defense—which may include collective defense—against an armed attack. All other wars, thus, are unjust, and the resort to war for purposes other than self-defense cannot be justified under any circumstances. "The insistence that whatever its grievances a state cannot justify initiating a war, that whatever its interests a state should not resort to war to preserve or protect these interests, stretches back through Roosevelt, Stimson, and Wilson and surges forward through Truman, Acheson, Eisenhower, and Dulles. . . ."[28] This concept of just war quite obviously differs from the traditional, or specifically the Catholic, concept inasmuch as injustice is largely equated with a breaking of the peace. Like the U.N. Charter provisions, it simplifies the traditional doctrine considerably by making this equation, for a state of peace is much more tangible than one of justice. From this basic proposition of the American doctrine, a number of consequences are seen to flow.

First, war as an instrument of national policy is regarded as definitely unjust. This is true not so much because such a war seeks to further the interests of only one nation at the expense of others as because it presumably must be fought without the adherence of the international community. However, it is pointed out, particular national interests may legitimately be advanced in a war that is waged as an instrument of international policy, i.e., in self-defense or collective defense against overt aggression. Thus, the important criterion here for the justness of a war is not its anticipated results but the presence of a community sanction which, it is assumed, can only be given to a defensive war. On the same basis, preventive war is to be condemned because it "implies condoning the resort to war by a state in circumstances other than those of self or collective defense against armed aggression; it signifies the acceptance of war as an instrument of national rather than of international policy."[29]

Secondly, because of the equation of justice with peace in the American doctrine, the belief is held that the moral consensus of "peace-loving states" inevitably will support this same conception of war. The forum today for developing such a consensus is the U.N. General Assembly;

[27] Tucker, 11. Tucker's study is both useful and suggestive, and I have relied rather heavily upon it for this section of my article. Tucker points out the simplicity of the American doctrine when he notes that, according to it, ". . . the just war is also the lawful war, the *bellum justum* is equated with the *bellum legale*. International instruments to which we have subscribed, e.g., the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Charter of the United Nations, are looked upon as legal expressions of the moral law . . ." (*ibid.*).

[28] *Ibid.*, 12. [29] *Ibid.*, 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

therefore it is assumed that American foreign policy should conform to the judgments of the Assembly and that the converse also should be true, since American policy seeks a just peace: "Thus in undertaking to subordinate our judgment to the collective judgment of the Assembly in case of 'indirect aggression,' our stated expectation has been that the Assembly's judgments will 'objectively' reflect the requirements of justice. . . . Given this attitude, only the obtuse will persist in asking whether what we want is objectivity from the Assembly in interpreting the moral law or support for American policy. The answer cannot be in doubt: we want, and expect, both."[30] That the U.S. position does expect both is clearly not a demand that is inconsistent with the American belief system. It scarcely need be noted that the acceptability to American policy-makers of this reverence for the judgments of the General Assembly surely depends upon the general compatibility of basic U.S. policy with the decisions made in the General Assembly. It is perhaps needless to ask how long the American belief that the moral will of the General Assembly represents objective justice would survive a major condemnation of U.S. policy by that assembly.

Thirdly, the extremism of the American doctrine in refusing to countenance the use of force except in very limited circumstances allows the pendulum to sweep far in the opposite direction once force is undertaken defensively against aggression. That is, when force finally is resorted to, it seeks very large aims—aims which, prior to the resort to force, were regarded as obtainable only by peaceful means.[31] The psychological attitude which permits policy extremes to be pursued in a defensive war that could not be pursued by peaceful means is obviously an attitude of vengeance that is more than a little reminiscent of the righteous posture of the medieval warrior, who may have made warfare more barbarous through his conviction that he alone fought for a just cause. We have noted before the difficulties inherent in showing tolerance toward the enemy when one is convinced that the enemy's cause is totally unjust. As to the American attitude, the assertion is made that "it is difficult not to conclude that this doctrine places almost no substantive limits upon the specific objectives which may legitimately be sought once force is employed in defense against aggression."[32] War is to be waged, once it has been forced upon the nation, until the enemy surrenders unconditionally or the entire world has been made safe for democracy. Paul Ramsey, in explaining the tendency of the American position to seek vast goals through the waging of war,

[30] *Ibid.*, 51-52. [31] *Ibid.*, 63. [32] *Ibid.*, 74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presents a picture of the American attitude on this point which is essentially consistent with that portrayed by Robert W. Tucker. He observes that the desire for infinite goals and ultimate achievements through war results from the absence in the society of any genuine religious conviction that this world is the kingdom of imperfect man, and that therefore permanence and perfection in social relations are unattainable. As he puts it, "Perhaps because of the Calvinism gone to seed in the atmosphere, and the lack of any doctrine of the Two Realms in which a human destiny is played out, the American people are ill prepared for the self-discipline necessary for the limitation of warfare."[33]

Hitherto we have spoken of the American "doctrine" of just war as though it were a precisely formulated theory of the law analogous, in that respect, to the doctrines of Aquinas, Vittoria, or Grotius. It is not that, nor does Tucker claim that it is. His formulation is meant to be evocative and if, drawing upon a large range of empirical data, he presents us with a construct that makes the American trend of thought on the subject appear baldly unsophisticated, his formulation has the merit of presenting the consistent tendencies of that thought. The pattern that emerges indicates little sophistication in American thinking about the just war because almost no systematic attempt has been made to develop a viable legal doctrine. In spite of the fact that the traditional *bellum justum* theory is not regarded as workable today without considerable modification (or perhaps because of that fact), American and Western scholars in general have been reluctant to attempt a systematic reformulation of the doctrine; perhaps they regard the poor showing, on balance, of the traditional doctrine as evidence of the futility of such an effort. On the other hand, it may be that there can be no agreement upon the fine points as to which uses of force are just—apart from the black and white distinction now present in American thinking—in a society within an international community which does not possess a unitary ideology that might make such distinctions almost self-evident. The Soviet Union does possess such an ideology, out of which has grown a more completely developed doctrine of just war.

IV. Communist Attitudes

In spite of the fact that the Communist doctrine is rather fully developed, it also appears to be in a state of flux at present, largely as the result of the changing technology of warfare. Non-Soviet writers on the subject generally have emphasized the ambiguities between the

[33] Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience*, 151.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxist-Leninist theory of war and Soviet practice, but less attention has been given the fact that that theory itself is now in the process of revision—notwithstanding the protests of Soviet theoreticians to the contrary. The formulation of the just war theory until about the time of the death of Stalin may be regarded as having laid down the major trend of the doctrine, whereas since Stalin's death a certain amount of revision has been necessary to provide peaceful coexistence with a doctrinal foundation. Moreover, even though Soviet theoreticians throughout the first period of their national existence were inclined to regard the development of international law as a distinctly bourgeois enterprise, designed to cloak the international politics of bourgeois states with a seemingly permanent legality, in recent years they have taken a more active role in that area themselves. In doing so, they seem to have outdone the bourgeois lawyers in adhering with doctrinaire rigidity to many traditional concepts in international law—for example, that of the absolute sovereignty of the state—while at the same time asserting principles that are little short of revolutionary, apparently unmindful of any contradictions that may exist between the two.

Starting from the proposition that all wars have their origins in economic struggles, Lenin distinguished three general classes of war in the modern world: (1) those between imperialist states, (2) national revolutionary wars against imperialists as well as counter-revolutionary wars, and (3) wars in regard to conquest or retention of colonies. On the basis of this classification, only those wars which resulted from class struggles could be considered as just; and, in them, justice inhered only in the cause of the oppressed class—with the proletariat or peasants in a struggle against capitalists or landowners—and with the subjugated people in a war against imperialists. Thus the first class of wars was excluded altogether from the just war category, while the second and third types fell within its scope. A just war, or people's war, might be waged as a traditional conflict between organized armies or as guerrilla war. Presumably, in the first type of war the army is a people's army, whereas in the second type hostilities are carried on by small groups of troops. However small the guerrilla units represented, the contest is defined as a people's war so long as they defend "with systematic consistency the interest of the people, which are the same as the interest of the State under Soviet condition [*sic*]."[34] War that is the result of class struggle is termed "civil war," whether the conflict is fought out as a revolutionary war within the confines of a single state or crosses national

[34] Kotzsch, 70; the quotation presumably is from Lenin.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

boundaries, and whether the troops involved are guerrilla units or organized armies fighting in the open field.

A corollary of the Leninist theory was the development of a doctrine of aggression. There was little of an explicit nature in the view of war mentioned above that would indicate the Soviet attitude on the subject, yet in ". . . the Soviet Union political thinking has long taken it as self-evident that aggression is characteristic of the Western world, as deeply rooted in the nature of capitalism; and orthodox communist doctrine excludes the possibility that any Soviet war could be a war of aggression, since it is argued aggressive attitudes contradict the inner structure of the socialist society. . . ."[35] In view of the belief system of the Communists, the logic of this position is consistent, if aridly scholastic, as is its further assumption that civil wars of liberation from exploitation and oppression can never be designated as "aggressive." Such a conception does not lend itself, however, to definition of a precision that would make it acceptable in international law. It is perhaps for that reason that the Litvinov definition of aggression—which was urged upon the international community by the Soviets for a considerable period of time—appears to have little in common with the Marxist-Leninist philosophic view of aggression. This definition, which was formally incorporated into the London Convention of July 3, 1933, as a generally recognized principle of international law, considered the aggressor state as that which is first to commit any of the following acts:

(1) A declaration of war against another state;
(2) invasion by armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state;
(3) an attack by armed land, naval or air forces, even without a declaration of war, upon the territory, vessels or aircraft of another state;
(4) naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
(5) aid to the armed bands formed on the territory of a state and invading the territory of another state, or refusal, despite demands on the part of the state subjected to attack, to take all possible measures to deprive the said bands of any aid and protection.

The first three conditions of the definition are basically in harmony with the formulations on the commencement of war made in non-Communist states; the fourth provision, while not a reflection of Marxist philosophy as such, goes beyond most Western definitions, while the fifth seeks to make provision for the Communist civil war doctrine. The fifth condition is interpreted as meaning that the state which aids the

[35] Stone, 114n.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formation of armed bands on its territory is itself the aggressor, and not the bands.[36]

We may speculate that the Litvinov definition of aggression was a response chiefly to the hostile threat from capitalist encirclement which the Soviet Union felt keenly in the early years of its existence. One need only recall the unfortunate Allied participation in the Russian civil war in 1918 to imagine the particular motivation for the provisions of the fifth paragraph. If the definition of aggression was an exceedingly broad one, the reason was probably because, at a time when the Soviet Union could not seriously consider indulging in offensive military action on a large scale, a definition of wide scope was obviously in the Soviet national interest. This assumption is rather well borne out by the Soviet attitude toward aggression in recent years, when the Soviet Union's ability to take offensive military action has been enormously increased. Thus, at the end of World War II, "the Soviet delegation . . . opposed any definition in the Nuremberg Charter of what was meant by 'aggression,' even though the United States delegation presented the very definition which the USSR had incorporated in its treaty of 1933 defining aggression."[37] Several years later, when a definition of aggression was before a committee of the U.N. in connection with the Korean War, the Soviet Union indicated still another change in policy. This time the Soviet delegation moved back somewhat in the direction of the Litvinov definition, but specifically refused to allow a clause like that of paragraph (5) to be incorporated. What had been regarded as uniquely expressing Marxist doctrine was now excluded by the Communists themselves. The reasons for this change were obvious enough, however, in light of the enhanced position of the Soviet Union in international politics. The provision which, in the 1933 definition, was meant to protect the Soviet state from attempts by the capitalist states to intervene in internal Soviet politics now would hinder the Soviets themselves from interfering in the civil conflicts of other states. Yet, most importantly for purposes of our discussion, the reversed Soviet position was still perfectly consistent with the general Leninist theory of civil war. If all class struggle leading to war makes that war just, and if—as a basic Leninist premise has it—it is the duty of the Communist Party to aid in the overthrow of the exploiting class anywhere in the world that it can, it follows that encouragement by the Soviet government to armed bands or guerrillas in foreign states does not constitute aggression. In short, what is unjust and an aggressive act in this respect if

[36] Kotzsch, 72-73.
[37] *Ibid.*, 74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

committed by a non-Communist state is just and cannot be considered as aggression if committed by the Soviet state.

Because of the obvious unacceptability of such a conclusion to any but the Marxist-Leninist states, however, the Soviet Union accepted the alternative which would place the least constraint upon its own actions—i.e., a definition of aggression limited to the obvious types of military attack by a state's armed forces. It has been suggested that this new position, which had its immediate repercussion in Soviet legal doctrine, tended to permit conformity to the distinction between civil and interstate war as it had been established in the nineteenth century.[38] It affirmed that an aggression in the sense of international law might occur only in relations between states, and, consequently, that the use of force by one class against another within a state could not be qualified as an aggression, but as civil war only. Throughout this discussion of the shifting nature of the Soviet position with regard to the concept of aggression, there has been no assumption that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of just war has been altered as a result. What has been shown is the way in which an attempt to implement some aspects of that doctrine has taken more than one form, presumably because of the changing nature of the Soviet Union's immediate international policies. As just noted, the most recent Soviet position on the state of war doctrine is sufficiently harmonious with the non-Communist attitude to permit a tentative cooperation not possible earlier in the formulation of positive international law, even though the Soviet doctrine of just war may be regarded as completely alien to most Western concepts.

It was suggested previously that the Leninist doctrine of just war is itself undergoing some substantive changes today. A recent text on international law by the Soviet Academy of Sciences states that "a just war is a non-predatory, liberatory war . . ." and thus includes "defensive wars and wars of national liberation."[39] This comes closest to a definition of anything contained in the book, and it is followed by numerous examples of both just and unjust wars on the basis of this distinction. The specifically Marxist "civil" war of class struggle is not included, although it might be argued that such a conception lurks between the lines. Yet the emphasis is upon "national" liberation, not the liberation

[38] *Ibid.*, 75. Kotzsch states that "All the controversies as to the legal meaning of aggression, however, . . . clearly illustrate that the Communist conception of war is very much like that of 'material war.' Suffice it to say that Soviet State practice conformed itself to the distinction between civil war and inter-State war as it had been established in the 19th century. Yet, this does not preclude Soviet Russia from maintaining her specific civil war doctrine in legal theory" (*ibid.*).

[39] Y. A. Korovin, *et al.*, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *International Law* (Moscow, n.d.), 402.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of an exploited or oppressed class. Furthermore, a predatory war is seen to be one which "aims at the seizure and enslavement of *foreign lands and peoples*,"[40] rather than of a social class, and the example of a predatory war specifically mentioned in the text is that of World War II, whose Russian phase is known as "the Great Patriotic War." The shift in emphasis from the Leninist formulation is distinct, even though it may be perfectly consistent with that doctrine. Certainly the textbook definition, suggestive though it may be of a possible change in Soviet thinking, is not complete enough to do more than indicate a change in emphasis, and since to alter the Marxist-Leninist thesis as to the nature of the class struggle and the obligations that flow from it would be to strike at the very foundations of the Communist system, it would be naive in the extreme to look for a precisely formulated alteration of that doctrine.

Likewise the Khrushchevian doctrine of peaceful coexistence, insofar as it is applicable to our subject, suggests some rather far-reaching revisions of traditional Marxism which must be disguised as orthodoxy. For example, Korovin and his associates pay homage to the same international law which earlier Soviet theorists dismissed as a bourgeois game by insisting that "peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states regardless of their social and economic systems is possible only if the generally recognized principles of international law are consistently observed."[41] Stress also is given those statements of Marx and Lenin which can be construed as supporting peaceful coexistence, and eventually the reader is reminded of the factors in the international scene which permitted the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union to conclude that war is no longer a fatal inevitability. None of this, let it be repeated, results in discarding the orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine of just war, but it seems nonetheless that the change in emphasis is great enough—given the peculiar nature of the Communist ideology, with its overriding need to provide doctrinal support for major revisions of attitudes and policies—to constitute at least an important step toward the formulation of a new doctrine. The differences between the old and the new Communist doctrines of the *bellum justum*, in other words, would seem to be greater than those between the doctrines of any two of the medieval just war theorists.

The recent discussion of the just war doctrine by another Communist theoretician lends further evidence to the assertion that the Marxist formula is undergoing alteration. Writing in 1960, Edvard Kardelj as-

[40] *Ibid.* (emphasis mine).
[41] *Ibid.*, 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serted that the Marxist-Leninist distinction of just from unjust wars was not formulated to give "... any absolute scientific or political evaluation, for this terminology is not appropriate to such evaluations, but solely in order to indicate what political action the working-class should engage in regarding one or the other sort of war."[42] Thus refusing to accept the doctrine as a political blueprint, he goes on to state that this formula ". . . cannot possibly mean that the working-class should be for a war or should even fight in a war which may be just. . . . The classics of Marxism and Leninism have always emphasized that it is not the mere justifiedness of a war that should determine the attitude of the revolutionary proletariat to it, but the part that war plays in the whole complex of international developments. Even very just wars can have a reactionary effect. For this reason, Lenin considered that it would be wrong to support a war, however just in itself, if that war were to excite reactionary consequences on a world scale."[43] The effect of Kardelj's argument is to relegate the Marxist *bellum justum* theory to a position of minor importance among the considerations that need to be taken into account by Communist decision-makers in determining which wars to engage in or support. If it is not the justness of a war that should determine the attitude toward it of the party or the proletariat, all that remains as a criterion are factors of a purely opportunistic rather than a doctrinaire nature.

Kardelj's opposition to the stand of the Chinese Communists on this subject rests precisely on the point that they seek to grant too great importance to adherence to the doctrine, even at the expense of maintaining peace: "The formula about just and unjust war as interpreted by the Chinese turns into a peculiar mystification, the sense of which is that you may not fight for peace if any war which interrupts peace is a just war. . . . Such a conclusion would be correct only if war were the sole means of tackling the solution of a precise contradiction."[44] But Kardelj goes even further and proceeds to deny—in fact, if not explicitly—one of the basic tenets of the Marxist *bellum justum* doctrine, namely, that wars waged by Communist states against capitalist states are *per se* just wars. He derides the Chinese attitude, which, he says, ". . . boils down to a theory that a just war is any war waged by a socialist country, because socialism is progressive and capitalism is re-

[42] Edvard Kardelj, *Socialism and War* (Belgrade 1960), 89. Professor Paul Ramsey has made the interesting observation that the effect of Kardelj's revision of the old Communist doctrine is to make it resemble the Thomistic criterion, which implies that the justification of the resort to arms even in a "just" cause still requires the topmost authority to weigh the good against the evil effects of war, i.e., count the costs involved.

[43] *Ibid.* [44] *Ibid.*, 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actionary. Here in fact the theory of just and unjust wars is brought to the ridiculous conclusion that any war which *I* wage is a just war."[45] Ridiculous or not, it is a conclusion which, as we have noted, followed from the basic Leninist equation of just war with "civil" war, whether or not the Communists of an earlier period cared to spell out the logical conclusion of that position.[46]

Before we turn to other non-Communist approaches to the theory of just war in the twentieth century, it should be observed that, in spite of the great divergence between the classic Marxist doctrine of war and non-Communist attitudes, the dominant line of development of the former, like the latter, is in the direction of a *jus contra bellum* rather than a *jus ad bellum*. This purpose underlay the Kellogg Pact and, with considerable refinement and some exceptions, the United Nations Charter. Likewise, present-day Communist theoreticians emphasize this aspect in their interpretation of Soviet history. The Academy of Sciences text on international law regards the Bolshevik Revolution as asserting a *jus contra bellum* on a grand scale: "The October Socialist Revolution . . . was of world-wide importance. . . . For the first time in history the people's right to peace was proclaimed in place of the 'right to war,' and aggressive war declared to be a most serious crime against humanity."[47] In another passage it is maintained that "Marxism-Leninism condemns war as a means of settling international disputes and differences. Lenin described wars of this kind as a bestial method of resolving conflicts in human society."[48] The entire doctrine of peaceful coexistence necessarily depends heavily upon the premise, however stated, that greater moral justness inheres in a state of peace than in that of war, including the just war. It is in the attempt to develop a *jus contra bellum* in the modern world that an unusual concern with the problem of aggression has arisen. The assumption which motivates this concern on the part of both Communist and non-Communist writers apparently is that the chief necessity in outlawing war is to outlaw all the means for starting a war, i.e., aggression. Ramsey has observed correctly that "Men of former ages would not have condemned aggression so categorically, or used it as the one main test of an unjustified war. . . . These former ages believed more that the rule of law or natural justice is indivisible than that peace is indivisible; . . .

[45] *Ibid.* Moreover, Kardelj asserts that the notion that any Communist war is just is contrary to Leninism (cf. pp. 93ff.).

[46] See above, 270.

[47] Korovin, *et al.*, 9.

[48] *Ibid.*, 401.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for them the prohibition of aggression was not the main rational limit to be imposed upon conflict between peoples."[49]

V. The Non-Western, Non-Communist Contribution

Interest in developing a *jus contra bellum* has not been limited to the major actors in the contemporary international scene, but has received much of its impetus from states which are neither Western nor Communist. For the most part, these are states which have been beyond the pale of independent participation in international politics until quite recently, and thus have not had occasion to produce full-blown theories of just war comparable to those in the West. These states appeared on the international stage at a time when, for reasons already discussed, attention was being shifted increasingly from the *jus ad bellum* to the *jus contra bellum*. Perhaps, then, it is the temper of the times—resulting from the evident horror of warfare in the modern world—which has been one major reason why the basic attitudes of these states tend toward a *jus contra bellum*. Moreover, a semi-pacifism seems to form the backdrop for the entire philosophy of government of at least the major neutral state, India. Indeed, an Indian political scientist specifically has rejected both just war theory and collective security as unconducive to modern security and has suggested that the dilemma posed by both may be resolved through the one difficult assumption that ". . . mankind, groping in the dark for a solution to the riddle, may accept . . . a moral alternative to war. The alternative [is that] preached and practiced by Mahatma Gandhi and a number of idealists before him, viz., non-violence."[50]

At least one writer has seen a sort of diluted Gandhism as pervading the international political outlook of this entire group of states, and he suggests that the dawn of an era in which "peace-loving states" are the actors in international law and politics will have widespread effects.[51] Not only have dozens of new states participating in international relations come into being since 1945, but they have also begun to make known their desire for an alteration of many of the rules of the game. The period inaugurated by the signing of the U.N. Charter may be seen as one which aims at the avoidance of the use of force,

[49] Ramsey, 81. Falk has noted succinctly the development in the direction of prohibiting aggressive war ("Revolutionary Nations," 320-22).

[50] A. Appadorai, *The Use of Force in International Relations* (Bombay 1958), 35. Elsewhere, Appadorai makes a cogent plea for the rejection of traditional just-war doctrine.

[51] B. V. A. Röling, *International Law in an Expanded World* (Amsterdam 1960), chs. 1-3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but it is an era which aims at much more than that. "For the Christian states (the appellation assigned to those states which were the principal actors from 1648-1845) the central idea might have been Christianity, with its consequences of crusades and missions. For the civilized states (1845-1945) the central idea might have been national spiritual values, soon shifting to commercial values and industrial nationalism. There is no doubt that the peace-loving states (1945–) concentrate their efforts on peace, economics, and welfare. The law of the peace-loving states will not only be concerned with the avoidance of war but also with the creation of conditions of well-being and the promotion of higher standards of living, full employment, and economic and social progress and the development of all the members of the world community."[52] Such an analysis suggests that the admittance of non-Western states as equal actors in international politics is resulting in a definite shift toward many new norms and rules in international law, among which are surely tendencies toward a strengthened *jus contra bellum*. This observation is admittedly vague, but a sufficient variety of evidence exists to give credence to what is suggested above. We have not discovered sophisticated *jus ad bellum* theories emerging out of the new African and Asian states, nor are we likely to, but we may soon expect to find valuable contributions from them for a *jus contra bellum*.

VI. Opinions of Legal Scholars and Moral Theologians

In moving to an examination of just war theory as it is discussed currently by individual writers in the West, we find that the positions expressed fall into two broad categories. These are that (1) any doctrine of the *bellum justum*, if considered as a juridical or moral guide for our time, is either irrelevant or dangerous since it assumes a *jus ad bellum* rather than a *jus contra bellum*; (2) the just war doctrine should be made applicable to the present age, because it can provide definite limitations upon war during a period when the abolition of war is regarded as utopian.

Among those who would deny the validity of a just war doctrine for the mid-twentieth century, the conviction is widespread that it is the technological revolution in modern weaponry which makes such a doctrine untenable. A typical expression of this conviction asserts that

[52] *Ibid.*, 52. Other recent publications that are relevant to this section on non-Western contributions include Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (Paris 1962); Nazendra Singh, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (London 1959); Alejandro Alvarez, *Le droit international nouveau dans ses rapports avec la vie actuelle des peuples* (Paris 1959).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a strategy based upon nuclear weapons blurs the separation between war and peace more than ever before and, consequently, the determination of a just from an unjust war. Justification for the use of force is seen as legitimate only if the alternative of non-participation and neutrality also is left open. The conclusion is reached that ". . . the basic limiting premises (just and unjust war; combatant and non-combatant; military and civilian targets) of the traditional patterns for justifying force . . . appear to be quite obsolete under present conditions. Despite the obvious aspiration of many non-nuclear states for neutrality, the global impact of nuclear warfare undermines a posture of non-participation."[53] In a similar view, nuclear weapons not only eliminate non-participation in a future war, but also make war invalid as a punitive technique. As stated by a study commission of the French Protestant Federation: ". . . the new possibility of war annihilating mankind brings into question the traditional and modern theses on 'just war.' These theses, introduced into Christian ethics in order to introduce some limit rather than to justify any particular war enterprise, found their place in it thanks to the assimilation of war to the practice of a magistrate. . . . But the war which threatens today has crossed the threshold beyond which this function of safeguarding the community no longer seems possible. The type of war which the doctrine of the 'just war' supposes is not that of the world war to come. The tie which still attached the right to war to the punitive function of the magistrate is in the process of being broken."[54] It is significant that the moral validity of a just war theory—and not simply its juridical feasibility—is called into question as a result of the supposedly changed character of warfare itself.

The moral question presented by *bellum justum* theory ultimately is one of the tenability of the desire to achieve justice for oneself. A number of years before the development of nuclear weapons brought such a question sharply into focus, Georges Scelle presented the issue with clarity: "Every recourse to violence is a war. If we introduce here any subjective elements, notably the will to make war, there is no longer . . . any security. What must be forbidden is precisely the will to do justice for oneself [*se faire justice à soi-même*]. . . . If we wish to proscribe war . . . we must wholly remove from international law the possibility

[53] Richard A. Falk, *Law, Morality, and War in the Contemporary World* (New York 1963), 53. Or, as Röling has put it, "In former times, the threat and the possibility of war were factors in the maintenance of law. War can no longer serve this purpose, however, for humanity can also be annihilated by a just war" (p. xix).

[54] Ecumenical Studies Commission of the French Protestant Federation, "Christians and the Prevention of War in the Atomic Age," *Cross Currents*, IX (Winter 1959), 25-26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of taking justice into one's own hands."[55] The dilemma of which Scelle takes cognizance points up the subtle irony running through the entire history of the attempts to determine which uses of force in international politics may be considered as legitimate. We may say that just war theory had its origin in the desire to impose a moral and (it was hoped) a legal imperative upon men to resort to war only in certain specified circumstances; and that, conversely, it was built upon the assumption that force could be used to obtain justice in those certain circumstances. Yet the substance of justice has never been so universally recognized that, in practice, all men could agree upon the justness of a particular war—at least before it was fought. To suppose that one of the parties involved in a war furnishes clear proof of the justness of its cause, agreed to by the other party, is to deny the existence of the dispute. Thus, as Scelle notes, it is precisely the will to do justice for oneself—as justice is seen through the eyes of the one party—that forms the basis for the existence of a doctrine of just war and at the same time ensures that wars will be fought and their causes justified. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the unworkability of the traditional doctrine became obvious, though this basic and more fundamental reason for its unworkability presumably was less apparent. In the twentieth century it was thought that the absence of such a doctrine encouraged recourse to war, and the process of distinguishing the legitimate from the illegitimate was begun again. Yet the dilemma inherent in such an attempt came to the surface more quickly in this century than it had previously, because the development of weapons of vast destructiveness threw the moral problem of war into much bolder relief. Thus some writers apparently have concluded that no helpful middle ground can exist between an anarchistic non-differentiation of the uses of force as an instrument of politics and the outlawry of all but strictly defensive war—which itself would not long be necessary in a world without any form of forcible aggression. Such a conclusion leads them to some form of pacifism, by which is meant simply the advocation of non-violence, though they may regard it as a *desirable* legal aim rather than as a juridical position that is immediately obtainable.

If the advocacy of non-violence as leading to the eventual outlawry of war seems to permit unjust actions to go unredressed, it is because "two world wars and the fear of more catastrophic wars have made the avoidance of war more important than the achievement of justice." Noting that we are faced currently with the "two juridical values of

[55] Georges Scelle, "L'Aggression et la légitime défense dans les rapports internationaux," *L'Esprit International*, XVI (1936), 389-90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security and justice," Josef L. Kunz notes that "security is the lower, but most basic value."[56] The security referred to here is obviously that which permits men and nations to continue living, even in a world where injustice abounds. Kunz's interpretation may be regarded as humanistic in a broad sense for, like most of the arguments that move toward advocation of non-violence, it regards the preservation of the human race as the fundamental requisite. It will be observed that this assumption is not made by some who currently are reasserting the validity of the *bellum justum*. Moreover, there can be little expectation that those who regard war as a phenomenon resulting from man's evil nature, or as an instrument of divine will to punish wicked men, will agree to the possibility of abolishing war by fiat, however strenuously they may advocate non-violence as a moral directive. They will likely find themselves on the side of those who are convinced of the historical inevitability of war, a group that is represented most notably today by the Chinese Communists. The humanist approach is somewhat more optimistic about the possibilities of abolishing all kinds of war and not simply restricting the resort to some kinds, by viewing war, in the words of one such humanist, as "identified not with the fundamental needs of human nature, but with the historical process; . . . war may not only change and evolve, but disappear, with the disappearance of the factors creating a relation between the social structure and war. . . ."[57]

Most of the vigorous Western critics of the position which denies that war is any longer possible—that is, those who come within the third category of writers—have been Christian moral theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, although this is not to say that the chief spokesmen for the Christian community are united in this position.[58] In general, Catholic theologians, drawing from a well-developed church tradition of just war theory, have been more inclined than their Protestant counterparts to uphold the *bellum justum* idea.[59] However, interestingly enough, the Catholic position itself has undergone rather radical revision in recent years, and no real unanimity seems to exist within the church hierarchy as to the merit of this shift. In 1948, Pope

[56] Kunz, 533-34.

[57] Luigi Sturzo, *The International Community and the Right of War* (London 1929), 208-9.

[58] For example, Luigi Sturzo, whose "humanistic" view of war was just noted, was himself a Roman Catholic priest.

[59] This is also the judgment which Ramsey makes in *War and the Christian Conscience*, where he is rather harsh in his criticism of most Protestant writers on the subject for failing to recognize the value of sophisticated just-war doctrine for the nuclear age.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pius XII condemned aggressive war as "a sin, an offense, and an outrage against the majesty of God," and "modern total war" as "a crime worthy of the most severe national and international sanctions," unless it was clearly waged in self-defense.[60] This pronouncement, in keeping with the general trend of the twentieth century, indicated a novel change in the Catholic position stemming from Augustine and Aquinas. John Courtney Murray, an American Roman Catholic priest, later voiced his own pessimism as to the practicality of such a dictum when he denounced the American policy of "we will never shoot first." The gist of Father Murray's argument, which leads to the possible support of non-nuclear, preventive war, is that such a policy is irrational because it may permit the outbreak of war on a vast scale using weapons that, morally speaking, "are unshootable, no matter who shoots first."[61] He is apparently disturbed, as others have been, by the fact that an anathema placed upon "aggression"—at a time when the legal and technical problems involved in such a proscription seem insoluble—apparently eliminates preventive action as a means of limiting war.

Others who reassert a just war doctrine generally are troubled by the same concern. They view the denial of traditional just war in this century as finding expression in the various attempts to outlaw aggression and the corresponding attitude that, once declared immoral, aggression is regarded as a crime of such magnitude that any and all means are legitimate in opposing it. It is the attitude characterized earlier as the American one that is opposed here. The most articulate critics of such a position regard it as a contradictory policy because it seems to assume, on the one hand, that war has become so destructive it can no longer be regarded as a moral instrument of national policy, while, on the other hand, it permits the continued stockpiling of ever more destructive weapons out of fear that war may nonetheless be possible; therefore, when war breaks out, attempts to keep it within bounds that are morally acceptable must be cast aside of necessity. It is, they say, a position which is piously moral to the point of the outbreak of war and then becomes fatalistically immoral.

Paul Ramsey suggests that the traditional *bellum justum* still has relevance if the terminology distinguishing just and unjust wars is changed to differentiate between counter-forces and counter-people warfare. "At once it will be seen that the position that counter-forces

[60] Quoted in Ramsey, 83.

[61] John Courtney Murray, "Remarks on the Moral Problem of War," *Theological Studies*, xx (March 1959), 45. This passage is also quoted in Ramsey, 86-87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

warfare alone can be justified for arming the political purposes of a nation may reasonably be proposed as a truth to be acknowledged in military doctrine."[62] He deplores the contemporary tendency to deny the relevance of just war doctrine on the basis that, as a result of modern weapons development, it is no longer possible to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in modern war, and that such a distinction is required if war is to remain morally just—i.e., a counter-forces war. Ramsey's answer is that "We only have to know *that* there are noncombatants, not exactly *who* or *where* they are, in order to know that warfare should be forces and counter-forces warfare, and attack be limited to legitimate military targets. This moral limit still holds, even if it must be admitted . . . that responsible political and military action has now to assume that civilians with their moral immunity from direct attack are now in far greater danger even in a justly conducted war than ever before in human history, because there are many more legitimate military targets than ever before and because the firepower of even a just war has been vastly increased. . . ."[63]

Ramsey recognizes the possibility that "a genuine world-wide community, reflected in world law, will come into being over decades to come, . . ."[64] but he regards the likelihood of the continuation of wars in the meantime as too great to permit an abdication of the restraints made possible by just war theory. Thus he apparently does not assume that the formula for just war which he presents should be considered as other than an ethical guide, or that any attempt should be made to transpose these moral limitations into international law, even if that could be done. He assumes that any juridical attempt to control the resort to force would best take the path of a legal *jus contra bellum.* Seen in this light, it is evident that Ramsey's concern with making the *bellum justum* workable in the mid-twentieth century—and the same would be true of virtually every other writer who takes this position—does not signify disagreement as to the ultimate goal with those who would eliminate it entirely; both groups desire to make the resort to force under almost all circumstances illegal. Even if we recognize, as we must, that very fundamental differences of opinion as to how war can be controlled will result from one's conception of the nature of war (which in turn flows from one's view of the nature of man and human society), it would seem that the attitudes

[62] Paul Ramsey, "The Case for Making 'Just War' Possible," in *Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience*, ed. by John Bennett (New York 1962), 143.
[63] Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience*, 68.
[64] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and assumptions of these two groups of thinkers are not irreconcilable on the question of methods for sharply curtailing, if not finally eliminating, the social cancer of war. Such an assumption, however, must be demonstrated, and for that purpose it will be useful to present, in summary fashion, the general lines of evidence that have resulted from this study.

VII. Appraisals of Relevance

The traditional Western theory of the *bellum justum* originated as an ethical and a moral doctrine of the Christian church which for centuries—because of the closeness of the ties between church and state—sought expression in positive law. With the greater cleavage between political and religious authority that followed in the West, the attempt to incorporate the doctrine into the secular law of nations never met with real success, and an international system arose which was forced to regard war as a natural, uncontrollable phenomenon in order that war or the threat of war could be used as the catalyst that gave the system stability. Just war doctrine survived, if at all, as an ethical and not a juridical force. In the twentieth century, when that balance-of-power international system broke down, the attempt was made once again to incorporate some sort of just war doctrine into the international legal framework. The traditional theory, still an important moral guide, did not seem to lend itself any better than it had formerly to being somehow translated into the law of nations; or, if it did, such an attempt was not made seriously. Instead, that doctrine was examined once again in the attempt to apply it as a moral formula, urged on the consciences of men, to the potential situations of war which were regarded as likely in the mid-twentieth century. Some writers insistently denied that the traditional doctrine was outmoded as ethical doctrine in the context of modern nuclear war, and sought to prove their point by updating the terminology to make it more obviously applicable to the strategies of nuclear war. A more radical development has been to attempt much more than was sought by the traditional doctrine—while reaffirming that doctrine's basic proposition that recourse to war can be restricted—by shifting the emphasis to a *jus contra bellum*, and denying the validity of any resort to force except for purposes of strict self-defense. This is the approach that generally has been taken in the legal sphere, as is seen in the incorporation of this idea into the legal framework of the Kellogg treaty and the United Nations Charter. Significantly, this approach

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also has been attempted in some strictly ethical doctrine as well—most notably as enunciated by a Roman Catholic pope—although the doctrinal underpinnings on the subject of both the Soviet Union and the United States may be regarded as tentatively adopting this position as well. By the dawn of the nuclear age, systematically developed theories of a *jus ad bellum*—theories that were radically different in content—were possessed by the Soviet Marxists and the Catholic church, and both of these groups, as we have seen, tended in the light of nuclear weapons development to move away from those theories in the direction of a *jus contra bellum*. In the legal sphere the dominant concern with a *jus contra bellum*, which has resulted in the problem of outlawing aggressive war, has led to an overriding interest in the definition of aggression in both its forms, i.e., overt violence (which in turn may have many forms) and non-military intervention. At present we may say that this definitional problem has proved to be too huge for ready solution, and the result is a sort of impasse wherein most of the world is agreed that aggression should be outlawed, but the concrete legal steps needed to implement that consensus cannot yet be taken. Perhaps, however, the way out of this impasse leads in another direction—via the route of the traditional just war doctrine to an extension of the horizontal legal order.

What is proposed here, in fact, is that the just war doctrine be "stood on its head" so that it may be used not as proof of the justice of a cause which, in itself, justifies war, but as proof of the threat to security that requires community action. One of the fundamental objections to any just war doctrine is that it assumes that the desire to do justice for oneself is a just desire,[65] and that, therefore, *not* to take to arms when a just cause exists is itself immoral. The present crisis in the theory, of course, results from the question of whether it is any longer true that a greater good results from the resort to war in certain cases than would result from remaining at peace. However much men may be agreed at present that initial resort to war should be condemned, they are far from unanimous as to what should follow in response to an act of violence. The necessity then—implicitly recognized by those who are concerned with the definition of aggression—is to prevent the just cause from occurring, or at least to ensure that the provocation and the response be acted out within limits that are controllable. Cannot the just war doctrine be used to point to "legitimate" causes, so that legal safeguards for peaceful settlement may be constructed at those

[65] See above, 278.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

points where the unilateral, forcible redress of a wrong would be regarded as most "justifiable" on the basis of an abstract standard of justice, but most suicidal in the present international context? An example which moves in the direction here advocated may be drawn from a comparison of the comments of two writers—one concerned with pointing out, by applying the traditional Catholic just war formula, what kinds of potential conflicts in the modern world might be regarded as morally justifiable, and the other interested in the development of a realistic doctrine of intervention through the extension into the horizontal legal order of recognized principles of national self-interest.

A Jesuit writer, Father McKenna, lists the seven conditions which must be met to justify war in the Catholic doctrine, then seeks to apply them to "various likely projections of the present world situation." This effort results in the conclusion that ". . . the eventuality which would most clearly justify a full-scale military response by the United States would be an attack on this country or its allies, initiated by the Soviet Union. Less clear would be an engagement among neutrals, between neutrals and American allies, or between the Soviet satellites and an American ally or a neutral. An American initiative would be permitted only in a constellation of circumstances so unique as to be virtually impossible. The use of some nuclear weapons, while legitimate in the abstract, is almost unthinkable in any but a direct Soviet-American conflict; and even in this case, their employment on civilian centers would be illicit."[66] A pattern of the justness of retaliation is here presented which, although the viewpoint of an American Catholic moralist, might be regarded as completely acceptable to a Soviet audience, given their reasonably similar view of the types of conflict that can or cannot be permitted in the national interest. The pattern just described, however, is presented only as it emerges from the view of just war which Catholic moralists are inclined to hold, and no explicit claim is made as to its heuristic value for international law. Yet, in a recent article by an international legal scholar, the attempt is made to develop a legal rule on the problem of intervention and non-intervention that would emerge from the observed behavior of states; the resulting pattern has some similarity to the one which is drawn from the observations of the Jesuit writer. On the basis of the observed behavior of the major Cold War actors in a number of conflicts, the second article posits that ". . . first, when domestic strife takes place

[66] Joseph C. McKenna, S.J., "Ethics and War: A Catholic View," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (September 1960), 658.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

within a nation that is a member of a bloc, the rival bloc should adhere to a policy of rather strict nonintervention. . . . Second, when domestic strife takes place in a non-bloc (or uncommitted) nation, intervention by one bloc authorizes non-nuclear counterintervention by the other bloc of approximately similar character. . . . This leads to a third normative pattern that is the hardest to articulate, and yet the most promising to contemplate: where internal violence appears likely to induce active intervention by major nations, responsible officials in national societies should endeavor to entrust the United Nations with the job of reestablishing order."[67]

These two writers are talking on different levels and to different purposes, but they have in common the desire to characterize different forms of intervention or armed attack. Seen in this light, however, the two sets of conclusions have a great deal in common: in those circumstances wherein the Catholic moralist sees the least likelihood that the resort to arms could be justified, the legal scholar advocates strict nonintervention or intervention of a limited variety only after the opposing party has already intervened; where the former imagines that a direct military response to provocation would be most readily justified on moral grounds (which might include attack and response between the two major actors as the result of their confrontation within a third country), the latter—apparently recognizing that possibility and seeking to avoid war—proposes that the U.N. be permitted to enter the scene to reestablish order. This type of comparison seems to suggest that it might be fruitful for legal scholars to turn their attention toward developing safeguards against the outbreak of war first where positions of potential conflict are such that both parties might with the most conviction be able to assert the justness of their cause on the basis of any traditional doctrine of just war. Such an effort, as already indicated, would aim at reversing the entire rationale of *bellum justum* theory in order to ensure that war will not result where it might be claimed as most legitimate. This would be done by creating at precisely such points of unilateral justifiability a legal basis for peaceful settlement of the dispute (e.g., through compulsory third-party arbitration, via the U.N.).

The practicability of such an attempt may be questioned, since, it could be argued, such an effort would assume that states thereby would relinquish their right to redress a wrong, not of the least, but of the greatest possible magnitude, against their national interest. But surely

[67] Falk, *Law, Morality, and War*, 61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the anticipated success of the extension of the horizontal legal order rests upon the assumption that states are willing to see their own "sovereignty" limited on the condition that that of other states is limited equally, an action which not only reassures the single state of remaining on a parity with others but also appears to that state as a positive advantage. In an age when a consensus seems to exist as to the suicidal nature of initiating nuclear war, it should not seem an insurmountable obstacle to convince states that the greatest threat to their own survival lies in those areas of statecraft that are at present invulnerable to community control. Specifically, cannot governments be made to realize that it is in their own interest to provide a mechanism which will prevent the unilateral decision and implementation of the justness of a cause of war?

Perhaps, in other words, the just war doctrine can be "stood on its head" if it is realized that to do so would be the most effective way of converting the desire to do justice for oneself into the desire to do justice for mankind (which is the only true justice, objectively speaking). To use a just war doctrine for this purpose would, at the same time, indicate where positive legal action may be taken to implement that altered desire. We have noted that consensus seems to exist at least on the point that security from annihilation is the first requirement, and it is assumed that this demand is regarded as sufficiently imperative to override the higher but less basic value of impartial justice.[68] The consensus on this point seems so strong at present, in fact, that it makes possible what has been only a utopian dream throughout previous history. The need is for action upon the basis of a precept already considered to be true—that the security of mankind demands that justice for oneself be sought only through multilateral, rather than unilateral, judgment. Then, those just war theories which indicate where an injustice to an individual state exists may themselves be used to direct the construction of a horizontal legal framework which would have as its purpose the prevention of a unilateral decision to resort to war when a "just" cause could be seen to exist.

[68] See above, 278-79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PEKING'S MILITARY CALCULUS*

By DAVIS B. BOBROW

CHINESE Communist military policy significantly affects our preparations for war and hopes for peace. However, we have few public studies of Chinese military policy and the reasoning on which it rests.[1] This article tries to set forth the calculus or rationale which Peking employs to select military strategy and tactics. In other words, it makes no attempt to attack or defend Chinese military policy or to appraise that policy's specific strengths and weaknesses. It does try to locate the important factors that operate in the minds of Chinese decision-makers and Peking's perception of the consequences of different tactical choices. When we say that the Chinese have a calculus for military policy, we do not mean to imply that it works well or badly. We do imply that the Chinese have a military calculus which imposes a predictable pattern on their military policy. Obviously, an identical military calculus does not operate in the minds of all Chinese leaders. Accordingly, "Peking thinks" is shorthand for the "averaged" views that can be induced from the public record of Chinese words and acts.

The following analysis rests on three assumptions. First, Peking's actions and words indicate her policy at least as validly as Yugoslav, Soviet, and Western interpretations.[2] Helpfully, the Sino-Soviet dispute

* This article was completed in January 1963. The author is indebted to Richard A. Falk, Morton Gorden, Peter Paret, Thomas P. Thornton, and Daniel Tretiak for their helpful criticism and to Andrea Herzog for research assistance.

[1] The most relevant are: A. Doak Barnett, "The Inclusion of Communist China in an Arms Control Program," *Daedalus*, Vol. 89 (Fall 1960), 831-45; Robert W. Barnett, *Quemoy: The Use and Consequence of Nuclear Deterrence* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Alice Langley Hsieh, *The Chinese Genie: Peking's Role in the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations* (Santa Monica 1960), and *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs 1960); Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," *Orbis*, III (Fall 1959), 332-50; Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York 1960); Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton 1962).

[2] This article is based on Chinese Communist mass media items. The following sources were used: For the period from January 1960 through June 1962, *Current Background* (hereafter cited as *CB*), *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (hereafter cited as *SCMP*), *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines*, later changed to *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (hereafter cited as *ECMM* and *SCMM*). These translations are produced by the U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong. Also consulted for the same period were the mainland press translations of the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service of Washington (hereafter cited as *JPRS*). *Peking Review* (hereafter cited as *PR*), an English-language publication for overseas consumption, was used for the period from January 1960 through November 1962. The methodology applied to these materials is discussed in Zagoria, 24-35; and Myron Rush, "Esoteric Communication in Soviet Politics," *World Politics*, XI (July 1959), 614-20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has led the Chinese to argue openly and explictly for their interpretation of enemy behavior (that is, of the United States) and Communist foreign policy objectives (the takeover of the developing nations). Internal economic failures have provoked a debate about the relations of economic growth and military capability. Second, Peking's leaders are politicians practicing the art of the possible; dogmatic and rigid ends do not require Chinese leaders to ignore political, economic, and military realities in reaching them. In other words, Peking's leaders resemble those of other nations to this extent: they adopt what they believe to be the best available military policy to cope with what they perceive to be the challenges of foreign opponents, to attain their foreign ambitions, and to satisfy domestic political and economic needs. Third, Peking's leaders evaluate current military policy alternatives on the basis of what they have learned from their military successes or failures in the past.

Accordingly, this article uses mainland sources to analyze four components of China's military calculus: expectations regarding the United States, foreign goals, domestic requirements, and interpretations of previous military experience. After completing these four explorations, we should have Peking's military "frame of reference." In other words, we should know the dangers Peking perceives, the value and cost of the means Peking believes it has available, and the preconceptions which operate when Chinese policy-makers make military choices. As the reader will see, we can conclude from each exploration that Peking integrates three methods in its military policy. The first is political bargaining, based on the possession of a powerful military establishment and the credibility that it will be used. The second is participation in wars that require a small investment of resources in combat and do not risk a large-scale Western military response. The third is a conscious policy of unilateral arms control.[3]

I. The Enemy: America

Mao Tse-tung has stated in capsule form the Peking assessment of American objectives, policies, and capabilities. In a long-term, political sense the Americans are "paper tigers," but in a short-term, military sense they are "living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can eat

[3] By "arms control" I mean: "Adjustments in military postures and doctrines that induce reciprocal adjustments by a potential opponent . . . reduce the danger of a war that neither side wants, or contain its violence, or otherwise serve the security of the nation."—Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York 1961), 143.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people."[4] Tigers spring on easy meals and when cornered. Until you can dispatch the tiger with ease yourself, you avoid becoming an easy meal and do not back the tiger into a corner; you do attempt to weaken him by setting him on unrewarding chases that sap his energy. These are the principles which explain Chinese military policy toward this country.

China assigns this goal to the United States: to "destroy the socialist camp" in order to achieve "world domination,"[5] and perceives the goal as unalterable ("a wolf is a wolf which cannot be turned into a sheep"[6]). All American elites are committed to this goal. The crucial "monopoly capital groups" require "arms expansion and war preparations."[7] As for our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, its executives are a "pack of notorious warmongers and armaments industry bosses."[8] However, Peking sees three other American characteristics that affect the pursuit of this threatening objective of world domination. First, the American leaders and masses have little taste for the costs of war; they are "sated with bread and sleep."[9] Second, the American public's fear of "another world war" can restrain its leaders.[10] Third, the American desire to avoid costly conflict is accompanied by calculation of the costs and gains of a particular type of war at a given time and place. This calculation can induce the United States to postpone its goal; it will refrain from nuclear war if war will "not pay."[11]

In Peking's eyes, American advocacy of arms control or acts of military restraint follow from these three modifying characteristics. They in no way indicate a change in the fundamental and hostile American objective. American advocacy of arms control and disarmament, "the soft and deceptive approach," is only an attempt to secure an improved "opportunity for attack."[12] For example, the United States

[4] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, IV (Peking 1961), 99.

[5] Jen Ku-ping, "The Tito Group: A Detachment of U.S. Imperialism in Its 'Grand Strategy' of Counter-Revolution," *PR*, V (October 12, 1962), 13.

[6] Chou Ch'ih-p'ing, "Comrade Lin Piao in the Period of Liberation War in the Northwest," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 8 (1960), in *SCMM*, No. 217 (1960), 35.

[7] "JMJP Commentator on Kennedy's Urgent Needs," *NCNA-English* Peking (May 29, 1961), in *SCMP*, No. 8 (1962), 4.

[8] Mao Tun, "The Way to General Disarmament and World Peace," *PR*, V (July 20, 1962), 9.

[9] Mao Tse-tung, 21.

[10] "Excellent Situation for Peace Struggle Says Red Flag Article," *NCNA-English* Peking (December 31, 1959), in *SCMP*, No. 2171 (1960), 4.

[11] I Yu, "U.S. Foreign Policy Seen Through Kennedy's Messages," *Shih-chieh Chih-shih*, Nos. 3-4 (1962), in *SCMM*, No. 307 (1962), 6.

[12] Fu Chung, "The Great Victory of Mao Tse-tung's Military Dialectics," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (October 6-7, 1960), in *JPRS*, No. 4282 (1960), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advocates inspection to secure more military intelligence.[13] American military restraint indicates to Peking that the United States feels the costs of nuclear war are too high. The Chinese leaders conclude that in spite of its expansionist goal, the United States will refrain from "escalating" local wars into "world war."[14] America has not escalated to nuclear war when faced with Communist revolution (Vietnam, Laos), counterrevolution (Hungary), or conventional war (Korea).[15] The Kennedy administration has publicly confirmed America's desire to avoid escalation. It develops conventional war capabilities in order to have a "choice" in military response.[16] Even the American turn to sub-limited war tactics is confirmation of the nation's softness; the appeal of this tactic is that American regulars will not have to be sent abroad.[17]

Peking is convinced that America can be induced not to apply her military capabilities. Since "even in the period when the U.S. imperialists had a monopoly of atomic bomb secrets, the bellicose elements dared not launch atomic war,"[18] Peking concludes that there are "two possibilities, not one" with regard to world war.[19] China must present an image to the United States that promises high American costs in any attempt to attack the "socialist camp." China can communicate to the United States that it desires to avoid military action, fears nuclear war, and is willing to make non-military concessions. Such a course only lowers the American estimate of costs; it does not alter the desire of the United States for world domination. Accordingly, Washington at least will increase its demands for concessions in arms control and elsewhere; if "given an inch," it will "ask for a yard."[20] The United States will engage in more regional, conventional wars like the Korean conflict.[21]

[13] "JMJP Censors U.S. Stand at Geneva Disarmament Conference," *NCNA-English* Peking (April 3, 1962), in *SCMP*, No. 2715 (1962), 23; "JMJP Observer on U.S. Scheme over Disarmament Talks," *NCNA-English* Peking (February 19, 1962), in *SCMP*, No. 2685 (1962), 33.

[14] Mao Tun, 11.

[15] Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Two Tactics, One Aim: An Exposure of the Peace Tricks of U.S. Imperialism* (Peking 1960), 38; "Peking Rally Backs Tokyo Conference," *PR*, v (August 31, 1962), 9.

[16] Mao Tun, 8.

[17] Yuan Lu, "Kennedy and the New Frontiers of U.S. Policy of Aggression," *Shih-chieh Chih-shih*, No. 10 (1961), in *SCMM*, No. 270 (1961), 7.

[18] "Excellent Situation for Peace Struggle," 4.

[19] Wu Chiang, "Our Age and Edvard Kardelj's Dialectics," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 5 (1962), in *SCMM*, No. 306 (1962), 25.

[20] Sung Tu, "Answers to Readers' Queries on War and Peace," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 4 (1960), in *ECMM*, No. 207 (1960), 6.

[21] Yu Chao-li, "The Great Significance of the Victory of the Cuban People's Patriotic Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism," *Hung Ch'i*, Nos. 9-10 (1961), in *SCMM*, No. 262

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Most seriously, such a "soft" image may convince Washington that "the balance of power is in favour of imperialism";[22] the United States will then initiate a nuclear war.

Peking also rejects the opposite image—i.e., one of Communist capability and eagerness to eliminate the United States immediately. To emphasize this, it feels, will only frighten Washington into a nuclear "struggle before final doom."[23] Instead, Peking contends there is a middle ground, an image of Chinese military preparedness and courage but also one of willingness to make partial compromises. This image will lead the United States to conclude that the time is not ripe for a military showdown, and to make concessions to postpone and terminate conflict. Washington will give way in order to settle conflicts at the conference table—e.g., as in Korea—and to reach arms control agreements.[24] This image also will strengthen the influence of the American moderates, i.e., advocates of "political scheming" rather than war, and may even lead to partial "peaceful coexistence."[25]

The challenge to the Peking policy-maker is to find the behavior pattern that best communicates this middle image. Peking recognizes that its choice is severely limited by the relative military strength of the People's Republic and the United States. Peking's military weaknesses restrict her ability to make American costs unrewarding in a nuclear or massive conventional war. The Chinese leaders recognize nuclear inferiority in their military policy of "self-dependence,"[26] i.e., deterring American attack without the benefit of the Soviet nuclear shield. Peking also feels unqualified for massive conventional war with the United States. Such conflicts enable America to use her "industrial potential," to achieve economic prosperity, and to maintain Western solidarity and anti-Communist attitudes. Conversely, massive conventional conflict is the "best means to wear out the resources of Socialist

---

(1961), 7; "The Great Victory in the Struggle to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (October 24, 1960), in *PR*, III (November 1, 1960), 13.

[22] Jen Ku-ping, 15.

[23] "Hsiao Hua's Speech at National Conference of Outstanding Workers and Groups in Culture and Education," *NCNA* Peking (June 3, 1960), in *CB*, No. 622 (1960), 30.

[24] "JMJP Editorial on Korea's Peaceful Unification," *NCNA-English* Peking (June 25, 1961), in *SCMP*, No. 2529 (1961), 41; "Chinese Delegate Speaks at World Peace Council Bureau Meeting," *NCNA-English* Peking (July 14, 1960), in *SCMP*, No. 2300 (1960), 26.

[25] "JMJP—A Summary of the First Six Months of the Kennedy Administration," *NCNA-English* Peking (August 2, 1961), in *SCMP*, No. 2555 (1961), 35; Mao Tun, 9.

[26] Ch'en K'e-han, "Overcoming Difficulties, Winning Victories—On First Reading of the Fourth Volume of Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 21 (1960), in *SCMM*, No. 240 (1960), 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries."[27] Accordingly, China must avoid such conflicts through a two-pronged policy: (a) convince the United States that their cost is high; and (b) refrain from provoking the United States to wage such wars. Peking believes that a nuclear capability will lend credibility to its threats of a costly conflict. In the meantime, and also after China enters the nuclear club, the second part of this policy requires her to avoid direct, formal confrontation of official Chinese and official American forces. An important example is the Quemoy crisis of 1958.[28] When she acquires a nuclear capability, China may test the United States more often, but not necessarily embark on direct conflict more readily.

Peking feels that a policy of sub-limited war by proxy (the military component of "wars of national liberation") and small-scale conventional war on her borders can demonstrate Chinese strength and militancy to the United States without provoking Washington. Peking feels that China's particular strengths make the cost to America of countering such military initiatives unappealingly high. If combined with a variety of arms control measures, the United States can be induced not to escalate the conflict.

Peking perceives that sub-limited wars let her use her greater ability to organize dedicated insurgents and render America's complex weapons and logistical systems inapplicable. "Political force" and "subjective effort" can produce combat victory; they can secure the "loyalty of the people" which is decisive in guerrilla war.[29] These advantages are maximized by China's geopolitical position in her area of prime interest, Asia. Peking believes that America is particularly likely to attach high costs to sub-limited war in Southeast Asia. For the United States, Southeast Asia is far away both physically and emotionally. China doubts that "soft" Americans will support protracted, bloody involvement at a military disadvantage in a low-priority part of the world.

Arms control in conjunction with such military pressure is expected to prevent American escalation. Conflicts should be kept within the boundaries of one nation; Peking opposes Communist forces "resisting the enemy outside of the national boundaries."[30] In other words, official

[27] Hsin Ting, "Adventuresome and Weak Character of the Kennedy Administration," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 17 (1961), in *SCMM*, No. 285 (1961), 1-2.

[28] See Robert W. Barnett; Hsieh; Tang Tsou; Zagoria; and John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis," *Orbis*, VI (Spring 1962), 38-64.

[29] Liao Kai-lung, "Dare to Carry out Revolution, Dare to Win Victory—Some Notes on the Study of the Fourth Volume of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 19 (1960), in *SCMM*, No. 235 (1960), 13; Sung Tu, 1; Fan Ke, "The Orientation of Political Work for the Army," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (July 28, 1961), in *SCMP*, No. 2556 (1962), 5.

[30] Fu Chung, 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese armed forces should not wage war significantly beyond Peking's self-defined national boundaries. For the most part, they should not wage war in independent states on which China makes territorial claims. Peking expects the United States to be persuaded by this policy that the stakes in the conflict are not valuable enough to warrant escalation. Battles and wars, though continual, should be of limited duration; Communists should apply the "principle of truce."[31] Such interruptions will damp American concern, and lessen attention to the conflict and thus the possibility of escalation. The scale of weapons used should be confined to non-nuclear, ground-warfare instruments, because to take advantage of its military strengths the United States would have to make a deliberate decision to escalate the conflict.

Recently, China has applied the techniques of time and weapons limitation to the Indian border conflict.[32] They have had the results predicted by Peking. Washington did not escalate the conflict even to the level of air war nor feel that India was in such danger that massive American intervention was necessary. American media and policy-makers' statements attributed intense and unflagging militancy to the People's Republic.

To convey the desired image to the United States, Peking unilaterally initiates these arms control measures. So long as the United States refrains from escalating the conflict, Peking feels that its interests are well-served. It recognizes difficulties and limitations in dealing from a weak military hand. However, only this policy of limited aggression is seen as able to buy time to create a more effective military establishment, time to overcome the "backwardness in the technical equipment" of the People's Liberation Army.[33] America will grant sufficient time to the People's Republic only under the suasion of carefully limited military pressure.

II. Foreign Policy: Goals and Means

The immediate objectives of Communist China's military policy are to remove the American military presence from her periphery and to secure dominant influence in the developing nations. Southeast Asia is the top-priority target for this second objective. Peking seeks the military policy most likely to overcome the obstacles that Washington poses to both goals, and that Moscow poses to the second. In some cases

[31] Mao is quoted in Tang Tsou, 333.
[32] Brig. Gen. W. F. K. Thompson, "When Two Empires Meet," *Survival*, v (March-April 1963), 79-80.
[33] Fu Chung, 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

she competes with the United States and the Soviet Union for the friendship of local governments, e.g., in Burma; in others she competes with the Soviet Union for control of the local Communist or anti-Western movement.

Peking perceives Chinese and American objectives as fundamentally opposed. Washington will never consent to the "peaceful expansion of the revolution."[34] Instead, America intends to "monopolize the vast intermediate area between the U.S. and the socialist camp" as a prelude to "attacking the socialist camp."[35] Washington uses two tactics to block Peking. The "hard" tactic is the threat of military, and even nuclear, retaliation if friendly and neutralist governments are overthrown. The American "soft" tactic is the bribery of foreign aid—"sugar-coated cannonballs"—to maintain and expand Western influence. Washington hopes that this "conquer the heart" tactic will "corrode revolutionary will."[36]

Peking seeks the military policy that will prove U.S. military threats to be sheer bluff and aid offers to be completely exploitative. Additionally, the Chinese want a military policy that will block Soviet attempts to reach accommodation with Western or non-aligned governments, and/or force Moscow to appear as a selfish, *status quo* power. However, Peking's range of choice is limited by two constraints. First, China cannot afford to provoke the United States into a test of conventional or nuclear military capability. Second, she cannot afford to press so hard that the governments of developing nations turn to Washington for protection. When China acquires a nuclear capability, her leaders expect the United States' provocation threshold to be higher, and the confidence of other nations in American protection to be lower.

For the present, Peking feels that the military policy summarized in the preceding section respects these two constraints and best copes with the challenges of Washington and Moscow. It seems useful to review the aggressive and the restrained segments of this policy and to point out how Peking expects each to contribute to its foreign policy goals.

The aggressive segment contains two distinct military tactics. First, China supports indigenous Communist proxies in sub-limited wars

[34] Liao Kai-lung, in *JPRS*, No. 6743 (1961), 41.

[35] Sung Tu, 6.

[36] Tsui Ch'in, T'an Wen-jui, "Comment on the Present Foreign Policy of the United States," *Shih-chieh Chih-shih*, No. 6 (1960), in *SCMM*, No. 213 (1960), 11; Liu Chang-sheng, "On the Question of War and Peace," *PR*, III (April 26, 1960), 14. The Chinese are aware that the Soviets also offer such a cannonball in connection with their disarmament and peaceful coexistence proposals. Liu rejects the very aid to the underdeveloped nations that the Soviets propose. For the Soviet inducement, see G. Mirsky and L. Stepanov, *Asia and Africa: A New Era* (Moscow, n.d.).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of national liberation. Second, on rare occasions China initiates carefully limited conventional war against non-American military units on her borders. In the first case, Chinese participation is indirect; it is confined to aid in the form of small arms, training programs, and advisors. In both cases, China feels that the United States will not escalate the conflict, but will reveal the hollowness of its military threats. If Washington shuns any military response, Peking expects significantly to reduce fear of applying military pressure to non-Communist regimes. If Washington responds to the sub-limited war in kind, Peking feels this will confirm the fundamentally hostile nature of the United States. The sugar-coated aid offers will be revealed for the devious instruments they really are. The Chinese leadership also expects these two aggressive tactics to have desirable effects on the Soviet position. If a Chinese-instigated war of national liberation is launched, the Russians are confronted with a series of undesirable choices. They can oppose the insurgents or ignore the conflict, and not compete with Peking for insurgent loyalties. On the other hand, they can become the major backer of the insurgents—as they have, for example, in Laos—and undermine other foreign policy moves to lessen tension with Washington. In either event, Peking makes some gain. Direct Chinese border incursions against a non-aligned country also confront Moscow with undesirable choices. For example, in the Indian case, if Moscow supported Peking, the Kremlin's wooing of non-aligned nationalists would suffer. Even Soviet non-support of India makes Chinese friendship seem more essential to Asian governments, especially those on China's borders, than that of the Soviet Union. If the USSR instead supported India, the unity of the international Communist movement would decline still further, and with it Russian influence. The CPR expects any of these Soviet choices to serve its own foreign policy goals.

Peking expects to benefit by not applying these aggressive tactics to all target societies. Target selectivity will induce the uninvolved local governments neither to support China's victim nor to invoke American protection. Accordingly, military pressure on India has been accompanied by conciliation of Pakistan, with the predicted results. To select the target for a national-liberation war, Peking looks for the "most reactionary" society available.[37] Chinese-supported attacks on this target are expected to have significant military and political advantages. Militarily, any American sub-limited military response is crucially handicapped; it is relatively easy for the Communist insurgents to secure

[37] Mao is quoted in Tang Tsou, 333.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

popular support. Politically, governments in the region that are already critical of the target society are likely to be critical of American intervention in its defense. These political effects are most easily attained if the target regime is not a member of the "non-aligned club." Of course, the regimes aligned with the United States are particularly important targets for Peking. China can identify its revolutionary clients with the unexceptionable causes of nationalism and social change. She can more easily portray the United States as guided by imperialist and selfish economic motives. South Vietnam and Laos have provided such targets with the predicted results.

Peking's selection of a few of the available targets is one part of its unilateral arms control policy. It is combined with the restrictions of geography, time, and weapons discussed earlier. This ensemble of arms control measures is expected to curtail Washington's military response and the neutralists' reactions to aggression. If either type of military aggression is confined to one state, other local governments will not feel sufficiently threatened to cooperate against Peking. The war is either a "domestic" conflict or a border skirmish which will be widened only if the United States interferes. If conflicts do not continue for many months, neutralist governments will not make the "painful reappraisal" necessary to cause them to ally with the United States. Peking feels it can commit and support military aggression without disturbing the cherished neutralism of uninvolved governments. These governments will not even be shaken enough to divert resources from economic development to expand their military capability. Peking's predictions and techniques have been confirmed on the Indian border. Asian and African governments have been more concerned with reestablishing peace than with India's territorial integrity.

We should note that Peking's policy—i.e., to stimulate local revolutionary forces without evoking a United States response or a pro-American policy by other third-world governments—is not served by formal, multilateral arms control agreements. Such agreements could lead potential insurgents to feel that Peking is exploiting them for its own purposes. They could lead them to question Peking's claim that America is unswervingly hostile to independent national development. Of course, Peking can negotiate with the United States to confirm its negative interpretation of American objectives. The failure of negotiations serves the Chinese as proof of the "evil" nature of the West.[38]

[38] Chang Ming-yang, "Use Two Tactics of Revolution to Oppose Two Tactics of Counter-Revolution—Notes on Study of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV," *Shih-chieh Chih-shih*, No. 20 (1960), in *SCMM* No. 239 (1960), 35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In contrast, unilateral and tacit arms control behavior avoids pitfalls in foreign expansion without sapping revolutionary morale.

III. Domestic Requirements: Economic and Political

Domestically, the Chinese Communists seek to develop an industrialized, technologically complex economy and to exact total effort and loyalty from the population. Domestic success is necessary to deter the United States and to attain China's foreign policy goals. Peking, as we have seen, believes that military action is necessary to buy time for internal development.

Peking can fulfill its domestic requirements only if it overcomes fundamental economic and political obstacles. Economically, the regime is plagued by scarcities of capital, equipment, and skilled personnel. Moscow will not significantly ease these shortages. Somehow these resources must be stretched to cover both "economic construction" and "national defense construction." Politically, the specialists and the general population must be convinced that the development programs are worth the effort. They must be convinced that the severity of the American threat demands rapid development and "national defense construction." Simultaneously, they must be convinced that the American threat is not great enough to make their efforts meaningless—that their choice is not "capitalist or dead."

China's military policy must help fill these requirements. It must be economically cheap, but deter Washington from destroying mainland economic facilities. It must communicate to the people that China is strong enough not to give in to America, but too weak to deemphasize military research, development, and production. Peking's military policy must make the United States demonstrate that it is not benign enough to leave China alone, but not ferocious enough to obliterate mainland society. For these reasons, the regime claims that Washington does not intend to make a "traditional . . . declaration of war," and forbids its propagandists to cause the people to be "uneasy and uncomfortable" about war.[39] In sum, Peking believes that its domestic requirements demand the attitudes and internal loyalty of an aggressive military posture without its risks and costs.

Peking applies these requirements to arrive at two guidelines to military policy. First, the larger the scale of the war, the more it inhibits

[39] Huang Kang, "A Few Things of Kennedy," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 13 (1961), in *SCMM*, No. 271 (1961), 5; Ch'en Ya-ting, "A Condemnation of Bogus Socialist Literature," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (August 6, 1960), in *JPRS*, No. 6660 (1961), 43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic development. More resources are diverted from industrial expansion and agricultural labor; the United States is more likely to destroy existing facilities. This guideline will still apply after China detonates a nuclear device. Second, successful sub-limited wars do not interfere with economic development and help instill desirable political attitudes. They demonstrate to the Chinese people that the United States is hostile and that Peking can safely defy Washington. Economically, they are at least cheap. More positively, sub-limited wars and small-scale border clashes may bring other nations to trade with China on favorable terms. Newly installed Communist regimes will be heavily dependent on the People's Republic; cowed non-aligned regimes will want to avoid becoming China's next target.

The military policy previously summarized conforms to these general guidelines. Once again, formal multilateral arms controls clash with Peking's goals. In contrast, unilateral and tacit arms control behavior lowers the risk of provoking the United States, but does not hinder the maintenance of a domestic climate of national crisis. Domestic requirements add to the previously summarized policy two military measures with arms control significance. The first of these measures is to limit the size of the People's Liberation Army. In order to minimize the loss of able-bodied manpower in production, only a small proportion of the available male youth is conscripted each year. This unilateral restriction seems to be observed regardless of fluctuations in the number of American military personnel. It is, of course, compatible with Peking's intent to avoid the types of war that might require a massive commitment of Chinese troops.

The second measure is the emphasis on command and control of the military establishment. Political officers, Party committees, and political indoctrination programs are used to prevent the military from "catching" the popular discontent produced by forced-draft economic development and social change. However, the Party also emphasizes that these mechanisms must be used to reduce the possibility of escalation by overzealous field commanders. Since the Party center and not the military knows best, the latter cannot evaluate the real value of local victory. Peking attempts to keep the officer corps free of "petty bourgeois intellectuals" whose "revolutionary impatience" leads them into "disastrous and clumsy" military overcommitment. Officers are allegedly cleansed of the "peasant" mentality that might prompt them to "hang on stubbornly to local matters."[40]

[40] Fu Chung, 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV. Confirming Experience: Revolutionary Lessons

The Chinese elite naturally tends to judge present military policy alternatives in the light of previous success and failure; it attempts to secure cadre support by manipulating history to confirm current policy. Recent official interpretations of the "most precious historical experience" of the revolution stress three "lessons."[41] First, when the Communists failed to prepare for armed struggle, the enemy attacked. Second, when the Communists confused or overestimated military capability and political support, they suffered severe defeat. Third, when they participated in negotiations and truces, they secured the means for eventual military and political success.

When the Communists did not present a formidable military front, the enemy attacked the unready victim. During the first alliance with the Kuomintang (1924-1927), such Communist naïveté allowed Chiang Kai-shek to exterminate a large proportion of the Party. The Nationalists also interpreted Communist trust and compliance as invitations to attack. The lowered credibility of an effective Communist military response led to the massacre of much of the New Fourth Army (1941). At the present time, if Peking fails to expand its military capability and demonstrate its militancy, the United States will similarly attack.

Political support and military capability are mutually interdependent. When Communists forgot the need for both, or deluded themselves into overoptimistic estimates, they met disaster. Four variants of this fallacy are often cited. First, Party members falsely concluded that political strength negated overwhelming military disadvantage; e.g., the bloody failure of the Canton rising (1927). Second, they falsely concluded that military ventures did not require organized political support; e.g., the short-lived seizure of Nanchang (1927). Third, they deluded themselves that a relative increase in military strength warranted escalation of the armed struggle; e.g., the Li Li-san line of attack on the cities (1930). Fourth, they foolishly equated holding territory with preserving strength and thus undermined the Communist military capability; e.g., the rigid resistance to Chiang's Fifth Bandit Extermination Campaign (1933-1934). The lesson drawn stresses the virtues of patience, attention to both military and political factors,

[41] The interpretation of revolutionary antecedents is drawn from Ho Kan-Chih, *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (Peking 1960); Wang Shih, Wang Ch'iao, Ma Ch'i-ping, and Chang Ling, *A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party* (Shanghai 1958), in *JPRS*, No. 8756 (1961); Hsiao Hua, "The Chinese Revolution and Armed Struggle," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 16 (1962), in *PR*, v (August 10 and 17, 1962), 6-9, 14-16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and temporary retreat. Regardless of enemy "challenges and incitements," China must "avoid a decisive battle until the objective conditions are favorable."[42] Otherwise, military defeat will be compounded by political attrition, i.e., "isolation from the masses."[43] These lessons are fully compatible with the policy of carefully controlled sub-limited war and conventional military pressure on China's borders. They also argue against a sharp change in military policy after China enters the nuclear club. Political strength will still be valuable; escalation will still not be in the Chinese interest.

The third revolutionary lesson is a tactic to use, not one to avoid. Arms control techniques, such as negotiations and truces, enabled the Communists to survive and helped create the "objective conditions" for victory. Their use against the Kuomintang after World War II produced both military and political benefits. Militarily, the Communists gained time to familiarize their army with the Japanese weapons acquired in Manchuria, and to assimilate personnel from the disbanded puppet armies. Politically, negotiations and truce privileges gave the Communists an excellent platform from which "to work for the awakening of the middle-of-the-road groups . . . to win over all the allies that could be won over."[44] This platform produced political support for Communist offers to the Nationalists; it enabled them to pin much of the responsibility for the resumption of civil war on the Nationalists. In other words, the peace-loving image acquired through arms control tactics enabled the Party to capitalize on "men's abhorrence of war" when the conflict resumed.[45]

The lesson drawn here is that it is to Peking's advantage to propose and enter into negotiations and truce agreements with the United States and local enemies. These and other Communist arms control initiatives will (a) deter the United States from using its current military superiority; (b) increase Communist popularity and political support among the people of target societies and uninvolved governments; and (c) gain time to remedy the current military inferiority of the People's Republic. Thus Indian border truce offers helped to damp the

[42] Mao is quoted in Sin-ming Chiu, "Some Basic Conceptions and Rules of Conduct of Chinese Communism," *Studies in Chinese Communism Series*, IV (January 1955), 10.

[43] Ho Kan-chih, 199.

[44] Hsiao Hua, 15.

[45] Liao Kai-lung; Lin Piao, "The Victory of the Chinese People's Revolutionary War Is a Victory of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 19 (1960), in *SCMM*, No. 231 (1960), 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American and British response and to soothe non-aligned governments.

Peking's military policy assumes American hostility and that the admission of American military superiority or explicit concessions will only increase the military pressure exerted on China by the United States ("If we fall victim to the fear complex, they will be able to do what they like and stir up trouble"[46]). The nature of the Chinese-American competition precludes any compromise not based on the manipulation of power. "Technical" arms control agreements—e.g., nuclear force limitations—are not possible because "agreement must first be reached on matters of principle."[47] Since agreements on "matters of principle" are impossible, war is "inevitable."[48]

Accordingly, the task of Peking military policy planners is to make the best of an "inevitable" series of military conflicts. The revolutionary experience is interpreted to prove that, in spite of its military weakness, the Party can mold and benefit from the "inevitable" armed conflicts. If her leaders are realistic and flexible, Peking expects to manipulate the "incidental" aspects of war to her advantage. The previous pages have presented Chinese preferences for the "incidental" factors of time, place, opponent, and scale of conflict ("when to fight, where to fight, with whom to fight, big war, small war").[49] Peking believes that it can force non-Communist governments to accept its choice of sub-limited, national liberation wars and small, conventional, border clashes. This is the purpose of the unilateral arms control measures: target selection and geographical, time, weapons, and manpower restrictions. Tight command and control of the People's Liberation Army are intended to ensure its obedience to conflict-limiting orders.

To Peking, American opposition to China's goals does require a "tit-for-tat" response to any American, or American-supported, military action or threat. However, China's interests are often better served by unilateral military restraint than by military action.[50]

[46] Kuo Mu-jo, speaking to the International Students' Union Meeting on September 15, 1958, as quoted in Robert W. Barnett, 40.

[47] Chou En-lai, as quoted by Edgar Snow in "Red China's Leaders Talk Peace, on Their Terms," *Look*, XXV (January 1961), 93.

[48] Fu Chung, 8.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Chang Ming-yang, 35; Liao Kai-lung, 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

A NEW STUDY OF FASCISM

By KLAUS EPSTEIN

Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, Munich, Piper Verlag, 1963, 633 pp. DM 35.

I

DR. Nolte's *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* is a work of exceptionally broad range that combines description, comparison, and interpretation in an admirable manner. It attempts three major tasks requiring skills rarely combined in a single historian: a general classification of Fascist systems aiming at a typology; a special examination of the main features of one pre-Fascist (*Action Française*) and two Fascist movements (in Mussolini's Italy and in Hitler's Germany); and an overall interpretation, in both historical and philosophical terms, of fascism as the dominant force of the period of European history extending from 1919 to 1945.

A general characterization of Nolte's book is appropriate before discussing its specific content. To avoid disappointment it will be best to begin with a brief listing of the things that the book does *not* attempt—for while Nolte is broad in his subject matter, he is explicitly and self-consciously selective in his approach. Readers must not expect a conventional political history of the movements headed by Maurras, Mussolini, and Hitler, or a specific analysis of why and how fascism triumphed in particular countries at particular times. The author provides only incidentally a sociological description of the groups supporting fascism, and there is very little analysis of how Fascist systems actually worked from an institutional point of view. Nolte has little to say on such previously investigated topics as Fascist police repression, propaganda techniques, or economic policies. His work is based exclusively upon published sources, and does not aim at uncovering "new facts" either through archival research or through interviews with survivors.

Nolte has aimed at something far more important than these tasks of "conventional history" (whose value he of course does not deny)—namely, to define the position of fascism in modern history; to analyze its constituent elements with reference to an empirically derived but theoretically elaborated "ideal type"; and, above all, to explore the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"phenomenology" of fascism in terms of its ideology and *self*-understanding. This final aim has led him to include first-rate intellectual biographies of Charles Maurras, Benito Mussolini, and Adolf Hitler in which he argues convincingly that their personal outlook largely shaped the movements they led. Nolte is well aware of the criticism likely to be directed against this biographical approach, but it is one of his major theses that "great men" *do* matter even in an age when politics is often interpreted as the clash of impersonal forces.

Nolte's preoccupation with the ideology of fascism is rooted in the thesis (convincing to this reviewer) that Fascist ideas were crucial in determining the motives and shaping the structures of at least some Fascist movements. This thesis will be unacceptable on *a priori* grounds to those who believe that ideology is never anything *but* "rationalization" of material interests; it may be questioned more plausibly by pointing to the primitive crudeness of Fascist ideas. To this Nolte replies that crudeness does not preclude conviction (on the contrary, crude men have a natural affinity for crude ideas), and that the intellectual caliber of two of his protagonists—Maurras and Mussolini—has been too often underrated. He insists, moreover, that fascism constitutes the culmination of the reaction against the ideas of 1789; it reckons among its forerunners the entire European "conservative tradition," going back to Maistre and Bonald. Nolte brilliantly describes the French current of this tradition in his survey of the roots of Maurras' thought, thus giving fascism a distinguished intellectual pedigree not usually found in studies of the subject. The establishment of this pedigree is far more subtle and convincing than the once-popular pastime of rummaging through German intellectual history for possible forerunners of nazism: a procedure that usually resulted in twisting thinkers (wholly or in part) out of their contemporary context and interpreting German fascism as the "inevitable" result of Germany's national history, thereby distracting attention from the *universal* roots of modern fascism.

A special feature of the book is its "objectivity"; a quality made possible by the fact that fascism, while still a powerful memory, is no longer a significant political force. Nolte seeks to approach it as the historian would any other "dead" historical period—say, the Renaissance or the Counter-Reformation—and succeeds to a remarkable extent in this self-appointed task. He does not deny fascism the minimum of "sympathy" that is necessary for "understanding" it: "sympathy" in terms of recognizing that the Fascists (though often criminals) genuinely wrestled with the major problems of our exceedingly perplexing age. Nolte seeks to understand them both as they understood them-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

selves and as they appear *sub specie aeternitatis*; their statements are taken seriously unless obviously made with an *ad hoc* purpose; the record of their deeds is studied without political or personal bias. It should be stressed that this attitude does not involve any moral obtuseness on Nolte's part, for he is poignantly aghast at such a phenomenon as the Nazi destruction of Europe's Jews: but he shows his historical perspective by viewing this destruction as the (objective) *logical consequence* of certain ideas, not merely the (subjective) *personal wickedness* of certain individuals. He completely avoids (what some might expect from a German author) the apologetic tendency potentially inherent in a comparative approach to fascism by stressing on repeated occasions that the most abhorrent aspects of nazism, such as the destruction of the Jews, were peculiar to itself and find no analogue in other Fascist systems.

The scope of the subject matter and the objectivity of treatment are only two of the qualities that give Nolte's book a claim to the rare attribute of greatness. One can also admire his combination of courage and judiciousness in tackling the most unpleasant aspects of his topic. To give only one example, deliberately selected for its provocativeness: Nolte does not hesitate to point out certain parallel features of Nazi and (of all things) Zionist ideology: extreme racialism, disregard for the historic rights of others, drive for *Lebensraum*, and fear of extinction. He hastens, however, to add a commentary on the last parallel: "The Jews faced in sober reality what the Nazis only imagined in the light of their pathological fears" (p. 608). The author shows superb craftsmanship in his 70-page scholarly apparatus (unhappily placed at the end of the book). The reader will find here some masterpieces of critical reasoning; for example, a conclusive defense of the essential authenticity of the famous "Hossbach Protocol," recently challenged by A. J. P. Taylor and David Hoggan (p. 603). Nolte's scholarship is admirable, yet it is never only an end in itself; he is deeply stirred by the importance of his subject matter—important in itself and for the light it throws upon the predicament of modern man—and seeks to *explain* as well as merely to *document*. This is not to say that description, sometimes colorful description, is missing; see, for example, the account of the terroristic practices of the Italian Fascists in 1921 (pp. 256ff.) or of the Nazi party rally at Nürnberg in 1937 (pp. 464ff.). His special talent, however, lies in *analysis*, especially the analysis of various doctrines, and *interpretation*, especially the metaphysical interpretation of fascism in the concluding section. All these qualities make Nolte's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

book, in the opinion of this reviewer, one of the half-dozen most important historical works to appear in Germany since 1945.

A word of warning to the reader is, however, necessary about some obvious weaknesses of *Fascism in Its Period*. Some great books are difficult to read, and this is certainly one of them. All authors have the defects of their qualities—in this case, the list begins with the style; although it conveys the author's meaning clearly and precisely, it is often more suitable to a philosophical treatise than a work of history. The exposition is studded with technical terms that are not always satisfactorily explained. The analysis is sometimes on an intolerably abstract level; certain sections (for example, the important last section on "Fascism as a Transpolitical Phenomenon") must be read at least twice before the drift of the argument emerges. The historical sections are marred by an occasional allusiveness that may either flatter or irritate; the interpretive sections can easily breed an inferiority complex in those who have not enjoyed the rigorous philosophical training of the author. Nolte errs (unlike most historians) in *thinking* too much rather than too little; one suspects, for example, that there is a good portion of Nolte in what purports to be merely a systematic statement of the philosophical foundations of Maurras' doctrine (pp. 183-90). The attempt to establish a typology of fascism (to be discussed below) shows a tendency to impose *a priori* constructions upon empirical facts. These defects are by no means inconsiderable. It should be stressed, however, that (if this reviewer's experience is any guide) Nolte's book is very much worth the struggle required to master it. It is merely difficult, not intrinsically obscure; and the persevering reader will be rewarded by profound insights not only into the nature of fascism *per se*, but also into the historical configuration of the tragic period of European history of which fascism was part cause and part effect.

II

Nolte's introductory section, "Fascism and the Epoch of the World Wars," describes the historical prerequisites of fascism, classifies its miscellaneous varieties, differentiates between fascism and communism, and defines fascism as a "significant unit of historical study."

What were the historical prerequisites of Europe's Age of Fascism, a period Nolte dates from 1919 to 1945? First and foremost was the pulverizing impact of the First World War upon the predominantly liberal society of nineteenth-century Europe. The war caused not only untold suffering but shook the moorings of a still largely intact tradi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionalism; both effects intensified the demand of the broad masses for a higher material and psychological stake in the community. This demand provoked a near-hysterical fear of social revolution on the part of the established classes. They were frightened and puzzled by the rise of the Communist world movement, with its elaborate organization, ideology, and mass appeal; they welcomed Fascist movements that developed a successful counter-ideology and a counter-organization with similar appeal. The *international* character of the Communist challenge suggested the advantage of a *national* response in an age when nationalism was still burning (if properly stoked) with an explosive intensity. The unspent force of imperialism could also be mobilized, with its suggestion that internal problems could be solved through external conquest. The "scientific rationalism" of communism provoked a counter-appeal to the "irrational currents" that had played an influential role in European culture since the turn of the century. It should not be thought, however, that fascism was exclusively shaped by its hostility to communism; it was equally hostile to the democratic parliamentary system that the liberal nineteenth century had considered the "normal" type of government for a modern industrialized community. This system was denounced as degenerate, corrupt, and incapable of dealing with current problems—a charge that was, unhappily, not totally devoid of substance. Fascism claimed that it would restore the vigorous and effective government needed to deal with the Communist challenge and the many problems left unresolved by "liberal civilization."

Nolte is excellent not only in describing the general political, social, and intellectual situation in which fascism developed in Europe; he also defines the international situation that permitted it to become a major world phenomenon. We know today that the "European Age" of history ended irrevocably in 1917 with the almost simultaneous epochal events of the Russian Revolution and the American entry into the World War. This fact was obscured for contemporaries, however, by two powerful forces whose temporary character was not understood: the revival of American isolationism in the 1920's and the Russian concentration upon building "socialism in one country." These factors created a final opportunity for "autonomous" European development, an opportunity used by the Fascist forces to establish a European hegemony that could be overthrown only by the reentry of America and Russia into European affairs in 1941.

The most interesting part of Nolte's introductory section is his taxonomy of the different types of fascism. He defines four different stages

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under the labels "pre-Fascist," "early Fascist," "normal Fascist," and "radical Fascist." Where any given movement belongs depends upon the compound answer to several questions: (1) What is the movement's relationship to traditional authority, religion, and class structure? There are very traditionalist "pre-Fascist" regimes (e.g., Horthy, Pilsudski, Alexander of Yugoslavia, Salazar), less traditionalist "early Fascist" regimes (e.g., Franco), non-traditionalist "normal Fascist" regimes (e.g., Mussolini), and outright anti-traditionalist "radical Fascist" regimes (e.g., Hitler—though this fact was concealed for opportunistic reasons until the Second World War). Traditionalist regimes are more concerned with defending the past than with constructing a totalitarian future. They lack any basic hostility to such traditional institutions as the monarchy, the church, the army, or the aristocracy. The answer to this first question is crucial in classifying any given example of fascism; much can also be learned, however, from the answer to the following additional questions.

(2) What is the relationship among Caesarist, elitist, and socialist features in a regime? Much depends upon the personal style of the Leader, a fact made obvious when one looks at the very different personalities of, say, Franco and Hitler. The formation of a distinctively Fascist elite, standing apart from the traditional upper classes, presents a further criterion of radicalization. The "socialist" features in fascism are in some ways the most fascinating problem of all: the "state socialist" goals of the period prior to the seizure of power tend to be forgotten when power is achieved, only to revive in the period of "radical fascism" under the impact of external misfortune. Mussolini's "Republic of Salo" was more "socialist" than the pre-1943 regime; Hitler became a "Bolshevist of the Right" only in the phase of "total mobilization" as he confronted military defeat.

(3) What is the relationship between particular and universalist elements in ideology and practice? Fascism is, on the one hand, aggressively nationalist (although its elitist conception of rule is quite contrary to the traditional nationalist emphasis upon the unity and homogeneity of the nation), yet it frequently advances a racial doctrine that transcends national borders. The relationship to other fascisms also raises problems, especially in the case of those Fascists (Quisling, for example) who secured power only as the result of German occupation. Quisling (assuming that he was not a mere opportunist) presumably believed that allegiance to "world fascism" was a higher allegiance than that owed to the national independence of Norway—though Fascists are usually fanatical champions of national independence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(4) What is the social composition of a given Fascist movement? There is an invariable lower middle-class core; the crucial question is how far it also reaches into the upper classes, the peasantry, and the proletariat.

(5) What is the real purpose or function of a given Fascist regime? Its leaders generally seek power and prestige for themselves, and frequently loot as well. These common motives are not unknown in other regimes and cannot serve the purposes of taxonomy. Nolte finds that Fascist regimes may have four types of motivation. They usually begin as dictatorships restoring order in the midst of anarchy, real or alleged (*Festigungsdiktatur*). They subsequently justify themselves by the impetus they give to modernization (*Entwicklungsdiktatur*). They are not, however, satisfied for long with the peacetime laurels of establishing order and creating prosperity, but begin to show a tendency to embark upon foreign conquest (thus becoming *Raumeroberungsdespotien*). The final motive, fully reached only in the case of Hitler, is to bring salvation to a suffering world by freeing it from a Jewish (or Marxist, or plutocratic) illness. (Nolte calls this *Weltheilungsdespotie.*)

An intransigent hostility to the revolutionary movement of the Left (interpreted as the spearhead of what Nietzsche called the "revolt of the slaves" against the "natural" aristocratic order of society) is characteristic of all Fascist movements. This antagonism is rarely one of contemptuous hostility, for a weak enemy would deprive the regime of much of its *raison d'être.* It is often accompanied by a more than grudging respect, as witness Hitler's envious admiration for Stalin (especially after the conspiracy of July 20, 1944, which showed that the Russian dictator had more skill in handling his generals than Hitler) and Mussolini's lifelong fascination with Lenin. Fascism's hostility to communism is shared by democratic and traditionalist regimes, but it differs from both of the latter in the quality and intensity of its response. Fascists meet the danger of Communist ideology by developing a radical counter-ideology, whereas democratic regimes remain pluralist-libertarian and traditionalist regimes merely reiterate their traditional values. Fascists meet the danger of Communist organization by developing counter-organizations, whereas democratic regimes rely upon the good sense of their citizens,[1] and traditionalist regimes upon intensified police work.

[1] Such is, at least, the ideal case. In practice, even democratic regimes frequently fall into Fascist practices when combating communism, as the United States did in the McCarthy period. Is it needless to add that there is a world of difference between Fascist practices *within* a predominantly liberal system, and fascism *per se*?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is a notorious fact that Fascist regimes take on many of the features of the Communist enemy they combat (for example, the use of terror, concentration camps, single-party dictatorship, and destruction of man's "private sphere"). Yet it is important to keep communism and fascism sharply distinct for analytical purposes. They differ in their avowed aim, ideological content, circumstances of achieving power, and the groups to which they appeal. Fascists seeks the greatness of the nation (which need not exclude a racialist internationalism); Communists, the world triumph of the working class (which need not exclude a strong Russian nationalism). Fascists stand in avowed revolt against the ideas of 1789; Communists pose as the heirs and executors of those ideas. Fascism has a miscellaneous and heterogeneous ideological content; communism prides itself upon the all-embracing logic of its *Weltanschauung*. Fascism glories in an irrational world of struggle; communism aims ultimately at a rational world of peace and harmony (which does not preclude some pride in the violent methods required prior to the final achievement of utopia). Fascism has triumphed in some highly developed communities through abuse of the electoral process (e.g., Germany); communism typically achieves power through military occupation or successful use of violence in backward communities demoralized by prolonged military strains (Russia, Yugoslavia, China). Fascism has special appeal to the lower middle class and sections of the frightened upper class; communism generally finds its greatest resonance in sections of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia. Fascism consists, finally, of a series of national movements lacking centralized overall direction, while communism is a centralized world movement in which each member party obeys the orders emanating from a single center. (At least this was true until the Moscow-Peiping split.) For all these reasons, Nolte stands justified in selecting fascism as a "significant unit of historical study" instead of following the current fashion—valid on the level of political science—of exploring the broader phenomenon of "totalitarianism."

Nolte delimits his subject matter by the following working definition: "Fascism consists of anti-Marxist movements that aim at destroying their opponents through the development of a radically opposite (yet in many ways similar) ideology, and the application of nearly identical (yet characteristically transformed) methods, while operating within the framework of the autonomous and self-assertive national state" (p. 51). This definition is obviously geared primarily to the phase of "normal fascism" in the four-phase classification mentioned above; it does not apply to pre-fascism (where ideology and organiza-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion remain embryonic) or radical fascism (where the framework of the national state is easily transcended, as in Hitler's racialism). It may be observed that the four types of fascism noted by Nolte—which are *not* necessarily stages that develop in sequence—are sufficiently variegated to obviate the charge that he has imposed his own systematic definition upon heterogeneous phenomena. The line between pre-fascism and (non-Fascist) mere traditionalism is obviously fluid; only one fully developed example of the species of "radical fascism" is as yet known (nazism) and can therefore be described by its unique qualities. Nolte is too good a historian to become a prisoner of any general definition (his own included), although his definition performs the useful function of identifying the essential common feature of a great number of known fascisms.

Nolte buttresses his view of fascism as a single phenomenon (whose many species are subordinated to a genus) by an appeal to the *consensus auctorum*. The most dissimilar authors, advancing the most heterogeneous interpretations, are agreed on the existence of a single fascism that requires explanation. Nolte provides an admirably fair-minded survey of all the general interpretations of fascism hitherto advanced, including the Marxist (e.g., Franz Neumann), liberal (e.g., Luigi Salvatorelli), Christian (e.g., Luigi Sturzo), conservative (e.g., Hermann Rauschning), psychoanalytical (e.g., Ignazio Silone), and sociological (e.g., Talcott Parsons).[2] The *consensus auctorum* concerning a "unitary fascism" is reenforced by the sense of solidarity to be found among Fascists themselves; sympathy for fellow-Fascists was frequently responsible for actions that obviously violated self-interest, as Nolte shows by examples drawn from the careers of Maurras, Mussolini, and Hitler.

The conclusion to be derived from the author's classification, definition, and methodological observations[3] is that fascism is a meaningful unit of study, and that it has been the dominant phenomenon of the historical period just preceding our own (with 1945 as the historical watershed). Nolte realizes that to cover fascism exhaustively would mean

[2] Nolte finds considerable merit in all these interpretations, while adding his own in the concluding section. He has no use, on the other hand, for the "anti-German" interpretation (e.g., William L. Shirer's) that sees nazism only as the extreme manifestation of a perennially wicked German national character. Even if true, this approach is of no value in interpreting fascism as a *general* phenomenon—indeed, it precludes fruitful generalization by being hypnotized by the particular German case, which, while an especially odious species, can nonetheless be subsumed under the general genus of "fascism."

[3] These are admirably self-conscious in the best sense of the word. See his remarks on the weakness of the "typological" method (p. 52) and his refutation of possible objections to his own "phenomenological" method, which attaches great importance to the *self*-understanding expressed by fascism (pp. 53-55).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nothing less than to write a history of the entire period of 1919-1945; even to study the various Fascist movements in depth would obviously exceed the strength and linguistic capacity of any single author. He has wisely confined himself, therefore, to sketching out in his introductory section what might become the research program for a future International Center for the Study of Fascism. Having set forth this overall program, he devotes the bulk of his book to a detailed examination of the three important cases of the *Action Française,* Italian fascism, and German nazism.

III

No attempt can be made here to discuss the many individual themes developed in the three case studies that form the bulk of *Fascism in Its Epoch.* Each of them is a solid monograph based upon impressive mastery of a vast printed literature; each of them seeks to answer particular problems and avoids becoming a mere narrative of generally known facts. A certain want of chronological proportion is the inevitable accompaniment of Nolte's selective method. To give only one example: the history of Italian fascism before it seized power (three years, 1919-1922) is covered in 94 pages, while fascism in power (23 years, 1922-1945) is compressed into 43. This disproportion is fully justified, however, by the important theses that Nolte develops about the young Mussolini and his problematic relationship to the early Fascist Party (both to be discussed below), whereas he has little that is new to say about the years of power. The book is notable for its excellent overall organization. Each of the three sections on the *Action Française,* Italian fascism, and German nazism is subdivided into chapters dealing with the history of the movement (including the biography of the Leader), its traditions (i.e., roots in the cultural heritage of the respective countries), its practices (i.e., organizational setup before achieving power, institutional development thereafter), and its doctrine. Nolte is above all interested in the interaction of these four factors, which he finds through his comparative approach to be very different in the three cases studied.

The best way to convey an impression of the richness of Nolte's study is to present some of the results of his comparative approach. The treatment of the three leaders—Charles Maurras, Benito Mussolini, and Adolf Hitler—is a superb study in similarities and contrasts. Each was born in the provinces as a scion of the Catholic petty bourgeoisie and possessed the confidence of the self-made man; each succeeded to a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remarkable extent in imposing his personal style upon the movement he headed, though this was less true of Mussolini than of the two others. They differed fundamentally, however, in their personality, political aptitude, and intellectual outlook. Maurras combined a sensitive artistic nature with a complete inflexibility in his substantive opinions after he had reached thirty. His rigidity made him all the more convincing a teacher for those attracted by his views; but it made him an impossible political leader, since he could neither compromise nor adapt to changing circumstances. His inflexibility brought him to the tragically false position of the years 1940-1945 and hence to his post-Liberation trial and imprisonment. Maurras had in fact never collaborated with the Germans in *subjective* intent; he simply had not understood that his anti-Semitic tirades assumed a new significance through the new circumstance that the Gestapo was now hunting Jews in occupied France.

Mussolini was, by contrast, an eminently practical man with great flexibility and adaptability. It is easy to denounce him as a mere opportunist, but Nolte shows that at least his most controversial change of position—the shift from socialist internationalism to nationalist interventionism in 1914—was contrary to his personal interests: he abandoned a position of great influence in the Socialist Party to enter upon years of uncertainty and isolation. Nolte succeeds, in one of the most brilliant sections of the book, in depicting Mussolini's intellectual development with considerable sympathy by identifying a consistent socialist strain through all the stages of Mussolini's career. Before 1914 he was a fervid Marxist, though one accessible to the "philosophy of life" exemplified by Nietzsche (who influenced him far more than either Bergson or Sorel). Nolte shows that Mussolini's pre-1914 views often strained the limits of what could still be considered orthodox Marxism (exactly as in the comparable case of Lenin), yet never unmistakably went beyond them.[4] The decision to support Italy's intervention in the 1914 war could be covered by the Marxist formula of permissible wars of liberation; in Mussolini's eyes, it was part of the necessary task of freeing Italian Marxism from its doctrinaire rigidity. He aimed, in his own words, "to strengthen socialist ideals while revising them, the criticism being dictated by the terrible lessons of contemporary life" (p. 225). He annoyed many of his followers in 1921 by declaring the education of the Socialists to "national responsibility" to be one of the primary goals of the Fascist Party; he contemplated a parliamentary coalition with the Socialists and Popolari that year; and there is some reason

[4] This theme is enlarged in a valuable article by Ernst Nolte, "Marx und Nietzsche im Sozialismus des jungen Mussolini," *Historische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 191 (1960), 249-335.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to believe that he wanted to take Turati, the Socialist leader, into his government as late as 1925. His dictatorship was, at least until 1935, predominantly an *Entwicklungsdiktatur* with great achievements in the modernization of Italy. Nolte notes, finally, the explicitly socialist program of the "Republic of Salo" in 1943-1945: Mussolini at that time openly repented of the concessions made to monarchy and plutocracy in the heyday of his power.

How different a figure was Hitler! In treating him Nolte is forced to abandon his favorite method of "intellectual biography" for a psychological approach which emphasizes the monomanic, infantile, and fear-obsessed sides of Hitler's personality. His systematic doctrine (if his crude ideas can be dignified with this name) had all the static consistency of Maurras' system, while being of course on a much lower intellectual level. Hitler's basic premise was fear for the future of the German race, which he saw as mortally threatened by a Jewish world conspiracy; this obsessive fear constituted the never-changing keynote of his outlook from the earliest political utterances in Vienna to his final testament written in the crumbling Berlin Chancellery.[5] Hitler must be described as an "honest fanatic" in his anti-Semitic convictions: what makes his career so grisly is that he combined this fanaticism with the tactical flair necessary to seize power, and used that power to translate his intellectual obsessions into the physical destruction of all Jews within his grasp. He pursued this program with fanatical tenacity as long as he could, and bequeathed it as a legacy to his followers just before his suicide.

The mode of death of the three leaders is, incidentally, symptomatic of much of their careers. Maurras retained his inflexibility in prison (1946-1952) but returned to Catholicism just before his death: a sign that he had not completely lost touch with that Christian conservatism which had stood at the cradle of his kind of pre-fascism. Mussolini showed, on the other hand, a flexibility almost indistinguishable from weakness, and explicable only by his personal disintegration. He allowed himself (quite unnecessarily, it seems) to be "legally" deposed from power after the famous meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on July 25, 1943; he consented in his Salo period to become a puppet of the Germans, whom he had always hated (although sometimes hypnotized by their power and achievement); he allowed himself,

[5] Nolte has discovered an important new source that documents the central role of anti-Semitism in Hitler's *Weltanschauung*: Dietrich Eckart, *Der Bolschewismus von Moses bis Lenin. Zwiegespräch zwischen Adolf Hitler und mir* (Munich 1924). Nolte gives an excellent analysis in "Eine frühe Quelle zu Hitlers Antisemitismus," *Historische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 192 (1961), 584-606.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

finally, to be arrested disguised in a German uniform, and to be killed under circumstances that showed no regard for his historical position. He showed that he was *not*, in the last resort, a man of fanatical conviction who could impose himself upon his environment. Hitler's death was very different: he chose suicide after keeping unchallenged control of Germany's governmental apparatus until the end; his manner of death precluded an abuse of his corpse similar to that of the murdered Mussolini, who was exhibited like a slaughtered pig in Milan; and he bequeathed a strident testament to his followers that he believed might yet develop historical efficacy. "The Last Days of Hitler" saw only a further exaggeration of the pathological sides of his personality: they remained unrelieved by the slightest trace of self-examination, let alone repentance.

The three movements analyzed had very different relationships to the national traditions of their respective countries. *The Action Française* was a not unimpressive synthesis of the strains of three French schools of thought: Christian conservatism (Maistre, Bonald), critical liberalism (Comte, Le Play, Renan, Taine, Fustel de Coulanges), and radical conservatism (de La Tour du Pin, Drumont, Barrès). It was firmly rooted in one part of the national tradition, while rejecting completely that greater part symbolized by the ideas of 1789. Italian fascism was, on the other hand, confronted by only *one* vital national tradition, the *Risorgimento*: it could never make up its mind whether to interpret itself as the continuation, fulfillment, or repudiation of that glorious period of Italian history. At any rate there can be no question that fascism was never deeply rooted in Italian soil: the nation's rather mixed but essentially irrepressible traditions of Catholicism, radicalism, and anarchism made it immune to thorough fascistization (a point insufficiently stressed by Nolte). Nazism was rooted in an anti-Semitic tradition that was international rather than distinctively German in character (Gobineau, Vacher de Lapouge, Chamberlain), though it probably had more—and, above all, more fervid—followers in Germany than in the other Western European countries. In the opinion of this reviewer, Nolte does not stress adequately the *indirect* roots of nazism in certain factors of German history (for example, the anachronistic survival of the authoritarian *Obrigkeitsstaat*). While *not* proto-Nazi in nature (as believed by Shirer and his school), it nonetheless prevented the mature development of those modern forces—liberalism, democratic socialism, left-wing Catholicism, responsible conservatism—alone capable of offering effective resistance to a Fascist onslaught. (This point will be discussed in detail below.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The most interesting comparisons are to be made in the field of *practice,* both before and after the Fascist achievement of power. Nolte shows brilliantly how the *Action Française* anticipated, in a way sometimes embryonic, sometimes rarefied, many of the institutional features of fascism: the *Camelots du Roi,* the storm troopers, the *Nouvelle Librairie Nationale,* the *Eher Verlag,* the *Institut d'Action Française,* the Nazi *Ordensburgen.* The value of the *Action Française* for comparative purposes is, however, limited by the fact that it never won power, whereas fascism and nazism offer an endless field for historical comparisons. Both Mussolini and Hitler won control of the state when the upper classes panicked in the face of the Communist danger and thought a Fascist government necessary to preserve the social *status quo*; they also trusted that the Duce or Führer would put a leash upon their own extremist followers, and relieved their uneasiness at Fascist rowdyism by the belief that power generally breeds responsibility. There were, however, considerable differences in the circumstances under which that power was attained. The Italy of 1920-1922 was in a genuine situation of civil war; Germany in 1930-1933 knew only sporadic—though for a civilized community quite intolerable—violence. Mussolini continued to experience organized opposition for several years and long remained a contested figure even within the Fascist movement; the early German opposition to Hitler was paralyzed by the fact that the majority of the German people succumbed in 1933 to an euphoric mood of national revolution. The Nazis established a totalitarian dictatorship in a matter of months, acting in accordance with plans clearly conceived in advance; Mussolini, on the other hand, was for some years satisfied to head a multiparty coalition and was driven into totalitarianism as much by the intransigence of his opponents (who refused to confine their criticism to detail, but struck at the foundations of this system) as by the extremism of his followers. The antagonism between party members and storm troopers (so important in the early history of nazism) was almost unknown in early fascism, where membership in the party and in the combat units was nearly identical. Hitler aimed at converting men to his *Weltanschauung* through public meetings, and valued the SA primarily for the removal of alien elements that might break the emotional communion between Leader and followers; when Röhm tried to turn the SA into an auxiliary army he aroused Hitler's suspicion. Mussolini had no cohesive *Weltanschauung* to preach, hence public meetings did not play the central role in his movement; the *squadristi* did not perform the limited functions of the SA, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arose in fact quite independently of Mussolini in the civil war that raged in several parts of Italy from 1919 to 1922.

The differences between fascism and nazism become especially striking after the seizure of power. Both regimes rested upon a potent combination of spontaneous consent, propaganda, and terror; there was, however, nothing in Italy comparable to the openly sanctioned terror that broke out in Germany on June 30, 1934. Both regimes aimed at foreign conquest, but differed significantly in opportunity and ultimate intent. Mussolini headed a nation with only a marginal Great Power potential; he could conquer Ethiopia and Albania only through skillful exploitation of an international situation not of his own creation. Hitler controlled a Great Power still capable of starting and sustaining (though not winning) a major war. The war unleashed in 1939 was from the beginning far more than a conventional "war of national restitution," aiming to break the remaining shackles of Versailles; it was even more than a conventional "war of conquest," since it aimed at the decimation of Slavic peoples for the sake of *Lebensraum* in the East. It was, in fact, the culmination of Hitler's obsession with the "Jewish illness" which he sought to cure through the total elimination of European Jewry. Hitler was able to impose his fantastic policies, derived from his personal obsessions and applied with a systematic rigor rare in history, only because he ruled over a remarkably docile people. There was nothing comparable to this in Italian fascism, though one must not minimize the odious mistreatment of the conquered Ethiopians or the introduction (apparently without strong German pressure) of anti-Semitic legislation in 1938.

It is a weakness of Nolte's book—rooted, I believe in the fact that he is more interested in a systematic than a historical treatment of fascism—that he does not provide an adequate explanation of why fascism took on a unique form in Germany. It would be absurd to suggest that the vast majority of the German people approved (or even knew) of the horrors perpetrated in their name; but it must be said that there was altogether too much acquiescence in what was done *because* it was done by duly constituted authority, and a widespread desire *not to want to know*. Nolte says in a notable passage that few Germans *had* to know the full horror of the Nazi policies, but nearly all were *able* to know a significant part of the truth (p. 438). The cause for their attitude is to be sought primarily in human nature in general, from which it is unreasonable to expect either great political insight or moral courage; moreover, one must always remember that the slightest protest against Nazi atrocities had ruinous consequences not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only for oneself but one's family: those of us who have never been in a comparable situation should avoid pharisaism in judgment. It is true, nonetheless, that acquiescence to the policies of a criminal government was partly due to *German* human nature as it had been shaped (of course not for all time, but for the period here considered) by the facts of Germany's exceptionally unhappy modern history. Bismarck, who had reason to know, once deplored the want of civic courage (*Zivilcourage*) among his fellow-countrymen; it is certain that this was part of a tradition that created the prerequisites for a government that was surely the most monstrous of recorded history. These considerations clearly go beyond what can be treated in a review article; suffice it to say that Nolte *describes* the unique features of German fascism but—contrary to his usual practice—makes too little attempt to *explain* them.

IV

Nolte has achieved (despite the last reservation) impressive results in the comparative study of fascism, and is fully aware of (indeed, stresses) the highly developed individuality of the three systems examined; yet his main interest is the interpretation of fascism as a *general* phenomenon. This is the purpose of his final section, "Fascism as a Transpolitical Phenomenon": it provides a comprehensive theory which incorporates many elements drawn explicitly from the thought of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Max Weber. The theory may be outlined as follows: The dominant fact of modern history is the evolution of "bourgeois society," a term that Nolte uses to describe essentially what Marx dealt with in the famous section of the Communist Manifesto hailing the achievements of the bourgeoisie: the destruction of the confining *particular* ties of class, nation, religion, etc., as society becomes characterized by a high degree of *universality*. Nolte calls this trend (of which industrialization is the key element) "practical transcendence"—i.e., transcending *in this world* the particularities which have previously limited man's freedom. The yearning of man for freedom from particular ties is, of course, far older than the modern process of industrialization; it has, indeed, been one of the main themes of Western history since the philosophical position of idealism was first formulated in ancient Greece by Parmenides. Nolte calls the idealist position, with its confrontation between the world of things (limited by the laws of number, space, and time) and the world of "true Being" (or "the One," or "Nature," or God—all expressing what is unitary, infinite, and eternal), "theoretical transcendence"—i.e., transcending

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the particularities of this world by entering into a supramundane world of theory. The schism between things and true Being is mirrored in human nature in the schism between our particular concrete existence and our capacity for universal, abstract thought. The latter allows us to enter the world of "true Being" and to derive from it general ideals that are then used to criticize the particular world of things. The result is a *demand* that the world be changed and a *belief* that change is possible: this has proved one of the factors behind the modern "emancipatory process," and in this sense theoretical transcendence is one of the factors behind practical transcendence. The realization of practical transcendence is one of the greatest events in history, for it means that "philosophy and religion cease to be experienced, in an axiomatic fashion, as the *only* way in which man can relate himself to the universal" (p. 519). The possibility now exists that man can become emancipated from particular ties in *this* world—this at least is the utopian vision of Marx, who believed that the residual particular fetters which still confined man in bourgeois society (exploitation, subjection to the division of labor, and political domination) could be eliminated with the establishment of socialism; theoretical transcendence would then no longer be necessary, since man's striving for freedom would be fully satisfied through the triumph of practical transcendence.[6]

This paraphrase of Nolte's philosophical framework surely bears out what he says himself with a tinge of self-irony: "The discussion seems to have left fascism and to have entered the lifeless abstraction (*Unanschaulichkeit*) of metaphysical terminology" (p. 521). It is improbable that Nolte shares Marx's vision of the perfectly free man fully integrated into a world of practical transcendence (though the final paragraph of the book has a *prima facie* utopian ring)—but he clearly affirms the inevitability of the "advance" to practical transcendence. His condemnation of bolshevism is comparatively lenient because—however great its vices—it at least promotes practical transcendence, though its

[6] Nolte gives an excellent account of Max Weber's criticism of the utopian strain in Marxism in a special chapter (pp. 535-40). He notes—I think, with a tone of reproach—that Weber faced bourgeois society in a spirit of "hesitating courage." His view of Weber is expressed at length in an important article: "Max Weber vor dem Faschismus," *Der Staat*, II (1963), 1-24. Nolte shows in a provocative fashion that some of Weber's substantive views (e.g., his Freiburg *Antrittsrede* in 1895) possess a remarkable similarity to Hitler's and that his ambivalence towards the process of modernization might have proved a source of weakness in the face of fascism; he does not question, of course, that Weber would have become a foe of fascism if he had lived until 1933. Nolte also demonstrates that Weber's sociology shows little anticipation of fascism, and that the concept of charisma is misunderstood when applied to the Hitler-Mussolini type of leadership—facts indicating that fascism was "one of the least expected phenomena of political history and therefore one of the most difficult to explain" (p. 24).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use of compulsion and repression of criticism produce many unpleasant features. It is the glory of bourgeois society that it encourages spontaneous "advance" to the accompaniment of much self-criticism—the danger being that this criticism degenerates easily into downright hostility. Criticism within the limits of overall acceptance of transcendence is laudable and can play a humanizing role; downright hostility Nolte finds understandable, but he insists that it only serves further to complicate problems already intrinsically difficult to solve.

The process of transcendence inevitably arouses fears, for it not only threatens but brings about the loss of much that is dear and familiar to man. It must be remembered that man not only yearns for freedom but also clings to the particularities that both confine and shelter him. The pulverizing process of practical transcendence inevitably arouses opposition: an opposition that first crystallized in conservatism, only to become invigorated and vulgarized in fascism. Nolte gives the following interpretative definition of "radical fascism" to supplement his earlier empirical definition of "normal fascism": "Nazism was the death struggle of sovereign, bellicose, hierarchic society. It was practical and violent resistance against the process of transcendence" (p. 507)—a process that was leading inevitably to a world of internationalism, pacifism, and equality. Fascism furthermore did not limit itself to the struggle against practical transcendence; it also opposed theoretical transcendence because the yearning for the universal stood in the way of fascism's idolization of the particular. The most characteristic feature of Fascist doctrine was the belief that the progress of transcendence was *not* an inevitable development, but rather the result of a Jewish conspiracy that could still be stopped if sufficiently brutal methods were employed. The Nazi resistance to the inevitable had all the violent futility characteristic of death struggles.

Nolte shows in an especially brilliant chapter (pp. 529-34) that the essence of fascism—resistance to transcendence—was anticipated by Friedrich Nietzsche. He far from supports the once popular doctrine that Nietzsche "caused" nazism; but *his* Nietzsche is nonetheless very different from the transfigured Nietzsche known to most American scholars from the important work of Walter Kaufmann. The "slave revolt" that so horrified the German philosopher took place in the name of a morality rooted in "theoretical transcendence." Nietzsche scarcely knew the work of Marx, yet he himself constituted the antipode of the latter's conviction that the world can and should be changed. Nietzsche opposed the desirability of change by the idolization of the existing world, as joyously mastered by the overman in the Here and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now. He did not hesitate to call for an alliance between military castes and intellectuals to defend the *status quo*; his main purpose was the "anti-transcendent self-preservation of sovereign, bellicose, and hierarchic society" (p. 535)—exactly what Nolte interprets as the essence of fascism. Maurras and Hitler were devoted to the same purpose, though their outlook (especially the latter's) was of course infinitely more primitive intellectually, and both (especially Hitler) used methods that would have made Nietzsche shudder.

It is difficult to pass a definite judgment on Nolte's interpretation of fascism, both because of its abstractness and because it is part of a general interpretation of man's modern history—and indeed man's fate!—which can only be sketched out in a review article. It is paradoxical that the interpretation of fascism he offers applies least well to the Italian fascism that has given the genus its name. If Mussolini in fact headed an *Entwicklungsdiktatur* promoting industrialization (a key feature of practical transcendence), he clearly does not belong among the anti-transcendentalists; it can be argued, of course, that the "really" Fascist character of his fascism emerged only with the Ethiopian conquest (1935) and the anti-Semitic legislation (1938). It appears to this reviewer that Nolte's overall interpretation is more impressive in its scope than helpful in its exploration of the concrete phenomenon that was fascism. The proof of this is to be found in the excellence of Nolte's preliminary empirical survey of fascism and his individual treatment of the *Action Française*, Italian fascism, and German nazism; both are virtually unaffected by his excursion into the transpolitical in his concluding section. Their value will be appreciated by the many readers who will fail to agree with (or, more likely, fail to understand) Nolte's concluding section.

What makes Nolte's book great despite its unhelpful metaphysical abstractions is the range of subject matter covered, the pioneering comparative treatment, the thoroughness of the scholarship, and the moral seriousness of the author. A deep compassion for the predicament of twentieth-century man often breaks through the most abstract pages and the most heroic (and remarkably successful) efforts at "objectivity." The author's meticulous scholarship gives firm support to many challenging theses developed throughout the book. The value of the comparative approach has been indicated above; the fact that it has been employed here for the first time in depth is a deplorable commentary on the still widespread compartmentalization of history along national lines. The author has succeeded in his primary task of establishing the *epochal* character of fascism for the period 1919-1945 and defining its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

historical prerequisites. His empirical survey of the varieties of fascism, and his theoretical construction of a Fascist "ideal type," constitute a valuable prolegomena to all future studies in fascism. It is to be hoped, but scarcely to be expected, that future works will reach the same level of scholarly precision, explicitly elaborated theoretical concepts, and the right mixture of objectivity and engagement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISARMAMENT AS A SPECIAL CASE IN MILITARY STRATEGY

By ARTHUR I. WASKOW

Amitai Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy*, New York, Collier Books, 1962, 285 pp. $.75.
Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War and Surrender*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962, 183 pp. $1.45.
J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament: Toward a Synthesis in National Security Policy*, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1962, 279 pp. $5.50.

WHEN men define the future as radically unprecedented, how can they prepare to cope with it? Statesmen have traditionally been students of history, on the assumption that history is full of precedents for the future. But even when statesmen are ready to agree that reading history may be useless, it is not easy to find substitutes. Statesmen are not likely to prefer learning from science fiction. Many of them are now prepared to accept at one level of consciousness that thermonuclear weapons have made history obsolete as a guide to action; but there is no agreement on whether adequate substitutes for history have been created.

The military strategist was the first expert to confront this problem on behalf of the statesman. Thermonuclear weapons had never been used in war, so that he had no history from which to judge. Could he concoct strategies on some evidence of what effects the use or the threat of using these weapons might accomplish? He could try to, of course, and could cloak the resulting science-fiction stories under the guise of "scenarios" or computer findings. But they remained fiction nevertheless, spun out of his own assumptions and expectations with no inductive scientific base either of historical observation or experimental data.

Outside the ranks of professional strategists working on assignments from the armed forces, there has over the last few years begun to grow up a loose profession of "counterstrategists" oriented to the analysis of world disarmament. These men have been plagued with the same difficulty that has been plaguing the official strategist: on what evidence can conclusions about a disarmed world be reached? For a disarmed world seems as unprecedented as a thermonuclear war.

Amitai Etzioni, a sociologist, Charles E. Osgood, a psychologist, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

J. David Singer, a political scientist, have tried to grapple with this problem. All of them have treated disarmament as official strategists treat "deterrence" or "counterforce": that is, as a means of disposing American military forces so as to advance American national interests. They recognize that disarmament is a special case among military strategies: *disposing of* military forces is a special and problematic case of *disposing* them. Yet the very act of examining disarmament as a military strategy produces a tone and flavor quite different from the traditional view of disarmament as a moral and ethical imperative.

For one thing, the disarmament strategists come to "the Establishment" (and to that majority of Americans who share or accept most of its basic premises) able to share most of its stated values: the preservation of the American political system, American political independence, and American privileges and power in the world. Most of the disarmament moralists, on the other hand, confront the Establishment as an enemy, since they tend to oppose the state system, the use of violence as a means of coercion, and the domination of men or nations. The disarmament moralists have therefore found themselves able to appeal only to men outside the corridors of power (or to powerful men only as "moral men," without regard to their roles as decision-makers) and have thus been unable to move institutions.

The disarmament strategists are able to find an audience at almost every level of society. The translations of their ideas into political language can be carried on by official advisers, lobbyists, and prestige journalists as well as by political candidates, street demonstrators, and direct actionists. For this reason the disarmament strategists may have the same kind of political potential that Gunnar Myrdal and other such scholarly believers in racial equality had about twenty years ago: the Establishment and much of the nation shared the same ultimate values and could "hear" the same language, and could therefore gradually be brought into political activity of many kinds in support of those values, once the scholars had effectively analyzed the way in which reality diverged from them.

The very possibility of political success and the share the disarmament strategists have in Establishment values have imposed upon them a responsibility that the disarmament moralists have not had to shoulder: the responsibility of estimating what the future would be like if their recommendations were adopted, and of providing evidence on which those estimates could be judged. The moralists generally argue that a right act should be performed, and that right consequences will necessarily flow from it; so they frequently do not feel it necessary to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provide complex evidence to support one or another expectation of the future. It is, however, an important element in the disarmament strategists' thought that they must seek, like the older military strategists, to provide the evidence by means of which a seemingly unprecedented future can be examined.

Etzioni, Osgood, and Singer vary in the extent to which they have adduced such evidence or suggested ways of gathering it. They also differ in the extent to which they examine the internal and international political problems and values associated with strategy choices, the extent to which they make explicit their own political values and assumptions, and the extent to which they believe present American society embodies the traditional liberal values. But all make it fairly clear that they share most traditional liberal values and believe most of mankind would like to be able to enjoy them; that they believe military superiority is no longer an effective means of advancing or extending those values and military parity no longer an effective means of protecting them where they exist; and that they expect these values to be far more effectively advanced in a disarmed world than they can be now.

Singer is the least explicit of the three about politics, or about what would replace military techniques as a means of advancing political values in the disarmed world. In this he is most like the military strategists, who rarely contemplate the effects certain choices in military strategy might have on American society, or on societies that are striving toward industrial economies and libertarian polities, or on totalitarian societies that are groping toward liberalization. Instead of examining such questions, Singer stays close to military problems.

He proposes a straight-line movement in American strategy from the eschewal of nuclear superiority and the unilateral choice of stable, finite deterrence through the choice of "arms control" to the choice of mutual disarmament. By "arms control" Singer means arrangements between the great powers that preserve thermonuclear weapons but "safen" them by making surprise or preemptive attack, accidental or unauthorized attack, and destabilizing research breakthroughs on new weapons or new defenses extremely unlikely. Singer believes such measures could be slowly turned into more meaningful efforts to reduce and finally eliminate weapons under joint inspection and control. Osgood, without naming such partial measures "arms control," suggests that acts along such lines, taken by the United States and reciprocated by its opponents, could move gradually into major arms reduction and ultimately elimination.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Etzioni, on the other hand, argues that "Arms control . . . definitely is not . . . a form of or a way to, disarmament." He warns that it would be unacceptable to a nation inferior in arms but catching up like the Soviet Union, and that even if accepted it would become a closed plateau with no trail down. Here Etzioni's dominant concern with world politics may explain his divergence of opinion from that of the other men. For neither of the others adequately assesses the possibility that an arms-controlled world in which international tensions have been moderately reduced (Osgood) or have stayed the same (Singer) may be one in which there is considerably less incentive than there is now to move all the way to general and complete disarmament. In this sense, a *détente* might be an enemy of disarmament.

None of the three men makes a clear, explicit, and direct statement of how he expects the final push to be given that will press the great powers from a situation of low tension and moderate arms into the process of total disarmament. Exegesis of Osgood would indicate that he regards disarmament as so clearly the rational, "human" policy that he believes it will be undertaken if "Neanderthal" fears of a bogeyman enemy can be removed on both sides. This he hopes to accomplish through a program of "running the arms race in reverse," through graduated and reciprocated steps to reduce the tensions that have produced the black-and-white Neanderthal mentality. Osgood also examines the proposals of Seymour Melman in *The Peace Race* (New York 1962) for bypassing "arms control" and pressing the Soviets toward disarmament, by competing with them so effectively in the political and economic struggle for the underdeveloped world that they find arms reduction necessary if they are to hold up their end of the politico-economic competition. But Osgood warns that such a program, unless it were carefully constructed to invite sharing of and reciprocation from the Soviets and from the hungry nations, might increase rather than reduce international tensions.

Etzioni accepts much of Osgood's tension-reducing approach as a first phase in moving toward disarmament. He also urges the improvement of Western political and economic efforts at encouraging libertarian industrialism, in a fashion reminiscent of Melman though sociologically more sophisticated. But on the Soviets' side, Etzioni sees the major tug toward disarmament as coming from their expectation that in a disarmed world, revolutionary communism could quickly succeed in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Etzioni does not adequately examine the problem of whether this Soviet expectation (and with it the Soviet wish for disarmament) might fade away if the West were greatly to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

improve its chances of resisting totalitarian revolution by encouraging democratic revolution or reform. He also does not adequately examine the claims of some American scholars that Soviet revolutionary zeal is dying out.

Singer, since he sticks much closer to purely military problems, does not directly confront the "peace race" question. He indicates that the motive power for disarmament will come from continuing fears that even "safened" nuclear weapons might go off, intentionally or not. Singer therefore proposes an "arms-first" policy that would leave psychological tensions to be reduced and political conflict to be resolved later, after the weapons have been eliminated. In short, he hopes for disarmament to be adopted in the most precise sense, as a joint military strategy of the great powers, and nothing more.

On the problems of verifying, enforcing, and managing disarmament, Etzioni and Singer go into some detail. Both regard the multiplication of overlapping and mutually reinforcing inspection systems as a way of achieving effective verification of compliance. Both assume a supranational enforcement institution. Singer suggests that national weapons stocks would piece by piece be transferred to the world police, but that it would not deploy nuclear weapons. Etzioni discusses the political and organizational preconditions for creating supranational institutions of various sorts. He emphasizes the necessity of building the required consensus in two or three steps through widening circles of functional unification, rather than at one jump from the individual nation to the world state.

Despite the partial convergence of their policy recommendations and the considerable similarities in their images of the future, Etzioni, Osgood, and Singer base their conclusions on quite different sets of evidence. Singer, as befits his closely military approach, leans heavily on the sort of utility-disutility and capability-credibility analyses, on the information about weapons and inspections technology, and on the calculations of expectations and responses mirrored from one opponent to another that have all characterized military strategic thought. Osgood relies upon a model of the creation of bogeyman fears that comes from studying social psychology and the behavior of small groups. Etzioni uses both the history of confederal states and the sociology of complex organizations in discussing supranational institutions, and draws upon recent history to analyze what he believes to be faults in official military strategies. In none of the books, however, is there a full or rigorous examination of the wealth of historical cases of disarmament at the level of city-states, cantons, or provinces; nor is there any presentation of psychological experiments deliberately constructed to test the effects

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of tension-reducing initiatives upon group conflicts; nor is there any operations analysis of a disarmament-enforcing institution or experimental simulation of a disarmament crisis.

The books are, in short, hypotheses. Their appearance is a major event in strategic thought because they are reasonably good hypotheses: that is, they are reasonably clear as to their own assumptions; they are based on data at least as good as that cited by the official strategists, and often much better; and they indicate (not always explicitly) the kind of research that might be undertaken to confirm or disprove them.

The hypotheses are not structurally complete. Some questions not directly confronted by any of the three books emerge from reading them, especially problems of the politics encircling strategy: the internal impacts of military strategy choices upon various societies and institutions, the motive power for beginning the disarmament process against possible resistances from institutions created by previous strategy choices, and the relation between *détente* and disarmament. But even such gaps in the argument appear to be researchable, through examination of the political systems and attitudes of the countries involved.

Not only have the three books made clear what research is possible, but their authors have pursued the possibilities and are already working on the kinds of research that can confirm or confute their original hypotheses.

For these reasons, it seems possible that the disarmament strategists have broken through the problem of the unprecedented future. Unlike strategists of thermonuclear war, they may find evidence available on which to build and revise their ideas. The experiments that cannot be attempted to assess thermonuclear wars can be attempted to assess the "peace race." The studies of decision-making that can hardly be made under conditions of ultimate thermonuclear crisis can be made under conditions of political and economic competition, tension-reduction, or arms control. The history that does not exist for thermonuclear wars does exist for small "disarmed worlds." And so the disarmament strategists may be evolving a way to think about the future that is far more scientific than the approaches of either the disarmament moralists or the official strategists.

If the disarmament strategists can join an ability to talk scientifically with an ability to talk the same political language as the Establishment and most Americans, they may make a major impact upon both the scholarly and the political situations in America. Ultimately, such impacts would change the direction of policy choices in such important ways that the recent emergence of disarmament strategy might well come to seem an event of historic importance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DETERRENCE, DISARMAMENT AND THE ROCKY ROAD BETWEEN

By MICHAEL BROWER

P. M. S. Blackett, *Studies of War*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1962, 242 pp. $3.95.
John Strachey, *On the Prevention of War*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1963, 334 pp. $5.95.

UNTIL recently most of the books by disarmers said little about the dirty business of nuclear strategy and most strategists made only occasional references to the utopia of disarmament. And so it also was with the actual policies—military vs. disarmament—of the nuclear nations. So long as this split persisted there was little chance of disarmament being seriously considered, and so long as the best military analysts considered nuclear weapons useful and even vital to Western defense—as a great many of them did—there was little hope for nuclear disarmament. But in the last few years this split between armers and disarmers has begun to be bridged by an increasing number of men who analyze from both perspectives at once, and by a shift in the consensus on the specific question of the usefulness of nuclear weapons—a shift largely reflecting the steady increase in Soviet nuclear power. These trends were given a considerable assist from these two excellent works by eminent Englishmen, both of whom assume that nuclear parity (and therefore, they believe, nuclear uselessness) is upon us, and both of whom are concerned with deterrence *and* disarmament, and how to get from one to the other.

P. M. S. Blackett, Professor of Physics at the Imperial College of Science at the University of London and wartime "father of British operations research," brings together here nine of his path-breaking and provocative articles analyzing and attacking Western defense policies over the last fifteen years, plus two articles dealing with Tizard and with C. P. Snow's interpretation of the Tizard-Lindemann conflicts (Blackett supports Snow completely), and four articles on his experiences in applying scientific methods of analysis (and some simple arithmetic) to wartime problems of strategic bombing, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-aircraft defense.

The book by John Strachey, former Labour Secretary of State for War and holder of the same post in the shadow cabinet until his death last year, is a tightly organized analysis of current military policies and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems, of why these policies—even if improved according to his recommendations—will not be adequate for the long run, of the necessity for disarmament, of the considerable changes that disarmament requires in our world, and of the reasons for hope despite the rocky road he has described.

I

The two men were in general agreement on a number of basic policy positions, of which some—but not all—have since been at least partially accepted by the U.S. government:

(1) The Soviet Union has a missile force with a considerable, and growing, ability to survive the largest possible strategic counterforce first strike against it by the U.S. and still retaliate with enough undestroyed missiles to cause unacceptably high levels of damage to the United States.

(2) This means that the United States missile and bomber forces cannot any longer be used to threaten (with much credibility) first strikes against the Soviet homeland in retaliation for a small or medium-sized or even quite large Soviet ground attack on Europe or elsewhere. Thus "massive retaliation" is dead (Blackett) or virtually dead (Strachey).

(3) Consequently, the Western allies must build stronger and better-equipped conventional (non-atomic) ground forces in Europe. Blackett has been urging this for years. For example, in 1959 (chapter 7) he wrote: "Without a shadow of doubt the West, since the war, has committed a vast military blunder in neglecting adequate preparation for land warfare in the mistaken view that atomic weapons would do instead" (p. 85). Strachey argued forcefully that: "If we have a real intention to stop a medium-sized Russian move on the ground by conventional forces, we must take far more seriously than hitherto the question of both the quantity and quality of the N.A.T.O. divisions. . . . The NATO governments have never yet appreciated what is the true function of their ground forces in Europe. They have talked vaguely of providing 'a trip wire,' of 'psychological reassurance,' phrases which revealed that they supposed that all that really matters is S.A.C. and its thermonuclear weapons in the background. They have never fully realized that the era of Western nuclear predominance is over: they have never faced the military necessities of the era of nuclear parity. They have talked manifest nonsense about the impossibility of matching 'the Eastern hordes' except by throwing nuclear weapons at them, ignoring the simple fact of arithmetic that Western Europe is more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

populous than Russia and that Russia is hardly likely to employ, say, Hungarian divisions in the West" (pp. 92-93).

(4) The use of so-called "tactical" or battlefield atomic weapons (the largest of which may in fact be several times as large as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs) would result in fantastic death and destruction in Europe (and especially in Germany), an "immensely increased" danger of escalation all the way up to a thermonuclear exchange (Strachey, p. 98), and it would bring no significant advantage to the West. Since the Russians have now followed our lead and supplied their forces with these weapons, we cannot safely eliminate ours, but we can make it official policy to refrain from using these weapons unless the Russians use theirs first. In 1954 Blackett had supported the idea that tactical atomic shells might be advantageous to the defense of the West (p. 43), but by 1958 he was calling some of Kissinger's arguments[1] in favor of their use "plain poppycock—and very dangerous" (p. 62). In 1959 Blackett analyzed the question again and concluded: "NATO would be well advised to announce that in no circumstances would it initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons, though it would use them if the Soviet forces did" (p. 84).

In fact, as is well known, Kissinger has since changed his mind on the desirability of our being the first to use tactical nuclear weapons[2] and today the ranks of the military analysts who believe their use would be advantageous to the West are thin indeed. But the U.S. government continues to develop, test, and produce these weapons, and has increased by 60 per cent the number on the Continent since 1961. In one of the most disturbing passages in his book, Strachey reported that "the illusion that 'we must have tactical nuclears to compensate for the Russian masses' persists in N.A.T.O. circles. This is mere nostalgia for the period of Western nuclear predominance. This illusion is particularly dangerous because it is leading to a situation in which the N.A.T.O. forces in Europe, partly because of the nature of their equipment and even more because of the nature of their *training*, will soon feel themselves unable to undertake more than a border skirmish *without* the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Lip service is paid at N.A.T.O. headquarters to the need for preserving the capacity to fight with conventional weapons alone. But conversation with officers of, at any rate, the British N.A.T.O. contingent makes it clear that the doctrine has spread that it would be impossible to meet any consider-

[1] Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York 1957).

[2] "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal," in Donald Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able Russian move, even if undertaken with conventional weapons alone, except by using tactical nuclears from the outset" (pp. 94-95).

Strachey regarded this as a "disastrous doctrine" (p. 95) which he wanted to reverse completely. Furthermore, to help ensure against any possible unauthorized firing of tactical nuclear weapons, he believed they should be "held way back, under a separate chain of command, and never integrated with the front-line ground forces" (p. 112).

(5) In the short run, and against the possibility of rationally calculated surprise or preemptive strikes, the Soviet-American strategic missile confrontation either already was relatively stable (Blackett, 1961, chapter 10), or could be made relatively stable with further efforts by each side to increase the invulnerability of its missiles (Strachey, writing in 1959-1962).

(6) But it is not safe to rely indefinitely on this relative strategic stability, which refers only to sane acts of rational governments of the existing nuclear powers. Nuclear disarmament is essential because the balance of terror "is by no means stable against irresponsible actions of individuals or dissident groups or against technical accidents" (Blackett, p. 153); because of the danger of destabilizing technological breakthroughs in an arms race which has become more qualitative than quantitative (Strachey, with Blackett in some disagreement); and because of the greatly increased dangers of nuclear war as cheaper nuclear weapons come into the hands of Nth countries in the decade ahead, *if* they are not stopped now by a comprehensive test ban including *all* countries (Strachey, writing in 1962).

(7) Disarmament and military strategy are intimately related. They are both concerned with the same goals and should be studied and planned together. A considerable degree of parity and symmetry in Soviet and Western military capabilities at three levels—conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic—is both indispensable to short-run stability and a necessary precondition for the achievement of disarmament.

II

Underlying Blackett's policy analyses and prescriptions are two exceedingly important assumptions. The first is that the planner of a disarmament negotiation, no less than of a military battle, needs, if he is to succeed, to "envisage the situation as it must appear to his opponent" (p. 147). Obvious as this necessity would seem to be, the American record of achievement has not been high. The original American nuclear control plans, the Acheson-Lilienthal, or Baruch,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposals, were formulated with little concern for how they would look to the Soviet Union, for that country's probable strong interest in exploring fission electric power plants, for its deep-seated suspicion of foreigners and of intrusion by foreigners onto its soil and into its society, or for its legitimate fears that the United States might not carry out the promise to destroy all atom bombs *after* (perhaps several years after!) a Western-dominated international control body was firmly in control of all domestic atomic fission activity everywhere in the world. Consequently, generous as this plan has always seemed to Americans, who were after all promising to give up their new invention (and who never thought to doubt the sanctity of their own promises), it never really had a chance of acceptance, as Blackett argued soon after.[3]

In fact, J. Robert Oppenheimer, who was the actual architect of the core of these first American proposals, later said that "no one at that time could with much confidence believe that they [the Soviets] would accept these proposals" since acceptance would have required a major alteration of the whole Soviet system.[4] It is, of course, quite probable that in 1946 there was not a sufficient area of perceived common interests to permit of any agreement on atomic energy control. But American leadership at the time did not really attempt to understand and take into account the Soviet viewpoint, and thus to determine if an agreement were really possible. Certainly if the situation after World War II had been reversed, and the Soviet Union had the bomb, the American government would never have accepted a Soviet "Baruch Plan," calling as it did for so much trust in the good intentions of the author country.

Of the U.S. disarmament policies between 1947 and 1961 Blackett wrote little in the book under review, and about them little needs to be said. With a few deft paragraphs Strachey demonstrated that not only were they usually presented with little concern for basic Soviet objectives, but—worse—they were on the whole not even serious offers from the American point of view, as was amply demonstrated when the Soviets accepted the bulk of our proposals in 1955, leaving us flabbergasted and, after a hastily called three-month recess, forced to withdraw them and to talk of something new. He also documented some of the Soviet hypocrisy in these long years of fruitless "negotiation."

[3] *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy* (London 1948). Little of this discussion is included in *Studies of War*, but Strachey has an excellent balanced analysis of these proposals in his chapter 10.

[4] U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Hearings, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer* (Washington 1954), 38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The most recent American disarmament policies have been formulated with more genuine interest in reaching agreement, and they are somewhat better, but not yet adequate, with regard to seeing the situation not only from our own point of view but also from that of the Soviet Union. In an article written in 1962 (chapter 11) Blackett analyzed how the "missile gap" controversy must have looked to the Russians (who knew at the time that we were and always had been ahead of them in strategic power), and how they must be reacting to our continued drive to build over 1,600 strategic missiles even after we found out that we were well ahead of them. Blackett argued that instead of pushing ahead with a strong counterforce missile capability, the United States should quickly seek agreement with the Soviet Union to limit the missile forces on each side to a few dozen, or to even as few as twenty highly invulnerable countercity missiles. And in a 1963 article[5] written after *Studies of War* was published, he pointed out that while both the Russian and the American disarmament plans call for cutting back the armed forces to equal levels (this requires a greater percentage cut by the more powerful Soviets), the American plan calls for cutting strategic missile forces not to equal levels in each succeeding stage, but by equal percentages of missiles. This is patently favorable to the United States with its considerably larger missile forces, and it is unreasonable, he argued, to expect the Soviets to accept it.

Blackett was equally critical of the Soviet disarmament proposals, but he did see their military policies as essentially defensive since 1948. On this, I think history will vindicate his judgment. But I do believe that he misunderstood the reasons behind the vast bomber and missile build-ups by the United States and the adoption of a counterforce strategy, which he interpreted as being useful only for a sudden surprise attack and therefore intended for that purpose and for making bargaining threats. This interpretation exaggerates the significance of our campaign talk of "roll back" and "liberation," and underestimates the importance of misinformation and excessive fear about imagined Soviet strategic programs, of interservice rivalries, and of desire to provide a nuclear defense for Berlin.

III

The other important basic assumption of Blackett—or, more accurately, a basic theme which runs through his many articles—is that we Americans and English must beware of our tendency to succumb to

[5] "The First Real Chance for Disarmament," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 226 (January 1963), 25-32.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what C. P. Snow called a "euphoria of gadgets," a "tendency on the part of some scientists—and not only scientists—to believe that a new device, or a new tactic, is a solution of all our defence problems" (p. 126). Closely related, and equally dangerous, is our chauvinistic faith in the technological superiority of our weapons and in our ability to maintain meaningful technical leadership.

The "euphoria of gadgets," Blackett writes, "was fundamentally the error behind the over-concentration during the war on the area bombing of enemy cities [by the English]. It is worth remembering that Germany never did this. Her remarkable military successes of the first years of the war were achieved by brilliant co-ordination of armour, artillery, infantry and close air support.[6] The same was true of Russia" (p. 126). The British strategic bombing campaign designed to "de-house" the German working class was opposed by Blackett at the time; and later, with the results of the Strategic Bombing Survey in hand, he documented its expensive failure. "About 500,000 men, women and children were killed, but in the whole bombing offensive 160,000 U.S. and British airmen, the best young men of both countries, were lost. German war production went on rising steadily until it reached its peak in August 1944. . . . If the Allied air effort had been used more intelligently, if more aircraft had been supplied for the Battle of the Atlantic and to support the land fighting in Africa and later in France, if the bombing of Germany had been carried out with the attrition of the enemy defences in mind rather than the razing of cities to the ground, I believe the war could have been won half a year or even a year earlier" (p. 125).

Blackett got his first lesson on the fallacy of assuming technological superiority when as a young man he observed the Battle of Jutland from the gun turret of a British ship. "In the first decade of this century, belief in the technical superiority of the British Navy was almost an article of national faith" (p. 27). Yet in 1916 at Jutland, "In the first three-quarters of an hour of the engagement between six British battle-cruisers and five similar German ships, two of ours blew up, while little damage was inflicted on the enemy. The new German navy, without tradition or experience, had proved itself superior in gunnery and in ship construction" (p. 73). Blackett later studied the

[6] But the Germans did suffer from the second hazard. Samuel Goudsmit, the leader of the U.S. scientific-intelligence mission to Germany at the end of World War II, argued that the Germans' failure to build an atom bomb was in part due to their arrogant assumption of the superiority of German science. Cf. *Alsos* (New York 1947), esp. ix-x, 3-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

locus of technical superiority during the two World Wars and found it in different countries for different weapons, with no country or alliance holding a monopoly.

Yet despite these lessons of history, and despite the warnings of scientists that Russia could and would build atom bombs too, the United States, followed by Britain, shaped its postwar policies on the assumption of a continued atomic monopoly. When the Russians did explode an atomic device in 1949, the reaction of the United States was to redouble its efforts to maintain superiority by expanding fission bomb development and production, by going all-out for the "super" hydrogen bomb, by developing smaller "tactical" fission weapons, and by designing and building a fantastic bomber fleet.

The Russian explosion of a fusion device in 1953 caused not a soul-searching examination of American objectives and methods, but a frantic increase in our efforts to stay technologically ahead. As the Russians, under the spur of our growing strategic power, continued to close the gap in nuclear technology and even stole a lead in designing giant rocket-boosters and in getting a "Sputnik" overhead, American scientists and strategists offered us one new nuclear tactic, gimmick, or gadget after another: "more bang for the buck," "tactical atomic weapons," a "counterforce strategy" to destroy all Soviet bombers and missiles before they could take off, an "anti-missile missile" because counterforce wouldn't work completely, a "no-cities strategy" because neither counterforce nor the anti-missile missile would work, fallout shelters which won't shelter because the Soviets won't play our "no-cities" game, an integrated NATO nuclear force which turns out to consist of Americans and Germans plus some Italian cooks if they can be bought, "clean bombs," "dirty bombs," "neutron bombs," "cobalt bombs"—a euphoria of gadgets indeed!

Today, when it is becoming increasingly evident that staying ahead of the Russians is not so easy and that the arms race is not buying us security, it is instructive to look back at some confident calls in the past for technical superiority. In 1948 Bernard Brodie wrote: "A few German technicians [taken to the Soviet Union] are not going to make the difference between a backward technology and an eagerly progressive one. Our lead in types of aircraft, in the ordnance of combat aviation, and in anti-aircraft matériel should, or rather *could*, be as great during the next 20 years as it was in the recent war. The only question is whether we will make the necessary effort to keep in the lead in our military technology."[7] Also in 1948, Karl Compton wrote that "Our

[7] "The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker," *Foreign Affairs*, XXVII (October 1948), 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security in technological matters having to do with warfare rests fundamentally on our being as far as possible ahead of our unfriendly competitor."[8] Senator Henry Jackson declared in November 1953: "What can and must be asked is that every member of the Congress recognize the imperative necessity of maintaining and increasing our atomic lead over the Soviets."[9]

Gordon Dean, from 1950 to 1953 Chairman of the A.E.C., writing in 1953 with great enthusiasm of the U.S. program to develop tactical atomic weapons, put to himself the question: " 'But isn't is possible for the Russians to make these tactical weapons and use them against our troops in the field?' Of course, it is possible. But the important thing to remember here is that, even in that event, we will have succeeded in getting the competition back on a basis where the premium is no longer on man-power, where we are at our weakest, but rather on technological competence and production capacity, where we are at our best."[10]

Such attitudes are deeply ingrained in American culture and character; they die slowly, if at all. While the nuclear test-ban treaty represents in part a triumph for those arguing against seeking security through technological supremacy, it also represents a fear of fallout and of spreading nuclear weapons, and opponents of the treaty were talking the same old language of vital new discoveries around the next corner and of the necessity for us to race and beat the Russians to that corner, and then to the next and the next and the next. The idea that the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in slowing and preventing some technological developments has barely begun to sink into the American consciousness. Yet, until it does, halting the arms race and achieving even nuclear disarmament will probably be impossible. Furthermore, the same exaggerated faith in technology probably is still growing among some groups in the Soviet intelligentsia and leadership circles and, having more newly arrived there, it may take even longer to die out.

IV

In the second (and more original) half of his book, Strachey turned from immediate questions of strategy and stability to the longer-range prospects for survival. Only the bare bones of a very thoughtful and rich discussion can be presented here.

[8] "Science and Security," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, IV (December 1948), 375.
[9] "Congress and the Atom," *Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 290 (November 1953), 81.
[10] *Report on the Atom* (New York 1953), quoted in Blackett, 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If we allow war, in its new nuclear dimension, to survive as the only known means of settling disputes between sovereign nation-states, then nuclear war will come not just once, but will recur, for the same reasons that war has always recurred in the past. Thus, while a particular society might survive a particular nuclear war, as some analysts now argue, this is not the issue, for "who can contend that the fabric of human society could hold together against the recurrence, every few decades, of nuclear war . . ." (p. 18)? Thus we must abolish not a particular variety of nuclear war, but nuclear war itself, and this will require nuclear disarmament of the nation-states.

But here is the dilemma: "the fact is that for our existing world of fully sovereign states war remains inevitable, but has become intolerable" (p. vii). Fully sovereign nation-states, said Strachey, are incompatible with nuclear disarmament, which requires the partial surrender of sovereignty and the creation of at least a limited world authority.

Strachey proposed an interlude of Pax Russo-Americana, in which the two superpowers (or, later, four or five superpowers) would enforce nuclear disarmament on the rest of the world, working through the United Nations. "The United Nations must become the instrument of world-peace; but it must have a sword in its hand, and in our time at least that sword can be only the sword of one or more of the superpowers" (p. 284). This could begin with a minimal agreement to support "some sort of functional world authority engaged in enforcing a test ban treaty, or a nuclear cut-off" (p. 298). But power is in principle indivisible, and in practice the power of such an authority would grow until it became a "real, political, world authority."

This seems far away and hard to imagine today, but "Perhaps one of the obstacles to conceiving of such a development lies in the habit of Western thought of looking at things in their being or not being, rather than in their becoming. . . . But things do change" (p. 301). Indeed they do: when Strachey finished the book in 1962, even the limited treaty banning atmospheric nuclear testing which he so eloquently advocated seemed to him highly unlikely for the near future!

Despite the obstacles on the road to nuclear disarmament, Strachey was essentially optimistic about achieving it, because he saw "three forces of hope" in the world. The first is "the convergence of contemporary societies," the "tendency for the economic and social systems of the advanced, industrialized nation-states to approximate to each other, whether they are organized in the communist or the capitalist way" (p. 303). Despite its unpopularity today, this proposition is easy enough to demonstrate if one looks not at ideologies from the past (which,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, are not irrelevant, as they will influence future changes) but at recent trends and practices.[11] But we must nonetheless ask, as Strachey did (but too briefly): how many of these attributes of growing similarity are actually going to contribute to what must ultimately be reached, what is still far away—a sufficient community of interests, values, attitudes, and concerns to allow for, and indeed to demand, a common set of institutions and a common approach to some of our most fundamental, zealously guarded, prerogatives?

The strongest (and some argue, the only) shared concern existing today is Strachey's second force of hope, the "sheer dread of nuclear war." It has become fashionable to question the effectiveness of something as basically negative as fear in bringing the superpowers together; yet this would appear to have been the dominant factor in the achievement of bans on both atmospheric testing and nuclear weapons in orbiting satellites, and this fear may in fact now lead to further agreements. Ultimately, however, fear alone must prove wholly inadequate to bear the weight of building common policies and institutions.

Recognizing this, Strachey was still optimistic, for, as his third force of hope, he believed that "a new attitude of mind is emerging, an attitude transcending both national and ideological loyalties; an attitude of mind essentially concerned to find a way in which the human race may hope to continue to inhabit its narrow planet" (p. 303). This attitude is more than simply fear of annihilation; it is a loyalty to mankind and the world as a whole, based in part on a growing "world civilization." And, Strachey believed, this growth can even transcend the basic schism between communism and anti-communism in the world today, provided that each will give up its view that its own ideology is sacred and the one and only true way. But that is quite an order!

However, there is in addition a fourth force of hope virtually ignored by Strachey: the growing economic interdependence of the world. We are becoming increasingly aware of the tremendous dependence of the poor nations on the rich and of the reverse dependence of the indus-

[11] Even the American Management Association has recently recognized one of these convergences: "Broadly speaking, managers possess a common catalyst: *the capacity for getting things done*. Through the efforts of other people, and by utilization of the resources at hand, they know how to make things happen. . . . The Soviet leaders—though they may be loath to accept any Western definitions of management—are managers in the most realistic sense of the word."—A.M.A., *40 Years of Progress in Management* (rotogravure advertising section, inserted in *New York Times*, September 15, 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trialized nations on the still relatively untapped sources of minerals and on the tremendous potential and expanding markets of the poor nations. What we are not yet adequately aware of, and not yet capitalizing sufficiently on, is the growing interdependence of Communist and anti-Communist nations, especially those of Eastern and Western Europe. We should understand the purchases by Russia and China of the Western wheat surpluses more as a symbol and further stage of this growing interdependence than as simply evidence of the failure of Communist agriculture. Let such purchases continue and expand, and let us encourage their expansion by suggesting long-term sales contracts, by removing trade embargoes against Communist nations, and by increasing our imports from them. Let us encourage Sino-Japanese trade instead of blocking it, and let us welcome Soviet oil exports. Let all these and a hundred more examples of East-West trade grow and carve grooves of precedent and habit, and then of need and dependence, into our respective economies and we will have—not yet peace—but a growing interdependence that promotes, admittedly slowly, a growing sense of mutual need and interest which in turn will help to build other bridges—cultural, intellectual, and finally even political—across that great schism. Trading nations have of course often gone to war in the past and trade is far from being a cure-all for the world's problems. But in our desperate need to tie all nations and peoples into a growing web of world civilization, of civilized restraints on the use of violence, we cannot afford to overlook or stifle any such potentially important constructive forces.

Thus my chief criticisms of Strachey's work concern not so much what he wrote as what he left out. From a man who was a Democratic Socialist and who was before all else interested in questions of economic policy, there is disappointingly little in this book about the economics of building a warless world. And from a man so aware of the need to raise men's sights and loyalties beyond the anachronistic nation-state, there is disappointingly little here about the process by which men's loyalties are developed and held or shifted. Also lacking (in part owing to Strachey's belief that a world authority could begin with and concentrate on the supposedly limited sphere of abolishing nuclear war—a belief I do not share) is sufficient discussion of the processes of building a stronger, more general world authority. Nor is there much analysis of the many causes of wars large and small, of the many sorts of attack that must be made on these causes, of the need for developing ways of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suppressing the use of violence at various levels, of the vital need for development of methods of peaceful change in a world where violent change is too dangerous to be tolerated. It is the world's great loss that Strachey died before turning his tremendous knowledge and talents to studying these more general problems of war and peace and the growth of world institutions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM

By FELIX E. OPPENHEIM

Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations; The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, New York, Basic Books, 1963, 412 pp. $10.00.

ARE there any connections between epistemological theories and political doctrines? This question is of more than theoretical interest. If such links exist, it follows that concrete political events are influenced, not only directly by political ideologies, but also, at least indirectly, by abstract philosophical beliefs.

An affirmative answer was given by Karl Popper in his two previous works dealing with the social sciences, *The Poverty of Historicism*[1] and *The Open Society and Its Enemies*,[2] and in the present book he again attributes to epistemology "practical consequences for science, for ethics, and even for politics" (CR, 4). More specifically, Popper claimed in the earlier works that there are important relationships between rationalism and anti-rationalism on the one hand, and liberalism and anti-liberalism on the other. This is a recurrent theme in those parts of the present work which deal with political and social philosophy.[3] It seems therefore appropriate to reexamine this central thesis of the new book as well as of the two earlier works.

Popper is a staunch defender of the "open society"—i.e., of the ideals of both liberalism and democracy,[4] as opposed to the doctrine of authoritarianism, or of the "closed society." Popper also calls himself "a rationalist of sorts" (CR, 120), but he does not always make it clear in which of several meanings (to be specified in the following) he intends to use this term. Furthermore, he holds that rationalism is "connected," "linked," "bound up" with the open society, without indicating whether such alleged relationships are of an empirical or a purely logical nature. The question then becomes somewhat more

[1] London 1957; previously published in *Economica*, N.S., XI (1944) and XII (1945). References to this book will be indicated by PH.

[2] Fourth (revised) edition, 2 vols., London 1962 (first published in 1945; American edition, Princeton 1950). References are to the fourth edition, and will be indicated by OS. References to the present book will be indicated by CR.

[3] They make up about one-fourth of this collection of twenty-one essays and lectures, all except four previously published; the rest of the book deals with often rather technical problems of philosophy of science which are not likely to be of direct interest to readers of *World Politics*.

[4] To the extent that both are compatible, as they are, e.g., in the philosophy of J. S. Mill but not of Rousseau. Popper does not deal with this problem, and I shall disregard it here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERFORMANCE EVALUATOR

This test engineer is one of a team at GM's Michigan Proving Ground which has developed a new Performance-Economy Console, the latest in a long line of specially-designed test equipment. It registers car performance precisely—pickup, hill climbing, passing—under all sorts of driving situations. Fast, slow or in-between speeds. Long runs or short hops. City or country roads. Rainy, snowy or sunny days. Sizzling heat or extreme cold. Fuel consumption is also measured down to the nearest cubic centimeter. All year long, the exacting tests go on and on. In fact, a total of more than 50,000 test miles are logged every day at the three GM Proving Ground facilities—in Michigan, at Pikes Peak and in Arizona.

But testing doesn't begin or end on the track. In the GM Proving Grounds and other GM laboratories are ultra-modern instruments, machines and computers—specifically built to test for noise, vibration, stress and durability in engine, body and chassis. In fact, practically everything that goes into a GM car is thoroughly tested and retested. These constant laboratory checks make the data collected on the road more meaningful, more useful every year. The goal can be wrapped up in one word—*quality!*

The test engineer wears three, sometimes even four hats. He plans tests, performs tests, evaluates test results—and even designs the equipment used for testing. He makes a big contribution to your comfort, safety and pleasure.

Product quality is paramount at General Motors. That's why the test engineer is a key man on the GM team.

GENERAL MOTORS IS PEOPLE . . .

Making Better Things For You

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complicated, for we must ask: What kind of connections, if any, are there between rationalism in each of these meanings and the doctrine of either the open or the closed society? Analogous questions must be raised with respect to the various kinds of anti-rationalism.

I

"Rationalism" as a technical term in philosophy is generally used in contradistinction to "empiricism." The rationalist claims that all knowledge is gained by *a priori* reasoning, unaided by sense experience; he may appeal to "reason," "intuition," "self-evidence," "empathy," "innate knowledge," etc. Empiricism holds that all knowledge about the material world is based, however indirectly, on sensory observation.[5]

How does Popper fit into this classification? As an offspring of the Vienna Circle whose training and interest until the rise of Nazi Germany had been chiefly in the natural sciences, we would expect to find him among the most radical empiricists. Yet, he calls himself a rationalist, and launches "an attack on empiricism" (CR, 21). He even goes so far as to compare scientific theories to religious myths (*ibid.*, 126ff.). This apparent paradox disappears when Popper's position is seen as a reaction against the "naïve" empiricist view that science proceeds from sense perception to inductive generalization. Popper's most important book, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*,[6] did much to discredit this earlier empiricism in favor of a more sophisticated view, which is summarized in the title of the present book: Scientific knowledge starts with, and progresses "by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, . . . by *conjectures*. These conjectures are controlled by criticism; that is, by attempted *refutations*" (*ibid.*, vii; cf. also 28, 313). Unlike religious myths, scientific conjectures can be, if not conclusively confirmed, at least refuted by reference to empirical tests, and these refutations may lead to new and better conjectures.[7] Because Popper is opposed to naïve

[5] All except the most extreme empiricists agree with the rationalists that deductive reasoning alone determines the truth of "necessary" propositions, e.g., those of logic and mathematics.

[6] London 1959; first published in German as *Logik der Forschung* (Vienna 1935).

[7] This view implies the necessity of often long, definitional chains between abstract concepts which occur in empirical hypotheses and terms which refer to observables. Yet, Popper himself seems to fall back into naïve empiricism when he rejects as naïve "the theory that the social sciences study the behaviour of social wholes, such as groups, nations, classes, societies, civilizations, etc." (CR, 341). According to Popper, "these so-called social wholes are very largely postulates of popular social theories rather than empirical objects" (*ibid.*). He seems to reject the view that they are scientific constructs, and as such indispensable to the empirical study of social phenomena. Instead, he argues that "the belief in the empirical existence of social wholes or collectives" is a form of "*naïve collectivism*" (*ibid.*); but this is plausible only on the view that social

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton UNIVERSITY PRESS

One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast

By Aristide R. Zolberg

The Ivory Coast illustrates a phenomenon commonly found in the new states but so far, except for communist countries, relatively unexplored: a political system in which authority centers in a single, all-encompassing, mass political party. In examining this development Professor Zolberg concentrates less on the nationalistic phase than on the period which follows, the time in which a new nation is born and the dominant organization becomes politically responsible.

340 pages. Maps. $7.50

Nigerian Political Parties:

Power in an Emergent African Nation

By Richard L. Sklar

The author presents a study of the Nigerian party system in the last phase of British Colonial rule. Using first-hand observation, interviews, and party records, he explores the question of power within the three major political parties. Case studies reveal the social biases, underlying issues and strategies of political action, and indicate the motivation of key political leaders. *578 pages. $12.50*

Published for the Center of International Studies.

The Press and Foreign Policy

By Bernard C. Cohen

The competing demands of democracy and diplomacy on the reporting of foreign affairs creates tension between officials and reporters but also gives them common benefits. This study systematically examines this relationship and the problems inherent in it. Mr. Cohen has based his work on interviews with the foreign policy makers, correspondents, and reporters who are daily engaged in creating policy and interpreting it as news. *304 pages. $6.00*

Published for the Center of International Studies.

Order from your bookstore, or

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS • Princeton, New Jersey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

empiricism, he calls his own position one of "critical rationalism," which is "very different from the 'rationalism' or 'intellectualism' of Descartes" (*ibid.*, 26). As distinguished from rationalism in this latter, usual, sense, Popper's "critical rationalism" turns out to be a more sophisticated, but nevertheless genuine, empiricism—in the social as well as in the natural sciences, as "the methods in the two fields are fundamentally the same" (PH, 131; cf. CR, 337). He denies scientific relevance to generalizations arrived at by rationalistic methods such as Platonic insight, Aristotelian essentialism, or Hegelian dialectic, and much of *The Open Society* was a defense of the empirical method in the social sciences against its rationalist opponents.

Popper connects rationalism of the Platonic-Cartesian sort with authoritarianism; but he does so in an indirect way, the two intermediary links being historicism and utopianism. A corresponding chain leads from empiricism via anti-historicism and anti-utopianism to democratic liberalism.

Historicism and anti-historicism stand for opposing theories about the possibility of *long-range* historical predictions. Historicism affirms that such predictions can be derived from "laws of historical development" which can be discovered, not empirically,[8] but *a priori*—e.g., through dialectics or historical empathy. Historicists in Popper's sense are thus by definition rationalists, and empiricists will no doubt agree with Popper's denial and criticism of this historicist thesis. While "history *does* make use of universal laws" (PH, 145) in order to explain and sometimes even to predict historical events, such laws must be of an empirical nature, which the alleged laws of historical necessity admittedly are not. "Sweeping historical prophecies are entirely beyond the scope of scientific method" (OS, I, 3; cf. CR, 336ff.), whether they are based on "reason" or on allegedly empirical laws. Hegel is an historicist of the former type, and Comte of the latter. In fact, Popper himself considers Comte and even J. S. Mill as historicists (PH, 120; CR, 338). But is this not incompatible with his own narrow definition of historicism as being necessarily tied to rationalist methods?

Utopianism consists of drawing up a blueprint of the good society and of proclaiming that it ought to be, and hence that it can be, realized. Utopianism is thus based on long-range historical predictions and

---

wholes constitute *organic* wholes, which is not implied by viewing these wholes as indispensable constructs.

[8] "The historicist [asserts] that the variability of historical conditions renders the experimental method inapplicable to the problems of society" (PH, 96).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States and North Africa

(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia)

By CHARLES F. GALLAGHER

Here is a clear and valuable view of one of the great trouble spots of the world from the earliest times to the present, with informed insights into future trends. Much new material is presented, including a description of the Algerian revolution from the scene and the problems of the new state—the only appraisal of the situation from an American point of view. *American Foreign Policy Library.* $5.50

The United States and Mexico

Revised Edition, Enlarged

By HOWARD F. CLINE

This book was widely acclaimed when it first appeared in 1953. Said the *Christian Science Monitor*: "There is little doubt that Mr. Cline has written the definitive study of United States-Mexican relations." From the *American Historical Review*: "The book contains a wealth of detailed information . . . a welcome addition to our literature on contemporary Latin America." *American Foreign Policy Library.* $6.00

China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945

By ARTHUR N. YOUNG

The story from the inside of the role of foreign aid in China's fight against Japan, and why it failed. Mr. Young, Financial Advisor to China from 1929-1947, draws from his own extensive records, more complete on many topics than any existing collection, State Department records, and the Morgenthau Diaries. *Harvard East Asian Series, 12.* $10.00

A History of the Weimar Republic

From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenburg's Election

By ERICH EYCK

"This is the first volume of a work which has helped to establish Dr. Eyck as a leading interpreter of modern German history. He writes with vigour and clarity and gives the reader a vital sense of involvement."—*The Manchester Guardian*

"As journalist and lawyer Erich Eyck was intimately acquainted with the events and personalities he describes. . . . His book is a masterpiece of objective description."—*Harold Nicolson.* $10.00

A History of the Weimar Republic

From the Locarno Conference to Hitler's Seizure of Power

By ERICH EYCK

Describes the events surrounding the Locarno Conference, the subsequent German agreement with Russia, Germany's delayed entry into the League of Nations, and finally the second election of Hindenburg and the political maneuvering that brought Hitler to power on his own terms. $12.00

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hence logically entails historicism.[9] In Popper's theory, the connection between utopianism and authoritarianism is of an empirical kind: the necessarily fruitless attempt to realize utopia is in fact most likely to lead to violence and dictatorship, a consequence the utopianist often fails to foresee.[10] Popper considers utopianism both mistaken and dangerous; mistaken because it urges the realization of the impossible[11] and because it entails historicism (and rationalism); dangerous because it promotes the closed society. He urges us to confine ourselves to "piecemeal social engineering"—i.e., to "work for the elimination of concrete evils rather than for the realization of abstract goods" (CR, 361; cf. PH, 91, and OS, 1, 158), because such more limited goals of social reform can be reached within the framework of both empirical science and democratic institutions.

Popper does not claim that a rationalist is necessarily an anti-liberal. Indeed, he need not be (T. H. Green contrasted with Hegel). Popper does claim that rationalism in fact leads first to historicism, then to utopianism, and finally to authoritarianism. Now, just as a historicist need not be a rationalist (Comte contrasted with Hegel), so a rationalist need not be a historicist (Aristotle contrasted with Hegel). And while a utopianist is necessarily a historicist, a historicist need not be a utopianist (Spengler contrasted with Marx). And a utopianist need not advocate dictatorship, not even as an intermediary step (utopian socialism contrasted with orthodox Marxism). Again, Popper would deny none of this; he only contends that a *statesman* who attempts to put a utopian ideal into effect *often* ends up practicing violence and dictatorship (e.g., Robespierre, Trotsky). With this generalization we may agree; but notice how the alleged links between rationalism and authoritarianism turn out to be not only empirical rather than logical, but also both very indirect and very tenuous.

[9] Popper does not claim that the converse implication necessarily holds. Radical historicism leads, not to utopianism, but to fatalism, the view that the necessary course of history can be foreseen, but not influenced by human intervention (OS, 1, 157). Furthermore, historicists often prophesy states of affairs they consider undesirable (e.g., Spengler).

[10] "The Utopian attempt to realize an ideal state, using a blueprint of society as a whole, is one which demands a strong centralized rule of a few, and which therefore is likely to lead to a dictatorship" (OS, 1, 159). "Utopian rationalism is a self-defeating rationalism. However benevolent its ends, it does not bring happiness, but only the familiar misery of being condemned to live under a tyrannical government" (CR, 360).

[11] It is the anti-utopianist who disparages a goal as utopian which *he* considers, rightly or wrongly, to be unobtainable. Popper, for instance, tends to view all centralized planning as utopian (cf. OS, 1, 285), which may be due to the influence of F. A. Hayek, to whom CR is dedicated. On the other hand, he believes that the creation of institutions for the prevention of armed aggression, "though often branded as Utopian, is not even a very difficult problem" (OS, 1, 161; this passage still remains in the edition of 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PAPERBACKS IN CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT

This paperback series offers concise, accurate analyses of various governments, written for the undergraduate courses in comparative government, advanced study of a particular country, or programs in area studies. Each volume in the series is the work of an author who knows his country well, both by research and residence, and is unusually well qualified to discuss the constitution and legal foundations as well as the operation of the government in question.

5¼" x 8¼" *$1.95 each*

THE GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLICAN ITALY
John Clarke Adams, Syracuse University
Paolo Barile, University of Siena, Italy

BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
Second Edition
Sydney D. Bailey

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND
George A. Codding, Jr., University of Colorado

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL
Oscar Kraines

CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
Theodore McNelly, University of Maryland

THE INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania

CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
Elmer Plischke, University of Maryland

SOUTH VIETNAM: NATION UNDER STRESS
Robert Scigliano, Michigan State University

NORWEGIAN DEMOCRACY
James A. Storing, Colgate University

Houghton Mifflin Company

BOSTON · NEW YORK · ATLANTA · GENEVA, ILL · DALLAS · PALO ALTO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the other hand, it is correct that empiricist social thinkers are necessarily anti-historicists—that is, unless they are mistaken (Comte contrasted with Popper); consequently, they are anti-utopianists, hence proponents of piecemeal social engineering only. Now, Popper himself concedes at one point that "public or political social engineering may have the most diverse tendencies, totalitarian as well as liberal" (PH, 66). Indeed, dictators, who are often realists rather than utopianists, tend to rely on the procedures and findings of empirical science to determine whether and how their goals may be realized. But then, not much is left of Popper's alleged link between empiricism and liberalism. There seems to be no more truth to this than to the opposite view, held by certain rationalist philosophers, that empiricism or "positivism" is bound to lead to totalitarianism, or at least to its passive acceptance.[12]

II

At times Popper uses "rationalism" in a sense which "includes 'empiricism' as well as 'intellectualism'" (OS, II, 224), to refer to a philosophical attitude rather than an epistemological theory. The "fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith—from faith in reason" (OS, II, 231), from a belief that "man can know" (CR, 6), whether by rationalist or empiricist methods. Rationalism in this sense of epistemological optimism is used "in opposition to 'irrationalism' and not to 'empiricism'" (OS, II, 352). Irrationalism—or, better, anti-rationalism—is a synonym for epistemological pessimism, which holds either that "there is no such thing as objective truth" (CR, 4), or that truth can be apprehended only by "irrational or supra-rational means" (CR, 193), such as relying on dogmatic authority or tradition. If the term is taken in this broad and rather unusual sense, Mill would be a rationalist no less than Descartes, and Mannheim an irrationalist, as his sociology of knowledge is said to lead to the consequence that "scientific objectivity must indeed become completely ununderstandable, or even impossible" (OS, II, 217).[13]

We saw that Popper's comparison of scientific hypotheses with

[12] Via "ethical relativism" and "nihilism." E.g.: "Of the many factors which have contributed to the decline of liberalism in the modern world no single factor has been more important than the rise of positivism and its infiltration into every sphere of thought. . . . Unwittingly, it may be said, such liberals (who were under the influence of positivism) prepared the way for Lidice and Dachau."—John H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (New York 1950), 326.

[13] Sometimes Popper uses the term even more broadly: "I am a rationalist, and by this I mean that I believe in discussion, and argument" (CR, 337); this "presupposes a certain amount of intellectual humility" (CR, 336), a frame of mind which contrasts rather oddly with Popper's often self-righteous style.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Leopold III and the Belgian Royal Question

BY E. RAMÓN ARANGO. When the Germans invaded Belgium in May 1940, the Belgian government fled into exile, leaving behind King Leopold III, who chose to stay and share the fate of his army and his subjects. This separation of King and Cabinet marked the beginning of what the Belgians call the royal question. The author tells of the war years, the postwar battle between Leopold and his ministers, and the outcome and significance of Parliament's victory. *264 pages. $6.00*

IRAQ UNDER GENERAL NURI

My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958

BY WALDEMAR J. GALLMAN. Nuri, one of the most prominent public figures in the Middle East in this century, kept few records of his activities. The author, former United States Ambassador to Iraq, draws heavily on personal reports and notes of their talks during 1954-1958, crucial years for Iraq and the Middle East generally. None of this material has been made available to the public. The author's interpretation will give students of the Middle East a fairer understanding of Nuri as patriot, Arab nationalist, and statesman. *262 pages. $5.95*

PLANNING IN PAKISTAN

Organization and Implementation

BY ALBERT WATERSTON. This case study is the third in a series on economic planning published for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Within a decade the central planning agency has become widely recognized as one of the most effective governmental bodies in Pakistan. The lessons learned in Pakistan about national economic planning will have wide application among other newly emergent nations. *100 pages. $3.00 paperbound*

At bookstores, or from

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

In Canada: The Copp Clark Publishing Co., Ltd., 517 Wellington Street West, Toronto 2B, Ontario

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

religious myths, when interpreted in its context, is not an expression of epistemological pessimism. Popper is an empiricist and hence, by implication, an epistemological optimist. This general attitude does not, however, exclude skepticism in certain areas. Like other modern empiricists, Popper denies the possibility of a scientific determination of ultimate ends (CR, 358; cf. OS, 1, 161) as well as of the future course of history. "The historicist doctrine is untenable, but this fact does not lead us to lose faith in science or in reason" (CR, 343). Awareness of the necessarily limited scope of the empirical social and behavioral sciences may lead either to the belief that this range can be enlarged by *a priori* methods, or to skepticism as to the possibility of any scientific knowledge in this field. And so Popper is, perhaps unwittingly, engaged in a war on two fronts, defending empiricism in the social sciences against the overoptimistic rationalists (in the technical sense) and against the pessimists or anti-rationalists (in the present meaning).[14]

According to Popper, rationalism in the broader sense is related to the doctrine, not of the closed, but, on the contrary, of the open society, while anti-rationalism is linked to authoritarianism. "*Man can know: thus he can be free.* This is the formula which explains the link between epistemological optimism and the ideas of liberalism" (CR, 6). ". . . epistemological relativism, or the idea that there is no such thing as objective truth, . . . [is] closely linked with authoritarian and totalitarian ideas" (CR, 5). One might object: since rationalism in the narrower, technical, sense is a subcategory of rationalism in the larger sense, how can the former be linked to one type of political system and the latter to another? This contradiction is only apparent. Popper claims that epistemological optimism in general is linked to the *advocacy* of the open society, whereas *a priorism* in particular tends *in fact* to give rise to closed societies.

Popper obviously does not mean that there are logical relationships between beliefs concerning the possibility of objective knowledge and preferences concerning the desirability of liberal democracy. Man can know, thus he *can* be free (in a certain sense of this word); but not: therefore he *ought* to be free, e.g., to express his views. An epistemological optimist does not commit a logical fallacy by opposing freedom of opinion. Conversely, someone who denies that man can *know* may

[14] It is, however, not always easy to determine whether the anti-empiricists here referred to would claim that their method for apprehending "truth" is scientific, but non-empirical, or non-scientific—i.e., suprarational. This ambiguity may be found, e.g., in Herbert J. Storing, ed., *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (New York 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton UNIVERSITY PRESS

Asian Revolutionary:
The Life of Sen Katayama

By Hyman Kublin

This biography gives a detailed account of Katayama's early life in Japan, his struggles in Japan and in the United States to acquire an education, his role in the revolutionary movement on four continents, and his last years in Moscow as a prime manipulator of the Japan Communist Party, as Far Eastern expert for the Bolsheviks, and as a senior member of the Communist International. *443 pages. $9.00*

A History of the Sikhs
Vol. I, 1469-1839

By Kushwant Singh

"The story of the Sikhs is the story of the rise, fulfillment, and collapse of Punjabi nationalism." In volume one of the projected two-volume history of the Sikhs, Kushwant Singh develops the "rise and fulfillment" theme, and carries the story through the mid-nineteenth century. The gradual transformation of the Sikhs from a pacifist sect to a militant group is portrayed in detail. *424 pages. $10.00*

Order from your bookstore, or
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, Princeton, N.J.

THE DAWN OF A NEW AGE

Reflections on Science and Human Affairs

Eugene Rabinowitch. One of the most eloquent voices of the scientific world explains the implications of the atomic age he helped initiate. Profound, prophetic, these writings stress that technology rather than ideology will shape our future.

400 pages, index $6.95

HENRY L. STIMSON AND JAPAN, 1931-33

Armin Rappaport. In a close scrutiny of the Manchurian episode, the author examines United States policy toward Japanese expansionism in Asia between 1931 and 1933, and the position taken by Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of State.

272 pages, index $6.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

CHICAGO AND LONDON

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quite consistently advocate that all should be left free to express their *subjective* opinions. Popper's own commitment to freedom of speech is not weakened by his affirmation that intrinsic value-judgments cannot be objectively validated.

As a matter of historical fact, there has indeed been a long association between epistemological optimism and the idea of democratic liberalism. Empiricists from Locke to Dewey, and *a priorists* from Kant to Maritain, have been among the champions of the open society. Conversely, advocates of the closed society have often been epistemological pessimists (e.g., Calvin). Yet, the exceptions are sufficiently important to disprove Popper's generalization. I mention only Mannheim, whom Popper considers one of the most typical exponents of epistemological pessimism; yet Mannheim was a convinced democrat.[15] On the other hand, Hegel, whom Popper takes as one of the principal enemies of the open society, was no doubt an epistemological optimist (if not an overoptimist). It is therefore not *generally* true that epistemological optimism is linked to liberalism, and epistemological pessimism to authoritarianism.

III

Sometimes Popper uses the term "rationalism" in yet another sense, as referring to the *empirical* claim that men are rational; that all men are of substantially equal, and rather high, rationality; that they tend to apply the rules of rational decision-making in the pursuit of their "self-interest" or of whatever goals they may entertain. Contrariwise, "the irrationalist will insist that 'human nature' is in the main not rational" (OS, II, 228); that "emotions and passions rather than reason are the mainsprings of human action" (*ibid.*, 233); that all but a few tend to act impulsively rather than rationally. "Inherent in irrationalism . . . [is] the stress on the inequality of men" (*ibid.*, 234). Popper considers Toynbee, e.g., an irrationalist in this sense, because he regards "emotions, passions, religions, irrational philosophies" to be more important historical factors than human reason and science (*ibid.*, 252). Freud's theories, too, would presumably have to be labeled irrationalist in this particular sense. The view that men are rational permeates *The Open Society*, but is challenged in the present work (CR, 347ff.).

Rationalism in the present sense, too, is linked by Popper to the open

[15] E.g.: "Whatever criticism may be leveled against representative government, its outstanding virtues are bound to make it the point of departure for any social organization safeguarding freedom."—Karl Mannheim, *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning* (New York 1950), 149.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international peace / disarmament directory

711 South Duke Street
York, Penna., U.S.A.

Third Edition, Fall 1963

$1 per copy—bulk rates lower
(50c/copy: Asia, Africa, South America)
1750 organizational and 450 periodical addresses
in 90 countries

Bulk rates, (Paid Orders)

6 for $5, 10 for $7.50
25 for $15, 50 for $25

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

A Quarterly Published by
The University of Notre Dame

The January issue will include the following articles:

John R. Betts: The Laity and the Ecumenical Spirit, 1889-1893
Theodore R. Weber: Morality and National Power in International Politics
S. P. Rouanet: The Irrationalism of Georges Sorel
Lewis C. Mainzer: Honor in the Bureaucratic Life
Boleslaw Szczesniak: The Western World and the Far East: Conflicting Relationships
O. William Perlmutter: The "Neo-Realism" of Dean Acheson

Annual Subscription $5.00 **Single Issue $1.50**

Special Anniversary offer to new subscribers: The October number free with a subscription, accompanied by payment of $5.00, for the issues of 1964.

Address: THE EDITORS, THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
P. O. Box 4, Notre Dame, Indiana

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society, and irrationalism to the closed. Whoever believes that all men are equally rational is bound to advocate that all men should be treated equally, especially with respect to the right of free speech.[16] Conversely, "resignation towards the irrational nature of human beings . . . must lead to an appeal to violence and brutal force as the ultimate arbiter of any dispute" (OS, II, 234). Popper explicitly denies that these links are of a logical kind. " 'Equality before the law' is not a fact but a political demand based upon a moral decision; and it is quite independent of the theory—which is probably false—that 'all men are born equal' " (*ibid.*, 234). Indeed, a normative principle to the effect that government ought to grant equal rights cannot be logically derived from nothing more than the empirical theory that all men are equal as to rationality.[17]

It is true that classical liberalism did believe in the equal rationality of men, and did commit the "naturalistic fallacy" of deducing from this alleged fact the normative principle of equality before the law and of majority rule. This naïve view about "human nature" is no longer prevalent today even among liberals. In the statement quoted above, Popper himself says of the view that all men are born equal that it is "probably false," and in the new book he proclaims: "We are democrats, not because the majority is always right, but because democratic traditions are the least evil of which we know" (CR, 351). This statement does indeed summarize the neo-liberal position: Even though majority decisions are often irrational, representative government based on majority vote is desirable, because it is the only alternative to the concentration of power in the hands of a minority without the possibility of peaceful change. Similarly, equality of rights (including the right of free speech) is valuable, even though men are unequal with

[16] ". . . faith in reason is not only a faith in our own reason, but also—and even more—in that of others. . . . Rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his arguments. . . . Ultimately, in this way, rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of social institutions to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus freedom of men" (OS, II, 238). The expression "faith in reason" is ambiguous; it could refer either to the belief that objective knowledge is possible or to the view that men tend in fact to avail themselves of this possibility and thus to act reasonably. (Popper connects rationalism in both senses with liberalism.) However, taken in conjunction with the sentence quoted next in the text, it seems more likely that "faith in reason" should here be taken in the second sense.

[17] The normative principle does follow logically from the empirical premise, *and from* the further *normative* assumption that the extent of anybody's rights ought to be a function of the degree of his rationality. This same normative premise, together with the empirical theory that all except a few are irrational, logically implies the anti-liberal doctrine that these few should have the right to rule over the many. However, most social philosophers deny the further implicit assumption that "degree of rationality" can be operationally defined and objectively determined.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Volume 18, Number 1 Winter 1964

ARTICLES

De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance ..... Stanley Hoffmann
Soviet and American Policies in International Economic Organizations ..... Alvin Z. Rubinstein
The UN and West Irian ..... Paul W. van der Veur
The Executive Board of the IMF: A Decision-Making Instrument ..... Ervin P. Hexner

COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARIES

Recent activities of United Nations organs and of the specialized agencies

Recent activities of major regional and functional organizations

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Recent books and articles, both American and foreign

$6.00 a year **Student Rate**
$2.00 a copy **$4.00 a year**

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 Mt. Vernon Street
Boston, Mass. 02108, U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

respect to most physical and mental characteristics. But then it is simply not true that liberalism depends on rationalism in the sense of the outmoded belief in the rationality of man, and that "resignation toward the irrational nature of human beings" cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the open society.

IV

"I, like many others, believe in reason; . . . I call myself a rationalist. I am a rationalist because I see in the attitude of reasonableness the only alternative to violence" (CR, 355). In this context, to "believe in reason" does not mean to *believe* in the possibility of knowledge (*a priori* or in general) or in the rationality of man, but to *value* the attitude of reasonableness. "A rationalist, as I use the word, is a man who attempts to reach decisions by arguments and perhaps, in certain cases, by compromise, rather than by violence" (*ibid.*, 356). Clearly, Popper *here* uses the word in a valuational sense: A rationalist is a man who holds that everyone *ought* to engage in the give and take of free discussion to arrive at decisions and that no one *ought* to impose his will on others by force. To be a rationalist in this sense is to attach a certain ethical value to "argument" and "compromise." In the political area, a rationalist becomes an advocate of the democratic procedure of decision-making. Rationalism in this sense is linked to democracy, simply because a rationalist is by definition a democrat.

The reason why Popper advocates "rational" (i.e., democratic) methods is that he considers "decisions by argument and compromise" the only alternative to "decisions by violence." But are there no other alternatives than either democracy or civil war? Decisions may also be imposed from above, as they are in an authoritarian regime. While violence often precedes a dictator's rise to power and succeeds his downfall, he reaches and enforces decisions without the use of violence as long as he wields authority. Authoritarian regimes have actually been, on the whole, more successful in preventing violence than democratic systems. Those who adopt the Hobbesian ideal of internal peace and security as the highest goal would have to be proponents of the closed society rather than of the open. If democratic institutions are valued, it must be for reasons other than that they are the only, or even the most effective, devices for excluding violence.

Popper does give further reasons for his advocacy of democratic institutions. "Only democracy provides an institutional framework that permits reform without violence, and so the use of reason in political matters" (OS, 1, 4). The first part of this statement is no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An interdisciplinary journal for behavioral and social scientists who wish to keep abreast of research concerned with the problems of peace and international relations

The Journal of

conflict

RESOLUTION

A quarterly for research related to war and peace

Annual subscription: $5.50
per copy: $2.00

Published by The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution
1100 East Washington, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Princeton Studies in World Politics, No. 6
published for the
Center of International Studies

French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria

The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine

By Peter Paret. In Indochina and Algeria, France was subjected to new forms of revolutionary conflict, characterized by systematic subversion and guerrilla tactics. From this experience, together with lessons derived from Communist revolutionary theories, the French Army evolved one of the most coherent doctrines of unconventional warfare yet formulated in the West. In this detailed survey, the author analyzes an actual operation to show the doctrine in action and describes the history and contemporary practice of *la guerre révolutionnaire*, including its extra-constitutional involvement in French political life. *Late winter. Approx. 160 pp. Maps, glossary, bibliog. Approx. $4.95*

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Inc., 64 University Place, New York 3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doubt true; while democracy is not the only system which prevents violence, it is the only system which allows for changes without violence. The second part of the statement is ambiguous. If "the use of reason" stands for "democratic procedure," it is tautological; if it means the same as "rational action," it is false. As mentioned previously, dictators as well as democratic assemblies may or may not be guided by the rules of rational decision-making in the shaping of their respective policies.[18]

Writers who use "rationalism" normatively usually mean to refer to the view that the pursuit of independent, scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, regardless of the method or how many are deemed capable of rational thought. An anti-rationalist in this sense does not attach positive value to independent reasoning, because he considers such pursuits either fruitless or harmful—i.e., incompatible with goals which he values more highly than scientific knowledge, e.g., upholding the "true" faith or maintaining political stability.[19] Popper does not explicitly use these terms this way; yet, his writings are permeated with this rationalist morality. Nor does he explicitly link this type of rationalism and anti-rationalism with the open and the closed society, respectively. Yet, these are the only links which no doubt do hold. There is a definite means-end relationship between liberalism and rationalism in this sense. Whoever values the pursuit of independent, i.e., non-dogmatic, knowledge as an end must value freedom of expression as a means, and hence will be an advocate of democratic liberalism. We need only to remember J. S. Mill's dictum that "the beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded."[20] Conversely, proponents of the closed society restricting free speech cannot be interested in the promotion of independent knowledge.

V

Popper is then, above all, an empiricist, opposed to rationalism in the usual, technical sense of *a priorism*. He is a rationalist only in the particular *laudatory* senses in which he uses the term: a "critical ration-

[18] As to the choices of their respective ultimate goals, these cannot be said to be either rational or not, if we agree with Popper that such valuations are a matter of subjective commitment and not of objective knowledge. Utopianism is irrational in this sense; it is irrational to decide to bring about what in fact cannot be realized.

[19] Rationalism in this sense entails epistemological optimism, while anti-rationalism is compatible with both epistemological pessimism and optimism. Both rationalism and anti-rationalism in the present meaning are compatible with *a priorism* and empiricism, and with the view that all, or only a few, are "rational."

[20] *On Liberty*, chap. 2. Freedom of speech may be valued on other grounds than its conduciveness to knowledge. It may be valued by epistemological pessimists, as mentioned in section II, above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS OF THE FEBRUARY 1964

JOURNAL OF POLITICS

Volume 26, Number 1

THE AMERICAN SOUTH: 1950-1970

Edited by Avery Leiserson

CONTRIBUTORS

The Changing Mind of the South: The Exposed Nerve by Leslie W. Dunbar, Southern Regional Council

The South as a Developing Area by William H. Nicholls, Vanderbilt University

Southern Regional Planning and Development by Lawrence L. Durisch, Tennessee Valley Authority

Southern Metropolis: Challenge to Government by Robert H. Connery, Duke University and Richard H. Leach, Duke University

Southern Images of Political Parties: An Analysis of White and Negro Attitudes by Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina and James W. Protho, University of North Carolina

The Manipulated Negro Vote: Preconditions and Consequences by Alfred Clubok, John DeGrove and Charles Farris of the University of Florida

Political Movements and Organizations by Samuel DuBois Cook, Atlanta University

The Federal Judiciary and Political Change in the South by George W. Spicer, University of Virginia

State Legislatures in Southern Politics by Malcolm E. Jewell, University of Kentucky

Political Leadership in the Governor's Office by Coleman B. Ransone, University of Alabama

The South in National Politics by O. Douglas Weeks, University of Texas

PEABODY HALL, University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alist" as opposed to a naïve empiricist; an epistemological optimist; a believer in man's rationality (but with important restrictions); an advocate of reason in various senses. Popper claims that rationalism in each of the senses in which he considers himself a rationalist is somehow connected with democratic liberalism, and that irrationalism or anti-rationalism, as well as rationalism in the sense in which he denies it, is related to anti-liberalism. Yet, we have found only one connection. Governmental protection of free speech *must* be advocated if the pursuit of knowledge is deemed valuable; but democratic liberalism *may* be advocated by those who believe and by those who deny the rationality of man, by epistemological pessimists and optimists, and, among the latter, by *a priorists* and empiricists. Conversely, anti-liberals are necessarily anti-rationalists only in the sense of assigning low or negative value to the pursuit of knowledge; they need not doubt that objective knowledge is possible or that men tend to act reasonably or that political decisions ought to be taken rationally.

Popper's epistemological, empirical, ethical, and political views are on the whole most convincing and are supported by cogent and weighty arguments. They are strengthened by a thorough knowledge of modern logic and methodology of the physical sciences which most contemporary political thinkers lack. If the previous remarks seem unduly critical, it is because they were concerned almost exclusively with the *connections* which Popper alleges between the philosophical and political views he rightly holds and between those he rightly attacks.

Doctrines of normative ethics in general and of political ethics in particular are logically independent of theories of the possibilities and limits of knowledge. There may be historical and psychological relationships, but not the kind of functional dependence which Popper alleges. Popper is highly critical of both Hegel and Marx; between the two, however, his sympathies are all with the latter, not only because of Marx's ultimate (though utopian) humanitarian goal but also because of his emphasis on material factors in history. Yet Popper himself comes close to the Hegelian view of history as the history of ideas. "Our wars are fundamentally religious wars; they are wars between competing theories of how to establish a better world" (CR, 366). If these ethical views were causally dependent on epistemological ones, our wars would turn out to be fundamentally wars between theories of how to know the world. It is questionable whether wars, ours no less than previous ones, have been primarily contests between competing political doctrines or contests between competing powers using these doctrines as ideological weapons. Some may have been genuine wars between religions; they certainly were not wars between epistemologies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FREE

NO OBLIGATION Get Acquainted Offer

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

22nd year

America's Leading Quarterly on Russia
Past and Present

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW offers you quarterly a thorough, scholarly appraisal of developments in Russia found nowhere else. In the leading embassies of the free-world—in the libraries of the Universities with top Russian departments, the REVIEW is a fundamental source of reliable interpretation and information concerning Russia past and present. Every important work on Russia is here reviewed—its leading articles are by noted and expert observers of the Russian scene.

Editors and contributors include William Henry Chamberlin, H. H. Fisher, Richard Pipes, Gleb Struve, Dimitri von Mohrenschildt, Bertram Wolfe. Let us send you a current issue now—without obligation.

—— Mail coupon below ——

Box 146 THE RUSSIAN REVIEW Hanover, N.H.
Send me a FREE copy of THE RUSSIAN REVIEW with further details.

Name

Street

City Zone State

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code). 1. Date of filing: October 1, 1963. 2. Title of publication: *World Politics*. 3. Frequency of issue: 4 times annually. 4. Location of known office of publication: Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, Mercer, New Jersey (08540). 5. Location of headquarters or general business office of the publishers: William & Charlton Streets, Princeton, Mercer, New Jersey (08540). 6. Name and addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Publisher, Princeton University Press, William & Charlton Streets, Princeton, N.J. Editors, Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. Assistant editor, Jean MacLachlan, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 7. Owner: Princeton University Press (a non-profit corporation without stockholders). 8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: None. 10. A. Total number of copies printed (net press run): Average number of copies of each issue during preceding 12 months, 2,590; single issue nearest to filing date, 2,600. B. Paid circulation: (1) To term subscribers by mail, carrier delivery or by other means. Average number of copies of each issue during preceding 12 months, 2,098; single issue nearest to filing date, 2,208. (2) Sales through agents, news dealers, or otherwise: None. C. Free distribution by mail, carrier delivery, or by other means: Average number of copies of each issue during preceding 12 months, 111; single issue nearest to filing date, 115. D. Total number of copies distributed: Average number of each issue during preceding 12 months, 2,209; single issue nearest to filing date, 2,323. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. H. S. Bailey, Jr., Director, Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS PUBLISHED FOR THE

Center of International Studies

The Press and Foreign Policy

BY BERNARD C. COHEN. A pioneering study of the relationship between foreign policy and its reporting and evaluation in our newspapers, based on interviews with Washington correspondents of major news-gathering media and representatives of the foreign-policy sections of the U.S. government. It throws light on the constant struggle between officials who need to maintain secrecy for diplomatic purposes and reporters who wish to keep the American people informed. *October 1963. 304 pages. $6.00*

Nigerian Political Parties

Power in an Emergent African Nation

BY RICHARD L. SKLAR. The Federation of Nigeria symbolizes the African desire for unity and democratic self-government, but its cultural diversity, delicate constitutional balance, and highly competitive party system pose challenging problems. They are clarified by this study of Nigeria in the last phase of colonial rule, which uses firsthand observation, interviews, and party records to explore the question of power within the three major parties. *December 1963. 578 pages. $12.50*

Order from your bookseller, or from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, N.J.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED